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Abstract 
 
Water systems in the Sultanate of Oman are inevitably exposed to varied 
threats and hazards due to both natural and man-made hazards. Natural 
disasters, especially tropical cyclone Gonu in 2007, cause immense 
damage to water supply systems in Oman. At the same time water loss 
from leaks is a major operational problem. This research developed an 
integrated approach to identify and rank the risks to the water sources, 
transmission pipelines and distribution networks in Oman and suggests 
appropriate mitigation measures. The system resilience was evaluated 
and an emergency response plan for the water supplies developed. 
The methodology involved mining the data held by the water supply utility 
for risk and resilience determination and operational data to support 
calculations of non-revenue water. Risk factors were identified, ranked and 
scored at a stakeholder workshop and the operational information required 
was principally gathered from interviews. Finally, an emergency response 
plan was developed by evaluating the risk and resilience factors. 
The risk analysis and assessment used a Coarse Risk Analysis (CRA) 
approach and risk scores were generated using a simple risk matrix based 
on WHO recommendations. The likelihoods and consequences of a wide 
range of hazardous events were identified through a key workshop and 
subsequent questionnaires. The thesis proposes a method of translating 
the detailed risk evaluations into resilience scores through a methodology 
used in transportation networks. 
iv 
 
A water audit indicated that the percentage of NRW in Oman is greater 
than 35% which is similar to other Gulf countries but high internationally. 
The principal strategy for managing NRW used in the research was the 
AWWA water audit method which includes free to use software and was 
found to be easy to apply in Oman. The research showed that risks to the 
main desalination processes can be controlled but the risk due to feed 
water quality might remain high even after implementing mitigation 
measures because the intake is close to an oil port with a significant risk 
of oil contamination and algal blooms. The most severe risks to 
transmission mains were found to be associated with pipe rather than 
pump failure. The systems in Oman were found to be moderately resilient, 
the resilience of desalination plants reasonably high but the transmission 
mains and pumping stations are very vulnerable. 
The integrated strategy developed in this study has a wide applicability, 
particularly in the Gulf area, which may have risks from exceptional events 
and will be experiencing NRW. Other developing countries may also 
experience such risks but with different magnitudes and the risk evaluation 
tables could provide a useful format for further work. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 General Background 
Water is the most important and valuable resource not only for human life 
but also for all living things. Both the access to and the quality of drinking 
water affects public health, economic development and national well-being 
(IWA, 2004).  
 
Water supply utilities are required to fulfill water requirements both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, and in developing countries are, along with 
many utilities, operated by government organizations. In Oman for 
example, the Public Authority for Electricity and Water (PAEW) is a wholly 
public undertaking. Since water systems include several subsystems - 
sources, treatment plants, transmission, distribution networks, together 
with electricity and telecoms installations - there are many areas where 
undesired events may occur and cause harm (Beuken et al., 2008b). 
Consequently, there is a need to evaluate the urban water supply utilities 
in Oman, and assess and improve the resilience of drinking water supplies 
as part of long-term strategy to ensure service failures are close to zero 
and the service meets customers’ expectations. 
 
The impact of natural disasters on infrastructure including water supply 
systems can be considerable. In addition to natural hazards, the loss of a 
water service due to operational practices is a major concern with levels of 
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losses in Oman estimated at more than 40%, which is high by international 
standards (UNEP-IETC, 1999; Word Bank 2007; PAEW, 2010). High 
levels of water loss or Non Revenue Water (NRW) reflect the significant 
volumes of water lost through leaks and water not invoiced to customers. 
Such losses seriously affect the finances of the water utility through lost 
revenues and increased operational costs (McKenzie and Seago, 2005).  
 
High NRW levels normally indicate a poorly run water utility which lacks 
good governance, autonomy, accountability, and the technical and 
managerial skills necessary to provide a reliable service to its customers. 
The waste of resources resulting from high NRW levels in developing 
countries is considerable (Kingdom, et al. 2006) and at times of 
emergency or disaster, efficient water operators are imperative for the 
rapid return to normalcy.  
 
A natural disaster can cause contamination of water, breaks in pipelines, 
damage to structures, water shortages, and in extreme events, the 
collapse of the entire system (Beuken et al., 2008a; Nadebaum et al., 
2004). Depending on the level of preparedness that the water operator 
has adopted, repairs to systems can take days, weeks, or even months. 
The risk of damage to water systems increases dramatically with factors 
such as uncontrolled growth of urban areas, deficiencies in infrastructure, 
and, above all, the location of system components in areas that are 
vulnerable to natural hazards (Kwabena Sarpong and Mensah, 2006).  
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A holistic risk assessment and risk management approach, one which 
includes the entire drinking water system, from source to tap, is the most 
effective way to ensure a safe drinking water supply (WHO, 2008).There 
are strong parallels  between risk assessment  and management and the 
concept of resilience. As Blackmore et al. (2008) notes there are intuitive 
similarities between risk assessment and resilience concepts and it is 
therefore important to evaluate and assess the resilience of a system. The 
concept of resilience links strongly with risk management, but it is “a lesser 
function within the risk framework” (White, 2010) when defined as the 
ability of system to undergo change, while retaining functionality 
(Amarasinghe, 2014).The degree of resilience, which a system might 
require, also depends on risk and risk appetite (Howard, 2013). 
 
If such a system’s functions are compromised due to a change in 
circumstances, it may not be sufficiently resilient to cope with whatever 
change has caused the failure (Rance and Wade 2013; Johansen et. al. 
2014). Consequently, understanding the resilience of infrastructure or a 
service, requires an investigation of the systems required for its delivery 
and the risks associated with these systems (EPA, 2015). 
 
1.2 Risk Evaluation and Emergency Planning 
A risk assessment provides information so that well-informed decisions 
can be made. Water utilities must know the risk level to decide if risk-
reduction measures are required or not (Aven and Korte, 2003). Risks are 
4 
 
first analyzed and evaluated, and decisions are made in a subsequent 
step followed by risk-reduction measures and monitoring of the effects 
(IEC, 1995; Reekie, 2010; IPWEA, 2011). Risk analysis may be either 
qualitative or quantitative, depending on its purpose and the risk. Risk 
management priorities are determined by evaluating and comparing levels 
of risk against predetermined standards, target risk levels or other criteria 
(Almoussawi and Christian, 2005). If it is to be acceptable, it may be 
enough to control the risk instead of reducing it. However, if the risk is 
unacceptable, different risk reduction options have to be analyzed and 
compared so that the best can be identified (Rosen, et al., 2007). 
 
Improving the resilience of a water supply system requires understanding 
and planning for risks and increasing overall adaptability so that 
unforeseen changes can be dealt with (Carayannis, 2000). Examples of 
specific resilience-improving actions include preparing management or 
emergency plans, securing backup supplies, protecting water sources, 
improving infrastructure, and leakage management (Raouf, 2009).  
Emergency response management is another area where there is a clear 
overlap, particularly with the response element of resilience. Some 
sections of the literature focus entirely on this response element and how 
it can be assessed and improved in a complex system (for example Knott 
and Fox, 2010). Research in this field has been used to improve resilience 
by increasing the effectiveness of a system’s response to hazards (EPA, 
2015; Scottish Water, 2013; Tanali and Harrald, 2006; White, 2010). 
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This research tests and evaluates the effect of two particular stress factors 
on operating water supply systems in Oman; Non Revenue Water and, as 
an example of extreme event, a tropical cyclone. It further considers how 
the water service company might improve the resilience of drinking water 
supplies to extreme natural events and manmade hazards. The research 
involves identifying, understanding, managing, monitoring and 
communicating threats. The proposed emergency response to these 
threats is evaluated with regard to the risks to the water supply utilities in 
Oman and in the context of the financial resources available. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The water utilities in the study area (the Sultanate of Oman) face a 
number of problems, among which are; low coverage of water supply to 
households,  low service levels, high non revenue water, frequent pipeline 
bursts, problems with billing / revenue collection, and stopped or faulty 
water meters.  Oman is located on the northern Indian Ocean in a tropical 
cyclone zone and suffers from natural storms and cyclones that can cause 
major damage to structures and infrastructure such as water utilities. 
 
In June, 2007 a severe category four cyclone, ‘Gonu’, hit coastal Oman, 
with 213-232 km/h winds and heavy rainfall. High surface runoff, which in 
some areas exceeded three meters in depth, caused extensive flooding 
and substantial damage to critical infrastructure. Particularly severe 
damage was caused to the water distribution networks and water facilities. 
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The hurricane left thousands without a water service or with low water 
pressure for almost a month (Al Hattaly & Al-Kindy, 2008). 
 
Water loss is an extremely challenging problem in Oman which is a desert 
country. This is aggravated by the fact that there is a lack of technological 
expertise and equipment to deal with water loss in most water systems. 
Taking all challenges into account, better management of water resources 
in the country is extremely important and research is required to 
understand and to properly manage distribution systems (Thornton 2002). 
There is a lack of relevant literature and studies about Non-Revenue 
Water in desert countries and in particular Oman, and about the impacts of 
cyclones on drinking water facilities (Kingdom, et al. 2006). 
 
The emergency response to natural disasters should be appropriate, and 
problems associated with water lost through water distribution networks 
should be managed at an acceptable level (EPA, 2010).  The PAEW’s 
current emergency response regime is principally on resolving the causes 
of problems as quickly as possible and it does not take a long-term view. 
Equally, important aspects such as public information, alternative water 
supplies, contingency options for further reconfiguration of the network 
and rapid repair during extreme events are not given appropriate 
emphasis (James and Pavani, 2007; Tanali, and Harrald, 2006). 
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To summarize, water supply systems in Oman are exposed to a range of 
risks, both natural and man-made. There are risks to water supplies 
arising from operational practices, perhaps currently the most important 
being the leakage problem. However, new risk factors are certain to arise 
from for example, climate change, societal development and the 
emergence of new contaminants (UNESCO, 2012). To tackle these 
challenges, risks must be assessed and the results incorporated into a 
decision framework. This research identifies the problems and risk factors 
and recommends methods of analysis and assessment to improve the 
resilience of water supply systems in Oman and other desert countries. 
 
1.4  Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to bring an understanding of how resilience to 
various hazards (natural and manmade) in water supply systems can be 
developed in the Sultanate of Oman. The research developed an 
integrated approach to identifying the risks and assessing their impact on 
the source, transmission and distribution of water in Oman. To achieve the 
above aim a number of objectives were set: 
 
1) To identify and evaluate the financial impact posed by Non Revenue 
Water (NRW) and how this impact may be reduced, thus ensuring a more 
cost effective delivery of the water service. 
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2) To identify and estimate the risks associated with natural and manmade 
hazards to water supply utilities in Oman including desalination plants, 
transmission pipelines and water distribution network. 
 
3) To Identify and evaluate the risk factors on potable water facilities 
arising from natural events using tropical cyclone Gonu as a case study.  
 
4) To understand the level of risks to which the water infrastructure and 
hence wider society, is exposed and to determine how these risks may be 
reduced through effective measures of mitigation with the aim of improving 
the resilience of drinking water supplies. 
 
5) To develop a justified response plan for water related emergencies 
including the options available to improve PAEW’s response to managing 
emergencies.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured in accordance with the objectives and scope of 
work. There are eight chapters. 
 
Chapter One outlines the problem statement, research aim and 
objectives, scope of work, and structure of the thesis. Chapter Two 
deals with the theory and current practice of resilience of critical 
infrastructure, potential hazards to water systems and their impact, 
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tropical cyclones in the Arabian Sea, losses from water systems, risk 
assessment, risks to water facilities, and the emergency response plan. 
  
Chapter Three presents the research approach, research techniques, 
and the risk assessment methodology. Chapter Four presents basic 
data about the study area (Oman), the impact of the cyclone Gonu, a 
water audit of a part of the water distribution system (Al Seeb Wilayat) 
and information about wider regional water supply systems.  
 
Chapter Five is devoted to water audits and the background of the 
AWWA water audit tool, losses in the Al Seeb water supply system, 
results of a questionnaire survey and the strategy for reducing water 
losses. Chapter Six summarises and analyses risks and addresses 
potential mitigating measures, together with system resilience. 
  
Chapter Seven proposes a new emergency response plan which has 
been evaluated against the responses to cyclone Gonu and compares 
this new plan with the existing. Chapter Eight concludes on the three 
main threads of the work; resilience to risks, the financial impacts of Non 
Revenue Water, and the proposed new Emergency Response Plan. 
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Chapter 2   Literature Review 
 
The underpinning literature on the research reported in this thesis is 
reviewed in this chapter. There are three main threads to the work, Losses 
from Water Systems and Non-Revenue Water; Water System Risk and 
Resilience; and Emergency Planning. A general introduction to the 
research is followed by sections on each of the three threads. The relevant 
later chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) include additional consideration of 
further specific research texts. 
 
2.1 General Background 
Severe social, economic and ecological impacts may result when societies 
are unable to predict, adapt to, or respond to disruptions in the supply of 
water. WHO (2008) concludes that the most effective way to ensure safe 
drinking water supply is by means of a comprehensive risk assessment 
and risk management approach. Water demand for domestic, agricultural, 
commercial and industrial uses is significantly increasing worldwide and 
arid regions in particular have great challenges (Raouf, 2009). Securing 
water supplies and infrastructure is becoming of vital importance 
especially in areas with inadequate water supplies such as Oman (Raouf, 
2009). In addition to being a desert country, Oman is exposed to cyclones 
that cause damage to infrastructure and disruption of public services 
including water networks and there is concern that with climate change 
these problems will increase in frequency and severity. At the same time, 
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during routine operations, there are often service interruptions due to 
equipment failure and breaks in pipelines, which can cause severe 
disruption. The starting point of the research is a study of the losses in 
water network operations in an arid country and the stress factors 
influencing the resilience of the system to overcome such losses. 
  
2.2 Losses from Water Systems 
2.2.1 Overview 
Water lost from potable water distribution systems remains one of the key 
problem issues facing not only developing but also developed countries 
(McKenzie and Seago, 2005). The resource required for the development 
of infrastructure is lacking in most developing countries. This is 
aggravated by a lack of technological expertise and equipment to deal 
adequately with water loss in most water utilities, which further reduces 
the availability of adequate good quality water to consumers (Thornton, 
2002; Michel et al, 2012).  
 
Water loss rates in most cities in developing countries are in the range 
40-60% of the total water supply (Butler & Memon, 2006; UNEP-IETC, 
1999; Word Bank 2007).  While it is commonly accepted that no water 
network can avoid losing water throughout its path, it is of high priority to 
ensure that these level of losses are known and controlled and that they 
do not exceed the pragmatic level that is technically and economically 
manageable on given infrastructures. This is particularly true where the 
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production cost of water is high (as is the case in Oman through the 
necessity of using desalination plants), where there is the requirement of 
transporting water over long distances, where there is water scarcity, and 
where there are low income customers (PAEW, 2009; WHO, 2001). 
 
2.2.2 Definition of Non Revenue Water 
Non Revenue Water (NRW) is the difference between the volume of water 
input to a water distribution system and the volume that is billed to 
customers (IWA, 2004) and can be expressed in different ways: 
 The percentage of the water produced from the raw water source, which 
is not accounted for (MWAC, 1999). 
 The difference between water delivered to the distribution system and 
water sold (IWA, 2014). 
 An accumulated range of losses by a Water Utility when comparing the 
demand of a hydraulic water network with the quantity of water 
acknowledged as consumed by consumers (UNEP, 2000). 
 Lambert & Hirner (2000), go further, and define non revenue water, as 
the difference between the system input volume and billed authorized 
consumption. 
 
Although the above definitions seem to have differences, all have in 
common that they have taken the water produced and distributed to the 
system as an input and the water consumed or exported from the 
distribution system as output. In the local context, NRW is defined as the 
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difference between the amounts of treated water produced and supplied 
and the total amount of water billed and collected (IWA, 2014).  
 
Non-revenue water rates in different countries including Oman are 
summarized in Figure 2.1. It will be noted that, while the NRW rates in 
Oman are high, several other countries and cities have higher rates. 
 
Figure 2.1: Percentage of Non-Revenue Water 
 
Source: (IWSA,1991 Word Bank, 1997) 
 
2.2.3 Components of NRW and Water Losses 
IWA have developed a methodology (Mcintosh, 2003) for determining 
NRW in which all water that enters and leaves the distribution system can 
be classified as belonging to one of the categories in the water balance 
table shown in Figure 2.2. The three components are: physical (or real) 
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losses; commercial (or apparent) losses, and; unbilled authorized 
consumption. Each of these terms is defined below (Adu Yeboah, 2008). 
 
Figure 2.2: The IWA Best Practice Standard Water Balance 
 
Source: (Mcintosh, 2003)  
 
 Physical (or real) losses occur as a result of poor operations 
maintenance, the lack of active leakage control, and poor quality of 
underground assets and are “any leakage downstream of a production 
source and upstream of the consumer meter” (UNEP/IETC, 1999). 
 Commercial (or apparent Losses)  are  caused  by  customers’ 
meters recording low, data-handling errors, and theft of water; 
 Unbilled authorized consumption includes water used by the utility 
for operational purposes, for firefighting, and water provided for free to 
certain consumer groups. 
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The first two components constitute Water Loss (IWA, 2004, 2014). 
Normally the water loss indicators reflect the level of efficiency of 
management of the water supply system (Butler & Mamon, 2006). To be 
able effectively to reduce water loss, issues of technical, operational, 
institutional, planning, financial and administrative issues need to be 
coherently addressed (WHO, 2000 as cited in Butler and Mamon, 2006). 
 
2.2.4 IWA System of Performance Indicators  
Water supply systems are important and expensive core public assets and 
the primary objective of a water utility is to operate assets at their 
maximum possible efficiency with minimum cost. Performance indicators 
(PI) are useful when evaluating the efficiency (resilience) of all the 
components of the water supply system (Haider, et al. 2013). Various 
agencies and organizations worldwide have developed detailed 
performance evaluation frameworks including several indicators to cover 
all water system aspects including physical assets, staffing, operational, 
customer satisfaction, economic value (Alegre, et al, 2006). 
 
The IWA Performance Indicators System for water services is now 
recognized as a worldwide standard. Since it first appearance in 2000, the 
system has been widely quoted, adapted and used in a large number of 
projects both for internal performance assessment and metric 
benchmarking. It has proven to be adaptable and can be used in any 
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organization regardless of its size, nature or degree of complexity and 
development (Alegre, et al, 2006). The IWA PIs are grouped as follows: 
 Water resources (Wr) 
 Personnel (Pe) 
 Physical (Ph) 
 Operational (Op) 
 Quality of Service (QS) 
 Financial (Fi) 
 
Although the indicators, data and context information in the IWA system 
have been chosen to represent universal concepts that may be applied 
almost anywhere in the world, the system may be insufficient, incomplete 
or inappropriate in certain particular situations. However, it is possible to 
define a starting point as broad and general as possible that will enable 
users to develop their own compatible systems (Alegre, et al, 2006). In this 
research, some of the Operation (Op) and Finance (Fi) indicators are 
calculated as presented in chapter 5.  
 
2.2.5 Benefits of Reducing NRW 
NRW reduction and control is one area of demand management where the 
objective is to limit the demand for water services by users and continued 
water loss affects negatively on efforts to limit demand. In economic terms 
this can be translated as more efficient use of existing supplies which 
becomes an increasingly cost effective alternative to supply augmentation 
and management (Versteeg and Tolbom, 2003; Michel et al, 2012). 
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A programme for NRW reduction and control should significantly benefit 
the Authority both financially and operationally as the public see the efforts 
bearing fruit. Improved service, fewer leaks and extension of the 
distribution system are positive outcomes of reducing NRW. However, 
such a programme must be properly communicated so that the good work 
is not disruptive and is of long-term benefit (Motevallian et al, 2011). 
 
2.2.6 Causes of Water losses 
Leakage is usually the major component of water loss but this is not 
always the case in developing or partially developed countries, where 
illegal connections, meter error and accounting errors are often more 
significant  (Farley & Trow,  2003; WHO, 2001)). The several causes of 
increased NRW are; 
 
1) Leaks in Water Distribution Systems  
The causes of leaks vary depending on the nature of the soil, the 
quality of construction, the materials used, the pressure levels and the 
operating and maintenance practices of the utility (AWWA, 1987). 
Leakage is often a significant source of NRW and is a result of either lack 
of maintenance or failure to renew ageing systems. Poor management of 
pressure zones, resulting in pipe or pipe-joint failure, may also cause it. 
Although some leakage may go unnoticed for a long time, detection of 
visible leakage requires good reporting which also needs public 
participation (Motevallian and Tabesh, 2011). 
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2) Pressure and leakage  
Pressure in a pipe system on the one hand contributes to the increase of 
leakage, which increases with pressure, and on the other hand, low-
pressure systems suffer from a shortage of water causing unequal 
distribution of water among consumers. Pressure variation in a 
distribution network is also caused by changes in the demand by users 
(Kamani et al, 2012). Pressure reducing valves (PRVs) which throttle 
automatically are installed where high downstream pressures could cause 
damage (Walski et al., 2003; Ranhill, 2011).  
 
3) Age of pipes  
Pipe age and material are important factors contributing to the burst 
probability of pipes that as a result cause much water loss. However, as this 
information is not readily available especially for older pipes, it is usually 
estimated using the history of the urban development. There is a 
general correlation between the age of a system and the amount of NRW. 
Newer systems may have as little as 5 percent leakages, while older 
systems may have 40 percent or higher (Walski et al., 2003).  
 
4) Effects of corrosions  
Corrosion occurs in mild steel and ductile iron pipelines where they are in 
continuous contact with water or moist soil where they must be protected 
by coatings with corrosive resistant materials (Morrison et al, 2011). 
The majority of breaks in mains occur at locations where the metal pipe 
wall has been weakened due to corrosion.  
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5) Meter error and water loss  
Under-registration of customer meters also contributes to NRW as does 
the age of meters. Customer meter errors can be due to accounting 
procedures and under or over-registration of the metering units. Where 
customers are served by way of roof tanks, the probability of customer 
meter under-registration is increased because of the tendency for a greater 
part of the consumption to pass through the meter at rates less than the 
minimum flow for the meter (Lambert, 2003).  
 
2.2.7 Strategies for Dealing with Water Losses 
The starting point in addressing water losses in any water utility is to 
understand the network of the utility (Butler & Mamon 2006). These 
authors suggest that certain questions should be posed about the water 
utility; (i) how much water is being lost? (ii) where is it being lost from?, (iii) 
why is it being lost? This research addresses the first and last of these 
points. Two tools for water audits and network reviews respectively, 
enable priority areas to identified and tackled (Thornton 2002). 
 
After decreasing the level of leakage to a satisfactory rate, a continuous 
monitoring system must be implemented that permanently assesses the 
performance of the system and identifies areas where problems are likely 
in future. Computer simulation of the hydraulic system, with related 
techniques and instrumentation, also helps significantly at this stage 
(Covas & Ramos, 2000).  
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2.2.8 Assessment of Water Losses (Water Audit) 
2.2.8.1 The Importance of a Water Audit 
The objective of a water audit (Ganorkar et al., 2013) is to determine the 
amount of water lost from a system due to pipe leakage, overflows, losses 
due to metering errors, un-authorized connections and free water supplied 
at public standpipes. Water audits provide a rational, scientific framework 
that categorizes all water used in the system. It is a most effective tool for 
water management and with its help the water utility can identify and 
quantify what steps can be taken to reduce water use and losses (MDE, 
2013). In the context of the prevailing problem in Oman, the water audit 
becomes an inevitable activity. Thus, it is a tool to identify the wastage 
of public money due to the water loss and un-authorized connections 
(Ganorkar et al, 2013) based on measurements or estimations of water 
produced, imported, exported, used and lost. 
 
2.2.8.2 Water Audit Methodology and Software 
A number of different approaches to water audits have been developed, 
several by the American Water Works Association (AWWA) (IWA, 2000; 
Adu Yeboah, 2008; Butler & Mamon, 2006). All fall short by categorizing 
a portion of the supply as unaccounted for water. Not only is this term 
inconsistently defined, it has frequently fallen prey to manipulation, with 
many utilities arbitrarily quoting an “unaccounted for percentage” 
without the means to validate the source of data.  
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It is found that AWWA methodology and software (AWWA, 2010) is the 
most appropriate approach that are used in many places in the world 
(Puusta et. al. 2010; Mutikanga et. al. 2011) and it was selected as the 
most applicable for application for this research since; 
 It is based on a standard water balance 
 It is capable of analyzing the different categories of losses, revenue and 
non-revenue water and other parameters.  
 The software runs under excel Microsoft office with number of work 
sheets.  
 
2.3 Resilience of Critical Infrastructure 
This section addresses the issue of resilience. It might be considered 
premature to cover this topic prior to considering the more detailed 
aspects of risk and its determination since definitions of risk are covered in 
section 2.4 However, the concept of resilience covers broad issues 
including organization and governance and is addressed first. 
 
2.3.1 Overview  
Drinking water security is the ability to access an adequate amount of 
good quality water to support human health, the economy and the 
environment. It also means protecting drinking water from a wide variety of 
hazards including natural disasters, climate change, terrorist attacks and 
other manmade hazards (EPA, 2015). 
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The delivery of clean, reliable and secure water services relies on there 
being enough treatment capacity to satisfy consumer requirement. It also 
relies on the assets, such as treatment works, pumping stations and 
transmission and distribution pipes being maintained to a level that 
ensures services are not affected during normal, planned operation 
conductions (OFWAT, 2010). A water company should have to manage its 
system during and after extreme events such as cyclones, floods and 
droughts by providing appropriate levels of protection to consumers, this 
being termed resilience (OFWAT 2010). 
 
The concept of resilience informs the ability of a system to undergo 
change, while retaining functionality (Amarasinghe, 2014). Furthermore, 
resilience as a concept highlights characteristics such as the ability of a 
system to absorb pressures or disturbances, and re-organize itself. 
Resilience is considered to be the ultimate objective of hazard mitigation, 
that is, ‘action taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and 
property from hazards and their effects’ (Godschalk, 2002). While there 
are numerous definitions for resilience in the literature, the most relevant 
to this study is; "resilience is the ability of assets, networks and systems to 
anticipate, absorb, adapt to and / or rapidly recover from a disruptive 
event" (Cabinet Office, 2011). 
 
Since resilience is of particular concern to water utilities many have 
developed resilience criteria. These include Scottish Water (2013) which 
lists the following key resilience factors; 
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 Ensuring critical assets are secure; 
 Achieving the necessary levels of duplication and reliability; 
 Improved response to customers’ needs; 
 Improving drought resilience ; 
 Managing demand through leakage management; 
 Reducing the risk of failure of critical assets; 
 Improving response to short term interruptions to supply;  
 Ensuring customers have an adequate water pressure; and 
 Developing response and recovery plans for extreme events; 
 
Since the present research emphasizes the resilience of water supply 
systems in Oman as operated by the Public Authority for Electricity and 
Water (PAEW), the following section presents the components of 
infrastructure resilience, resilience of water supply systems, and the 
relation between resilience and risk management of particular interest to 
this research. 
 
2.3.2 Resilience of Water Supply Systems 
The resilience of water supply systems to natural disasters and other 
hazards implies a continuous cycle of planning and preparedness 
activities (Blackmore 2009), response and recovery actions following an 
adverse event (Rance and Wade 2013), adapting (Johansen et. al. 2014) 
and changing to be better prepared for future events based on lessons 
learned (EPA, 2015). Much has been written about the resilience of 
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drinking water systems to natural disasters (Copeland 2006; Béné et. al. 
2012), terrorist attacks (Little 2004) and other emergencies (ASCE, 2008; 
ANSI, 2010; USEPA, 2011 and 2012) providing useful information on 
preparedness, response and recovery, case studies and lessons learned, 
and water sector specific tools.  
 
One of the challenges to using the concept of resilience is determining 
how it may be quantified. With limited resources, water utilities must make 
decisions about which preparedness and adaptation activities will most 
improve their resilience (EPA, 2015). Measures of resilience would help in 
prioritizing such decision-making; however, satisfactory measures or 
indicators of resilience are not currently available. As described in 
McAllister (2013), resilience performance goals and quantitative metrics 
are needed that can be used to support risk-based decision-making for 
water systems. 
 
The Cabinet Office explains that resilience is the sum of four main system 
characteristics shown in Figure 2.3: resistance, reliability, redundancy and 
response (Cabinet Office, 2011). Resistance is specific protection such as 
floodwalls, redundancy consists of spare capacity such as backup 
systems, and reliability consists of designing system components such 
that they can operate in a wide range of circumstances. Response activity 
consists of emergency plans, and ensuring the right corporate culture and 
skills exist to be able to react in the event of a hazard. 
25 
 
Figure 2.3: The Components of Infrastructure Resilience 
 
Source: Cabinet Office (2011) 
 
In building resilience, the contribution made by each of these four 
components is considered since each can be utilized or adapted to 
different levels. Given the range of risks, organizations should select 
combinations of responses from all four components to develop a strategy 
that will deliver the most cost effective and proportionate risk management 
response to hazards and threats (Cabinet Office, 2011). 
 
Hence the resilience of infrastructure is provided through (a) good design 
of the network and systems to ensure it has the necessary resistance, 
reliability and redundancy (spare capacity), and (b) by establishing good 
organizational resilience to provide the ability, capacity and capability to 
respond and recover from disruptive events. The latter is gained through 
business operations and appropriate support for business continuity 
management as shown in Figure 2.4 (Cabinet Office, 2011). 
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Figure 2.4: Continuous Cycle of Building Resilience to Hazards 
 
Source: EPA, (2015). 
 
2.3.3 Enhancing the Resilience of Water Systems 
Preparedness involves anticipating risks and planning mitigation 
strategies. The Recovery Practices Primer for Natural Disasters (ASCE, 
2008) and Welter (2009) provide guidance on preparedness and hazard-
specific guidance for natural disasters. Le Chevalier and Chelius (2014) 
suggest resiliency planning should include: renewing aging infrastructure, 
planning for operational continuity, combining new operational solutions 
with capital improvements, and practicing emergency response plans. 
Several authors have a joint focus on building resilience of the water and 
energy sectors (Johnson Foundation, 2013; Ajami and Truelove, 2014). 
 
Several authors provide guidance for water utilities on enhancing 
preparedness to different hazards (ASCE, 2008, and Welter, 2009). The 
CIPAC Workgroup (2009) helps to build resilience of water utilities by 
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identifying specific actions that will mitigate the consequences of 
hazardous events by grouping the potential consequences of hazardous 
events into categories: loss of power, loss of communication, loss of 
supervisory control and data acquisition, service disruption, reduced 
workforce, contamination incidents, and economic disruptions. For each of 
these consequences, specific preparedness and response and recovery 
actions are identified.    
 
For a complex water system, Chang and Shinozuka (2004) noted that 
robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity enhance the 
resilience of a system. They identify different actions that can be taken in 
order to enhance systemic resilience including: increase of storage, 
strengthening the capacity of water treatment plants to treat lower quality 
water, providing alternative sources, and building an efficient management 
strategy. These actions have been included in the mitigation measures 
and solutions that have been considered in this study to mitigate risks and 
enhance resilience of water systems in Oman.  
 
2.3.4 Water System Resilience Tools 
A number of tools have been developed to help water utilities improve 
their resilience. The CBWR tool (USEPA, 2011) provides over 400 
targeted resources to help local communities plan for and respond to 
drinking water emergencies and includes a resiliency self-assessment tool 
which evaluates a water utility’s resilience in terms of outreach to 
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interdependent sectors, dedication of resources, security enhancements, 
vulnerability assessments and emergency response plans. It addresses 
contaminant detection, incident command system training, mutual aid 
assistance agreements, participation in local emergency response 
planning, and long-term climate change planning. 
 
Another EPA resilience tool is The Risk Analysis and Management for 
Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) standard for risk and resilience 
management of drinking water and wastewater Systems (ANSI, 2010). 
Different strategies may be classified as countermeasures (ones that can 
reduce vulnerability or threat) or consequence mitigating actions (ones 
that reduce consequences). The strategies can then be ranked by the 
amount that they reduce risk for the water utility, summed up across all 
threat-asset pairs.  
 
The Argonne National Laboratory Resilience Index (Fisher, 2010) 
measures the resilience of critical infrastructure including drinking water 
and wastewater systems. It combines more than 1,500 variables into a 
composite index that measures robustness, recovery and resourcefulness 
and produces an overall score from 0 (low resilience) to 100 (high 
resilience). In contrast to the RAMCAP tool, this index is designed for 
national authorities, the single index allowing national comparison of water 
systems to help prioritize funding and assistance. 
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The three tools outlined above were evaluated and it was decided (5) to 
use an approach similar to the CBWR and RAMCAP tools which 
concentrate on natural disasters and traditional utility challenges such as 
loses due to pipe breaks, and poor water quality. This is in contrast with 
many tools which focus on climate change scenarios while the others 
concentrate in threats from different issues and the factors that affecting 
community and environmental health (USEPA, 2011). It is considered that 
the CBWR / RAMCAP approach is best because of the amount of support 
resource material available and its relative ease of use and its match with 
the available data. 
 
2.3.5 Hazards, Risks and Resilience 
Risk management is a process of identifying, understanding, managing, 
controlling, monitoring and communicating risk while resilience is very 
closely related to the fields of risk assessment of management (Cabinet 
Office, 2011). Effective risk management is the key to facilitating and 
building resilience and the effectiveness of the four components of 
resilience (Resistance, Reliability, Redundancy and Response/ Recovery) 
can be assessed using the Resilience Cycle shown in Figure 2.5. Key to 
building resilience is the governance of, and attitudes to, risk and 
resilience within an organization. The resilience cycle emphasizes the 
need for continuous re-evaluation of resilience in the face of changing 
risks and the importance of sharing information between stakeholders. 
This is particularly important when assessing climate change risks and 
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adaptation options, since knowledge of climate predictions, and hence 
climate risk to service, will change over time (Cabinet Office, 2011). 
 
Figure 2.5: Resilience Cycle for Infrastructure 
 
Source: Cabinet Office (2011). 
 
Anticipating and managing risk is one-step towards increasing resilience to 
hazards. Disaster risk is “the potential for adverse effects from the 
occurrence of a particular hazardous event, which is derived from the 
combination of physical hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities” (NAS, 
2012). Risk is normally calculated as the product of the likelihood of a 
specific hazard and the consequences of that hazard and is addressed in 
more detail in section 2.4. Sometimes, the likelihood is expressed as the 
product of the vulnerability and the threat. Understanding risk enables 
informed decision making about how to reduce risk (either the likelihood or 
consequences) and increase resilience (EPA, 2015). 
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Building on the work of Klein (2003) and others, resilience can be defined 
as a measure of the ability of a system to absorb changes whilst 
performing its intended functions. If such a system’s functions are 
compromised due to a change in circumstances, it may be deemed not 
resilient enough to cope with whatever the change was that caused the 
failure. The concept of resilience links strongly with risk management, but 
that it is “a lesser function within the risk framework” (White, 2010).  
 
The degree of resilience which a system might require depends on risk 
and risk appetite (Howard, 2013). To investigate the resilience of a service 
therefore requires an investigation of the systems required for the delivery 
of that service and the risks associated with these systems including the 
infrastructure networks themselves, practices and procedures of the 
operators, critical external dependencies and institutional arrangements.  
 
The Community and Regional Resilience Institute’s (CARRI) definition of 
resilience helps to pull all of these concepts together: resilience means the 
ability of a system to anticipate risk; limit affects, and bounce back rapidly 
(CARRI, 2014). Anticipating risk means identifying and understanding the 
risks of potential hazards to a system. Limiting impacts means enhancing 
preparedness, implementing risk management strategies, and reducing 
vulnerabilities. Bouncing back rapidly means ensuring the ability to 
respond and recover rapidly through training, planning, and building 
flexibility and adaptability into the organization.  
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2.3.6 A Methodology for using Risk Scores to Understand 
Resilience in Water Systems 
Definitions of risks are covered in section 2.4 of this thesis. Several 
approaches to converting risk scores into estimates of resilience were 
investigated (Hughes and Healy, 2014; Perry, 2013; FAO, 2013) but none 
were found to be specific to the problem being considered and the 
procedure developed by Hughes and Healy (2014) for application in 
transportation infrastructure was adapted for this purpose. To investigate 
the resilience of a service therefore requires an investigation of the 
systems required for the delivery of that service and the risks associated 
with these systems. Understanding risk enables informed decision making 
about how to reduce risk and increase resilience (EPA, 2015). 
 
Logically, assessing resilience requires a comprehensive risk assessment 
relating to the system under discussion to be undertaken by developing an 
understanding of what the threats to that system are and what mitigates 
should be exist which help deal with those risks. A comprehensive risk 
assessment should therefore be a ‘resilience approach’ as Blackmore et 
al. (2008) define it. Consequently, the output of the risk assessment would 
determine the ‘desired’ level of resilience. 
 
Based on the results of a risk assessment, the resilience of a system can 
be evaluated and the resultant risk score is translated to a level of 
resilience. Hughes and Healy (2014) used a simple scoring method to 
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generate a resilience score from descriptions of the risks in a 
transportation system. Their procedure converts the risk into a four scale 
resilience score;  
1 Low resilience: The risks to the system are significant or extreme. 
2 Moderate resilience: The risks to the system are major. 
3 High resilience: The risks to the system are acceptable. 
4 Very high resilience: The risks to the system are very low.  
 
The information presented here is applied to the water networks in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
 
2.3.7  Potential Hazards to Water Systems and Their Impacts 
This section overviews the impacts of natural events on drinking water 
facilities and the ongoing efforts required to assess damages and the 
needs to repair and reconstruct damaged systems. Drinking water 
systems are subject, to a greater or lesser degree, to both natural and 
manmade hazards that are common in the Gulf Coast region of the USA 
(Gleick, 1996; Annerberg, 2009). It is a priority for such services to operate 
optimally, since a significant degradation of their quality can affect most of 
the population (WHO, 2005). 
 
Even during routine operations, there may be service interruptions due to 
equipment failure, breaks in pipelines, and rationing due to lack of water. 
Factors such as uncontrolled growth in urban areas, deficiencies in 
infrastructure, and, most importantly, the location of system components in 
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areas that are vulnerable to natural hazards all increase the risk of 
damage to water systems in disasters. Operation and maintenance 
organizations are required to have strategies directed at reducing the 
vulnerability of the systems and providing the best possible response once 
an emergency arises (WSDH, 2003; Michel et al, 2012). The emergency 
plan (considered in detail in Chapter 7 of this thesis) should establish the 
necessary procedures to mobilize existing resources quickly and 
effectively, and, if necessary, request outside assistance in order best to 
react to the effects of hazards.  
 
2.3.8 Types of Disasters and their Effects 
Disasters are mostly caused by natural phenomena, even if many of their 
consequences are attributable to human actions or negligence. Natural 
disasters can be of two types: sudden onset, as in the case of 
earthquakes and gradual onset, as in the case of drought (PAHO, 2002).  
 
2.3.8.1 Earthquakes 
Earthquakes are one of the most serious hazards, given their enormous 
destructive potential, the extent of areas affected, and the impossibility of 
forecasting their occurrence. The significance and type of damage relate 
to the magnitude of the earthquake and the area covered, the degree to 
which buildings and infrastructure are seismic resistant, and the quality of 
soil where structures are located (Robert et. al. 1997). Although Oman is 
in a low risk earthquake zone, the possibility of one’s occurrence is real 
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and earthquakes are considered here so that extreme possibilities are 
seen to be considered. The types of damages that an earthquake can 
inflict on water supply systems as given by; (Shi and O’Rourke, 2008; 
Javanbarg and Takada, 2010) are; 
 
 Total or partial destruction of intake, transmission, treatment, and / 
or distribution systems; 
 Rupture of transmission and distribution pipes and damage to joints 
between pipes or tanks, with consequent loss of water; 
 Interruption of electric power, communications, and access; 
 Deterioration of quality due to landslides and other phenomena; 
 Reduction in yields from groundwater sources and flow in surface 
water sources; 
 Changes in the exit point of groundwater or in the phreatic level; 
 In coastal areas, inland flood damage due to the impact of 
tsunamis. Introduction of salt water into coastal aquifers. 
 
2.3.8.2 Hurricanes  
Depending on wind speeds, hurricanes (known locally as cyclones) are 
tropical depressions (winds up to 63 km/h accompanied by changes in 
atmospheric pressure), tropical storms (winds between 64 and 119 km/h 
accompanied by intense rainfall), or hurricanes (wind speeds of 120 km/h 
or higher, accompanied by heavy rainfall and significant changes in 
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atmospheric pressure) (PAHO, 1998, 2002). The Saffir-Simpson scale 
includes five categories, as shown in Table 2.1 (Simpson, 1974).     
 
Table 2.1: Saffir-Simpson Scale 
Saffir-Simpson 
Category 
Maximum Sustained  
Wind Speed 
Height of 
Waves Potential 
Damage 
(m/s) (km/h) (m) 
1 32.7- 42.6 118- 153 1.0 to 1.7 Minimal 
2 42.7- 49.5 154- 178 1.8 to 2.6 Moderate 
3 49.6- 58.5 179- 210 2.7 to 3.8 Extensive 
4 58.6- 69.4 211- 250 3.9 to 5.6 Extreme 
5 ≥69.5 ≥251 ≥5.7 Catastrophic 
Source: (Simpson, 1974)  
 
Hurricanes can cause major damage to structures and infrastructure 
exposed to flooding and high winds. The potential damage is directly 
related to wind speed, height of waves, rainfall and exposure including 
damage to power lines and infrastructure located near waterways; 
damage to homes and an increase in precipitation that may give rise to 
severe flooding. 
 
In general, drinking water facilities are badly affected by the Hurricanes 
(PAHO, 2002; Copeland, 2006; Malam, 2010). The most common effects 
of hurricanes on drinking water systems include: 
 Partial or total destruction of buildings, broken windows, roof 
damage, flooding; 
 Ruptures of pipelines in exposed crossings over rivers and streams; 
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 Breaks of pipes in mountainous terrain as a result of landslides and 
water erosion; 
 Damage to elevated and ground-level tanks; 
 Contamination of water in tanks and pipes; 
 Breaks in pipelines and structural failure because of settling earth; 
 Damage to electrical transmission and distribution systems resulting 
in the interruption in operation of equipment, instruments, and 
communication. 
 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 is well researched and documented and is used 
here to illustrate the risks associated with tropical storms. Hurricane 
Katrina was the costliest and one of the top five most deadly hurricanes in 
the history of the United States (National Hurricane Center 2006; Knabb et 
al, 2006). It was the deadliest Hurricane since 1928 with hundreds missing 
and causing at least 1,836 lives to be lost in the hurricane and subsequent 
floods In addition, 450,000 were displaced and over 200,000 never 
returned to their city (Seed, et al, 2006). 
 
Much of the water system of Greater New Orleans area was completely 
wiped out, and in the entire area affected by the hurricane, over 1,200 
water systems and 200 wastewater systems were affected. About 40% of 
these systems were up and running again within two weeks but a full 
month after the storm only 85% of water systems were fully operational, 
many of which were still operating on boil water notices (Copeland, 2005). 
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In addition to the damage to city systems, in the state of Louisiana, 23% of 
drinking water and 29% of waste-water facilities were inoperable after the 
storm, all of which were located within 100 kilometer of the coastline 
(Muthuramalingam, 2005). Direct physical damage and extended power 
outages affected both the ability to treat and distribution of water 
throughout the area (Ram et al, 2007).  
 
The two largest drinking water plants serving New Orleans were 
completely underwater for at least two weeks after the storm and even 
after they were repaired to allow for flow for fire-fighting, toilet flushing, and 
showers, they did not provide potable water for over a month. For a 
population used to the comfort of a faucet in their own home, this sudden 
termination of water treatment can be very dangerous to health. Where the 
population has little concept of the dangers of unsanitary water or 
knowledge of alternative methods of sanitation, these deficits will 
inevitably lead to increased negative health effects and possibly outbreaks 
of waterborne infectious disease notices (Copeland, 2005).  
 
2.3.8.3 Floods  
Floods are the result of excessive rainfall resulting from hurricanes, 
unusually high sea levels or the rupture of dams and dikes (PAHO, 1998, 
2002; Haraguchi and Lall, 2013). Increasingly, floods result from human 
activity causing environmental degradation, deforestation, and 
inappropriate land use. On the other hand, some floods are the result of 
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the geomorphology and climatology of water catchment areas. The 
magnitude of the effects of floods is principally related to the level reached 
by the water, its speed, and the geographical area covered.  
 
The most common impacts of floods are (PAHO, 1998, 2002): 
 Damage or destruction of housing built close to waterways; 
 The flooding of urban areas, even entire cities, built in low−lying areas, 
affecting the economy and the provision of services; 
 Accumulation of water in low−lying areas, creating breeding 
opportunities for disease carrying insects. 
 
The main impact of flood on drinking water and sewerage systems can be 
summarized as follows (Attari and Rashidi, 2009; Fritz et al, 2007):  
 Total or partial destruction of intakes located in rivers or ravines; 
 Sedimentation, resulting in silting up of intakes and reservoirs; 
 Loss of intakes because of changes in the course of rivers; 
 Breaks where exposed pipe crosses ravines and/or rivers; 
 Contamination of the watershed; 
 Damage to pumping equipment; 
 Indirect effects such as interruption of electricity and communications, 
and road blockages. 
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2.3.9 Man-made Hazards 
Man-made hazards are defined as conditions of potential danger or risk to 
life and health or property resulting from acts of man and use of 
technology. They arise from deliberate human actions (e.g., war, terrorism, 
emergencies, etc.) that are usually predictable and preventable and from 
the unforeseen or unexpected consequences of human development and 
technology, for example, nuclear weapons, industrial accidents, etc. 
(Carayannis, 2000). Disasters in water utility operations may also occur 
due to neglect and/or failure to properly institute and adhere to 
maintenance procedures and manmade hazards may result in multiple 
impacts to water systems (EPA, 2015). 
 
2.4 Risk Assessment and Management 
2.4.1 Water Safety Plans 
The World Health Organization (WHO, 2008), concluded that a holistic risk 
assessment and risk management approach which including the entire 
drinking water system, from source to tap, is the most effective way to 
ensure a safe drinking water supply. Methods and tools available today, 
and possible future methods and tools, provide better means than 
previously for assessing risk and providing useful decision support 
regarding risk issues (Andreas, 2010). The purpose a Water Safety Plan 
(WSP) is to assess the entire water system, identify possible hazards and 
plan how to monitor and operate the system so that risks are controlled.  
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The WSP approach is a risk management strategy that aims consistently 
to ensure the safety and acceptability of a drinking water supply (Bartram 
et al., 2009).  These authors have suggested that WSP is used to 
determine whether the drinking water system is capable of delivering 
water that meets the health-based target and should include system 
assessment, monitoring and management plans as shown in Figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.6: The Framework for Safe Drinking Water 
 
Source: (WHO, 2008) 
 
The purpose of the WSP is to assess the entire drinking water system in a 
given area to identify possible hazards and set up plan how to monitor and 
operate the water system so that the risks are controlled (WHO, 2008). 
The assessment should include the complete system (from source to tap) 
and interactions between all elements in the system. The monitoring 
processes allows the assessment of control measures for better 
assurance that the system is functioning properly. However, management 
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plans should be adopted to document and communicate relevant 
information of the water system. WHO (2008) suggests that risk ranking 
should be a part of WSPs (Bartram et al., 2009). 
 
2.4.2 Risk Definition 
In the methodology adopted (MHLS, 2010), the probabilities of occurrence 
of a particular event are typically defined as small, medium, large or very 
large. Similarly, the consequences of the same occurrence are described 
as small, medium, large and very large and the risk is expressed as a 
combination of the probability and consequence of each hazard (event): 
 
          Risk = Likelihood × Consequence                                               (2.1) 
 
The Likelihood is the chance that a hazard will actually compromise 
drinking water quality or quantity and pose a public health threat while the 
consequence is the combination of the severity, nature, and duration of an 
event, the proportion of the population affected, and type of health 
consequences. The results are normally arranged in a risk matrix. (MHLS, 
2010). 
 
2.4.3 Risk Assessment 
A risk assessment provides information so that well-informed decisions 
can be made (Aven and Korte, 2003). Water utilities are interested in 
knowing the risk level to decide if risk-reduction measures are required or 
not. If the risk level is unacceptable, possible measures need to be 
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evaluated to determine what alternative is most suitable. Hence, risk 
assessments are initiated by an underlying decision problem. Since it is 
not possible to eliminate all risks, an acceptable risk level must be 
obtained by balancing risks, benefits and cost. Risk assessment is thus 
closely linked to decision-making and it is common to combine risk 
assessment and decision analysis. 
 
Risks are first analyzed and evaluated, and decisions are made in a 
subsequent step followed by risk-reduction measures and monitoring of 
the effects (IEC, 1995; Reekie, 2010, IPWEA, 2011). Risk management is 
an iterative process which means that the work should be continuously 
updated and that there are no strict boundaries between the steps. 
Furthermore, risk and related aspects need to be communicated between 
decision-makers, scientists, the general public and other stakeholders 
since risk management aims to protect humans and what is considered of 
value to humans.  
 
TECHNEAU (2005) promotes the integration of risk assessments of the 
separate parts in drinking water supplies into a comprehensive decision 
support framework for cost-efficient risk management in safe and 
sustainable drinking water supply as illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.7: Integrated Risk Assessment and Risk Management of a Water 
Supply System 
 
 
 Source: (Rosen, et al., 2007) 
 
2.4.4 Risk Management Process 
2.4.4.1 Introduction 
Although some differences can be found in the literature regarding the 
presentation and outline of the process, there is a strong consensus 
regarding the major topics in risk management. The outline shown in 
Figure 2.8 is commonly used and is often quoted (EPA, 2008). 
 
Risk management also includes risk monitoring and follow up during 
operations. It is an iterative process of continuous updating as new 
information becomes available and as the preconditions change. 
Successful risk management also requires communication of risks 
between the various involved stakeholders (IRR, 1996). 
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Figure 2.8: The Risk Management Process 
 
Source: (IEC,1995) 
 
2.4.4.2 Assessment of Risk 
The risk associated with each hazard may be described by identifying the 
likelihood of occurrence (e.g. ‘certain’, ‘possible’, ‘rare’) and evaluating the 
severity of consequences if the hazard occurred (e.g. ‘insignificant’, major’, 
‘catastrophic’). The potential impact on public health is the most important 
consideration, but other factors such as aesthetic effects, continuity, 
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adequacy of supplies, and the reputation of the utility should also 
considered (WHO, 2009). 
 
2.4.4.3 Risk Analysis  
Risk analysis is a major part of risk assessment and management and 
may be either qualitative or quantitative, depending on its purpose and the 
risk. The analysis may also be semi-quantitative, which is something 
between a quantitative and qualitative analysis (Rosen, et al., 2007). 
When analyzing risks it is important to choose which endpoints or 
consequences to include and also to decide which measures to use since 
that the choice of one measure or another can make a technology look 
more or less risky Slovic (2001), 
 
A simplified qualitative approach (Table 2.2) relies on the expert judgment 
of the water safety plan team. A small water supply may only require a 
team decision, whereas a more complex system may benefit from a semi-
quantitative risk prioritization approach.  The ranking table developed by 
WHO (WHO, 2009) takes into account the quantitative and semi-
quantitative approach and provides estimation of likelihood/ frequency and 
severity/consequence of an event as shown in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.2: Semi-quantitative Risk Matrix Approach  
(from Deere et al., 2001) 
 
According to WHO (2009) a 5x5 risk matrix is satisfactory for scoring and 
prioritizing risks with variable scoring ratios to separate high, medium and 
low risks. The use of a basic non-scoring 3x3 risk matrix (high, medium 
and low) is not helpful because most risks end up in the medium category 
and have to be reprioritized. An example is shown in Table 2.3, although 
each system must be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
Likelihood 
or 
Frequency  
Vulnerability  
 
 
Rating 
Insignificant 
or no impact 
Minor 
complian
ce impact 
Moderate 
aesthetic 
impact 
Major 
regulatory 
impact 
Catastrophic 
public health 
impact 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Almost 
certain / 
Once a day 
(5) 5 10 15 20 25 
Likely / 
Once a 
week 
(4) 4 8 12 16 20 
Moderate / 
Once a 
month 
(3) 3 6 9 12 15 
Unlikely / 
Once a year 
(2) 2 4 6 8 10 
Rare / Once 
every 5 
years 
(1) 1 2 3 4 5 
Risk Score < 6 6-9 10-15 > 15 
Risk Rating Low Medium High Very high 
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Table 2.3: Risk Table Developed by WHO (2009) 
High Risk ≥ 20 
Medium Risk 10-19 
Low Risk ˂ 10 
Consequence 
Wholesome 
Water 
Short term or 
locallised, not 
health related 
non compliance 
or aesthetic 
Widespread 
aesthetic issues or 
no long term non 
compliance not 
health related 
Potential 
long term 
health effects 
Potential 
illness 
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
1 2 4 8 16 
L
ik
e
lh
o
o
d
 
Has not happan in the past 
and it is highly inmprobable 
that it will happan in the 
future 
Most Unlikely 
1 1 2 4 8 16 
Is possible and cannot be 
ruled out completely 
Unlikely 
2 2 4 8 16 32 
Is possible and under certain 
circumstance could happan 
Forseeable 
3 3 6 12 24 48 
Has occurred in the past and 
hasthe potential to happan 
again 
Very Likely 
4 4 8 16 32 64 
Has occurred in the past and 
could happen again 
Almost 
Certain 
5 5 10 20 40 80 
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2.4.4.4 Risk Evaluation 
Risk evaluation decides whether or not a risk is tolerable. Risk 
management priorities are determined by evaluating and comparing levels 
of risk against predetermined standards, target risk levels or other criteria 
(Almoussawi, and Christian, 2005). If it is to be acceptable, it may be 
enough to control the risk instead of reducing it. However, if the risk is 
unacceptable, different risk reduction options have to be analyzed and 
compared so that the best can be identified (Rosen, et al., 2007). 
 
A further principle widely used to evaluate a risk is termed the As Low As 
Reasonable Practicable (ALARP) principle (Melchers, 2001). ALARP can 
be explained as follow:  
 Unacceptable risk: this type of risk must be reduced or eliminated;  
 Acceptable risk:  can be left without further action;  
 or between acceptable and unacceptable: may be accepted if it is 
economically and/or technically unreasonable to be reduced. 
 
2.4.4.5 Risk Reduction/Control 
If the risk is not acceptable, it is mandatory that it should be addressed or    
treated Rosness, (1988) and an action plans for risk prevention/ mitigation 
might include (AS/NZS 4360, 2004): 
 Planned actions; 
 Existing/required resources; 
 Involved responsibilities; 
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 Duration; and 
 Action tracking and controlling measures. 
These actions, when systematically applied, will evaluate, and control risk.  
 
2.5 Methods of Risk Analysis and Assessment 
2.5.1 Risk assessment methods. 
Risk assessments (Hokstad et al, 2009, WHO, 2009), can be carried out 
with a range of methods that can be broadly classified: 
 
1. Qualitative methods: result in qualitative descriptions of risk in 
terms of high, moderate, and low. These are used when the hazard 
cannot be expressed in quantitative terms and/or when the vulnerability 
cannot be expressed quantitatively. 
 
2. Semi-quantitative methods: Semi-quantitative techniques express 
risk in terms of risk indices. These are numerical values, normally 
ranging between 0 and 1 which do not have a direct meaning for 
expected losses but are merely relative indications of risk. Also, in this 
case risk, is expressed in a relative sense. 
 
3. Quantitative methods: express the risk either as probabilities, or as 
expected losses. The methods can be deterministic / scenario-based 
or probabilistic (taking into account the effect of all possible scenarios). 
Some of main risk analysis methods, mostly in the stage of risk 
estimation are reviewed by TECHNEAU (Rosen et al., 2007) as 
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presented in Table 2.4 which shows the most popular methods. In this 
research, the preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) using Coarse Risk 
Analysis (CRA) method was applied as discussed in the following 
section. 
 
Table 2.4: Overview of Main Risk Analysis Methods 
No. Name of Method Stage in Risk 
Type 
(Qualitative/ 
Quantitative) 
Data 
Require-
ments 
1. Hazard Identification (HAZID) Hazard identification Qualitative Low 
2. 
Hazard and Operability Studies 
(HAZOP) 
Hazard identification Qualitative Medium 
3. 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
- Coarse Risk Analysis (CRA) method 
- Risk and Vulnerability Analysis (RVA) 
method 
Hazard identification 
Risk estimation 
Qualitative High 
4. 
Failure Mode, Effect & Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) 
Hazard identification 
Risk estimation 
Qualitative/ 
Quantitative 
High 
5. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Risk estimation 
Qualitative/ 
Quantitative 
High 
6. Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) Risk estimation 
Qualitative/ 
Quantitative 
High 
7. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) Risk estimation 
Qualitative/ 
Quantitative 
High 
8. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Risk estimation 
Qualitative/ 
Quantitative 
High 
9. 
Physical models (e.g., EPANET, 
CARE-W) 
Risk estimation Quantitative High 
10. 
Health Risk Assess./Quantitative 
Chemical Risk Assessment (QCRA) 
Risk estimation Quantitative High 
11. 
Quantitative Microbial Risk 
Assessment (QMRA) 
Risk estimation Quantitative High 
12. Barriers and Bow- Tie diagram Risk estimation 
Qualitative/ 
Quantitative 
Low 
Source: (Adapted from Rosen et al., 2007) 
 
 
2.5.2 Approach to Risk Assessment for Water Supply Systems 
When deciding what method to apply it is important to consider what 
information the risk assessment provides and what resources are 
available. A logical approach is to first perform a qualitative risk 
assessment covering the entire system, from source to tap, and later use 
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a quantitative method for a more detailed assessment. However, if the 
overall risk situation is well known and documented, quantitative risk 
assessments can assess the entire system or specific parts directly. The 
most common semi-quantitative risk assessment approach which is used 
widely by different water supply operators is the Coarse Risk Analysis 
(CRA) method (TECHNEAU, 2010). Several case studies on risk 
assessment from different world locations were reviewed, some using 
qualitative methods and others using semi quantitative or quantitative 
methods.  
 
1. Breznice,Czech Republic: The risk analysis of the drinking water 
system in Breznice, the Czech Republic covered the system from 
source to service connection and was focused on identification of all 
hazardous events which may influence the quality of distributed water 
(Kozisek et al, 2008). The study applied the CRA method for risk 
identification and estimation process since in this case study it seemed 
to be a suitable tool for risk identification and estimation in small water 
supplies. 
 
2. Bergen, Norway: The drinking water system in Bergen, Norway, was 
analyzed using CRA (Rostum and Eikebrokk, 2009).The hazards were 
identified and assigned probabilities and consequences based on 
scales presented in a risk matrix. Three different types of 
consequences were considered: (1) water quality effects, (2) water 
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quantity effects and, (3) consequences to the reputation and economy 
of the water utility. All elements of the supply system, i.e. from source 
to tap, were included in the analysis. Based on the analysis possible 
new risk reducing measures were identified for all elements in the 
water supply system. 
 
3. Upper Mnyameni, Eastern Cape, South Africa: This risk analysis 
used CRA (Tornqvist et al., 2009). The objective of this study was to 
identify hazards in the drinking water supply system (from “source-to-
tap”), estimate and evaluate the risks to humans and the development 
of the society, and evaluate the risk assessment methods that were 
used. The risk reduction options proposed were found to reduce risks 
significantly. 
 
Quantitative risk assessment methods are often used when qualitative 
methods are not considered detailed enough. Quantitative methods 
provide an estimate of the risk level in absolute terms (e.g. as the 
expected consequence) which facilitates comparison with other risks and 
acceptable levels of risk. Furthermore, by using a quantitative method it 
may be possible to quantitatively estimate the efficiency of different risk 
reduction options. 
 
Further case studies on risk assessment of the drinking water systems 
using at least one quantitative method were reviewed. As an example, the 
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Goteborg, Sweden system was analyzed using a Fault Tree method 
conducted by Chalmers and Goteborg Water (Lindhe et al., 2008). KWR 
and Waternet (Beuken et al., 2008a) assessed the risks to the water 
supply for the city of Amsterdam, Netherlands using the CAVLAR method. 
A risk assessment of the system in Freiburg, Germany (Sturm et al., 2008) 
used a Geographical Information System (GIS) to assist the risk analysis. 
 
These case studies show that both qualitative and quantitative methods 
provide different kinds of results but they are both useful. The case studies 
where semi-quantitative (CRA) was used show that this kind of 
assessment typically requires a medium level of expertise, time and level 
of data detail. The assessments enabled the identified risks to be 
prioritized and guide the water utility where risk-reduction measures are 
most important. CRA is also useful in providing an overview of the risks in 
all parts of the system and can be used to identify what further more 
detailed assessments are required. The quantitative methods used in the 
case studies required a medium or high level of expertise, time and data 
details. At the same time, the results were more detailed compared to the 
qualitative or semi-quantitative methods and could more easily be 
compared to acceptable risk level, system requirements and similar 
measures (TECHNEAU, 2010).  
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2.5.3 Risk Assessment Approach Selected 
From the above discussion, it was decided that the Coarse Risk Analysis 
(CRA) method was the most appropriate for the research. The basic ideas 
of this method along with how it is applied are discussed in the following 
section. 
  
2.5.4 Coarse Risk Analysis (CRA)  
The main objective of the CRA is to identify hazardous events, the 
cause(s) of the event, and to make a coarse evaluation of likelihoods and 
consequences of these events. The basis for the CRA is a description of 
the water supply system and a list of undesired events that may occur in 
the system. For each event, the likelihood of occurrence and the 
consequence are assessed using a scale of 5 categories in order to 
estimate the risk. The objectives of the analysis are to identify undesired 
events, to rank the undesired events with respect to risk and to assess the 
need for risk reducing measures. The scope of an overall CRA – including 
risk evaluation and risk control - typically consists of (Hokstad, et al, 2009): 
 
1. Identify hazardous events related either to the total water supply 
system, or to a specific part (or in general to some category of 
undesired events).  
2. Risk estimation, i.e. estimate the probability and consequence for each 
hazardous event. Present these risks in risk matrices, and possibly 
compare to risk acceptance criteria. 
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3. Rank the hazardous events with respect to their risk. 
4. Assess the need for risk reduction options or more detailed analyses. 
  
The risk estimation in a CRA is usually restricted to presenting categories 
of probability and consequence. The probability categories are denoted 
e.g. rare, unlikely, possible, likely, and almost certain, and similarly 
consequence categories, e.g. negligible, minor, moderate major, and 
severe. The combined likelihood-consequence categories could then be 
inserted in a risk matrix. 
 
Several combinations of scale are possible. Table 2.5 shows an example 
of a CRA semi-quantitative risk matrix where the likelihoods and 
consequences have been assigned numbered levels that have been 
multiplied to generate a numeric description of risk ratings. 
 
Table 2.5: Example of Basic Semi-Quantitative Risk Rating Matrix  
Risk Score ˂ 6 6-9 10-15 ˃ 15 
Risk rating Low Medium High Very high/extreme 
Likelihood 
Consequences 
 
Scor
e 
Negligibl
e 
Minor 
Moderat
e 
Major Severe 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Rare (1) 1 2 3 4 5 
Unlikely (2) 2 4 6 8 10 
Possible (3) 3 6 9 12 15 
Likely (4) 4 8 12 16 20 
Almost 
Certain 
(5) 5 10 15 20 25 
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The values that have been assigned to the likelihoods and consequences 
are not related to their actual magnitudes, but the numeric values that are 
derived for risk can be grouped to generate the indicated risk ratings. In 
this example, extreme risk events have risk ratings greater than 15, high 
risks are between 10 and 15, medium risk are between 6 and 9 and low 
risk are less than 6 (Australian Government, 2008). Critical to evaluating 
and comparing risks is good estimation of the scores which, in this 
research, were addressed in the workshop detailed in Chapter 3. 
 
2.6 Risks to Water Facilities  
2.6.1 Introduction 
Water supply systems are usually designed, constructed, operated, and 
managed in an open environment, thus they are inevitably exposed to 
varied uncertain threats and hazards (Karamouz et al., 2010).  
 
The components and subsystems of water networks give many 
opportunities for both natural and human-related influences because most 
components are spatially diverse and accessible. Potentially the most 
vulnerable areas in water delivery systems are (see Figure 2.9) 
(Karamouz et al., 2010):  
1. Water sources (e.g., river, reservoir, and wells);  
2. Water treatment plants that remove impurities and harmful agents 
and makes water suitable for domestic consumption and other 
uses; 
58 
 
3. Distribution pipelines that deliver clean water on demand to homes, 
commercial establishments, and industries;  
4. Storages (tanks); and  
5. Other facilities (transmission pipes, channels, pumps, valves, etc.).   
 
Figure 2.9: Elements and Vulnerable Points in a General Water 
Supply System 
 
 
Source: (Karamouz et al., 2010) 
 
With respect to the security of the water supply the actual risk to the water 
supply is only realized as a consequence by the customer. Risks from the 
marine environment are generally mitigated in the treatment process but if 
overwhelmed, the consequence is on production. Small changes in 
production are mitigated by storage of treated water at the desalination 
plant and within the transmission system but when this is exhausted; the 
customer suffers a loss of water supply. 
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Figure 2.10 illustrates the sequence of risks from sea to the customer if 
the measures in place are inadequate to mitigate the risks. The concept of 
this change of location of the risk is important to the consideration of 
solutions as problems resolved at the highest level have the greatest 
impact on the overall risk profile, although they may be more challenging 
to implement.  
 
Figure 2.10: The Sequence of Risk Location from Sea to the 
Customer 
 
Source: (Karamouz et al., 2010) 
 
2.6.2 Major Desalination Plant Threats 
In the late 1990s, nearly half of the world’s desalinated water originated in 
the Arabian Gulf region (Wangnick 1999, cited in Latteman and Höpner, 
2003). The Sultanate of Oman has been using desalinated water since 
1976 when the Al-Ghubrah power and seawater desalination plant was 
first commissioned. The threats from the marine environment that affects 
desalination plants in the Gulf Region are characterized by: 
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1. Close proximity to busy national and international shipping lanes 
(potential for accidental and incidental pollution of the marine 
environment); 
2. Warm and deep coastal waters (ideal conditions for blooms of 
jellyfish and algae which block intake screens (Al Hasni, 2012);  and 
3. Exposed coastline (risks from occasional extreme weather 
conditions).  
 
2.6.3 Major Network Threats 
1) Pipeline Failure 
Long single pipelines are at risk from failure due to a variety of causes 
(PAEW, 2011): 
1. Ageing/ deteriorating pipes. 
2. Corrosion and growth of iron consuming bacteria resulting in pipe 
pitting. 
3. Lack of proper maintenance, leading to failures of air valves, fittings. 
4. Poor quality of installation and use of inappropriate materials. 
5. External damage, either accidental or deliberate vandalism. 
6. Rapid valve closure causing high surge pressures. 
7. Failures of joints in pipes and fittings. 
8. Natural disasters e.g. floods breaking pipelines at wadi crossings. 
 
An overall level of risk is normally assessed from failure records for pipes 
of different diameters and different materials. The average risk of failure 
can then be applied to all pipelines. If certain sections prove to have 
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higher failure rates, then the reasons for this can be examined and, where 
appropriate, action taken to reduce the risk (PAEW, 2011): 
 
2) Pumping Stations and Control Systems 
The risks to pumping stations may be grouped under three headings: 
1. Breakdowns of pumps and motors. 
2. Loss of incoming power supply.  
3. Failures of control systems 
 
3) Service reservoirs 
Service reservoirs are at risk from: 
 Pollution 
 Structural failure 
 
2.6.4 Extreme Weather Events 
Several of the failure mechanisms described above may be due to 
adverse weather. In extreme weather conditions, it is likely that many 
failures will occur at the same time and they may be spread over a wide 
area. Furthermore, communications may be disrupted, creating difficulties 
in ascertaining where failures have occurred and reaching sites to 
undertake repairs (Brekke et. al., 2009). 
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2.7 Emergency Response Plan 
2.7.1 The Requirements for an Emergency Response Plan 
The emergency plan should comprise tools, measures and approaches 
aimed at overcoming the identified constraints to effective water supply 
and sanitation. The plan, if well implemented should achieve some 
expected outputs. First, the strategies and mechanisms for effective water 
supply and sanitation will be achieved. Further, when all relevant 
institutions work together, implementation of the plan will not be hampered 
and harmonizing monitoring and evaluation practices of the programs 
ensures that they are well implemented to the letter. Lastly, members of 
the public will be fully aware of issues during an emergency ensuring 
coordination and facilitation towards any emerging issue in the supply of 
water within the state (WHO, 2011; WSDH, 2003). 
 
2.7.2 Mission statement 
The mission statement for an emergency response plan is to plan and 
manage water supply and sanitation effectively by ensuring that members 
of the general population are effectively and adequately provided with 
consistent water supply and sanitation and health is well maintained 
during an emergency, (Reaves, Termini & Burkle, 2014). Having a mission 
statement and goal facilitates fast tracking of measures that will later 
ensure that the goals are realized. In addition, the response plan should 
establish a framework for effective planning and management of the water 
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supply and sanitation and ensure that water supply and sanitation is 
achieved at all times. 
 
2.7.3 International Practice of Emergency Response Plans for Water 
Supply 
To counter the risks associated with disasters, each country tends to have 
its own unique way of handling cases of disasters.  
 
2.7.3.1 Status of Disaster Preparedness and Risk Mitigation in the 
USA 
As a developed country, the USA has a well-structured program with 
institutions tasked with disaster preparedness and risk mitigation (DPRM). 
The Us Federal Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act 
of June 2002 require that all systems must conduct a vulnerability 
assessment to gauge the level of preparedness in time of disasters. The 
department of Homeland Security under presidential directive should 
ensure that water supplies are free from any form of attacks by terrorists 
(Whybark, 2015). 
 
2.7.3.2 Status of DPRM in the Philippines 
In the Philippines, many agencies are involved in ensuring that DPRM is 
effectively executed. Overall, the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal 
Security (COC-IS) is in charge of national crisis management. The 
National Peace and Order Council is tasked with handling any form of 
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crisis situation that poses a threat to peace and order (Lum and 
Margesson, 2014). The National Disaster Coordinating Council is tasked 
with strengthening disaster control and ensuring general preparedness in 
times of crisis. Through this body, all information relating to National 
Disaster preparedness are relayed to the President for management plans 
to facilitate the release of the National Calamity funds as required. 
 
The Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) in Manila 
has a plan, which is monitored and evaluated periodically by the MWSS 
regulatory office. Manila has the group called Risk, Crisis and Asset 
Management Cluster (RCAMC), which prepares for any emergency that 
may affect service delivery and includes risk, crisis, and asset 
management (McEntire, 2014). In smaller cities, for example Urdaneta, 
also have backup from the Army (Abdullah et. al., 2015). 
 
2.7.3.3 State of DPRM in Tanzania 
Tanzania, a sub Saharan suffered from catastrophic floods in January 
2010 but had no proper disaster preparedness plan in place (McEntire, 
2014). A first emergency appeal was launched on the 20th January 2010 
which highlighted the vulnerabilities caused by the collapse of the water 
and sanitation infrastructure. Support came from internationally recognized 
institutions like the Red Cross, which provided 10 WatSan-Kits, which 
included social safety nets and provision of insurance cover. The main 
advantage of these kits was that people could cope with small-scale 
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emergencies without requiring any external assistance. Tanzania opted to 
use satellite navigation to preposition emergency equipment. However, the 
use of satellite navigation is not enough as a counter measure for disaster 
preparedness since it does not address all issues and it is concluded that 
the use of the satellites should be combined with existing measures on 
site for capacity assessment (Almarez, Peòaroya, and Rubio, 2015). 
 
2.7.3.4 Summary of Findings on International Practice 
This review shows that the country showing the best example of disaster 
preparedness is the Philippines, which, in comparison with the USA and 
Tanzania has many departments tasked with ensuring that they combat 
any form of disaster that may occur. In Oman, the National Committee for 
Civil Defense (NCCD) is in charge of emergency preparedness within the 
regions of Oman. It works jointly with the Gulf Cooperation Countries 
(GCC) Regional Crisis Centre in Kuwait to achieve prevention, mitigation, 
disaster preparedness and with the armed forces and other governmental 
ministries in cases of disasters. In comparison with other countries, 
particularly within the region, Oman well prepared for disasters and 
response due to the mandate given to the NCCD (PAEW, 2011). 
 
2.8 Summary 
Only a limited number of studies that could form the basis of research into 
assessing the risks to water system arising from both natural phenomena 
and water losses were found. There is little literature on the effect of 
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exceptional events such as Cyclone Gonu and their adverse effects on 
water networks in arid countries such as Oman, and consequently little 
attention has been focused on this joint problem that might assist in 
improving responses to emergencies. Further, no comprehensive study 
was found which addresses the issue of non-revenue water when 
estimating the revenue lost. 
 
This chapter has included a comprehensive review of the risks factors in 
the problems addressed and this knowledge informs the risk assessments 
in Chapters 5 and 6. The most appropriate risk assessment method which 
links exceptional events and manmade hazards to water supply systems 
has been shown to be the Coarse Risk Analysis (CRA), a method which 
commonly used in the management of water supply systems.  
 
The research translates the risk score to a level of resilience, the 
resilience score being generated using a simple scoring method used in 
transportation analysis. The data and performance indicators obtained 
using the well-known AWWA methodology and software, and the risk and 
resilience scores, an emergency response plan is developed in Chapter 7 
taking into consideration the research output and best international 
practice. Before the risks are determined and the resilience evaluated, the 
methods used are outlined (in Chapter 3) and the case study area 
described (in Chapter 4). 
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Chapter 3 Methodology and Data Collection 
 
3.1  General Background 
Both Quantitative and Qualitative data gathering (Blaxter et al. 2010) was 
undertaken in order to obtain and present relevant data and meet the aim 
and objectives of the research. After extensive reading of the literature on 
risk and resilience, records and data held by the water supply company 
were mined for system information. Risk factors were identified, ranked 
and scored at a workshop with key stakeholders. The data were mined a 
second time for the determination of NRW and the operational information 
required was principally gathered from interviews. Finally, the emergency 
response plan was developed through an evaluation of the above factors, 
which highlighted the deficiencies in the old plan, particularly following the 
experiences during tropical cyclone Gonu. 
 
3.2  Research Approach 
Blaxter et al. (2010) identified four basic approaches to the design of a 
research project; Action research, case studies, experiments and surveys. 
Apart from reviewing the literature, the two main research approaches 
adopted in this study were case studies and surveys. Case studies are 
usually used to illustrate problems or indicate good practices since they 
attempt to describe relationships that exist in reality, very often in a single 
organization. For this purpose, case study methodology was considered 
the most appropriate approach because it provides a systematic way to 
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collect data related to water losses and risks to water supply systems, 
analyze information and report the results thus enabling an understanding 
of the particular problem in great depth. Figure (3.1) is a schematic 
representation of the framework of the research approach. 
 
Figure 3.1: Research Approach 
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From the critical review of literature in chapter 2, the following tools are 
used in the subsequent chapters; the AWWA Water Audit Tool (see 
section 2.2.8); the CRA method for risk evaluation (section 2.5.4); a tool 
for resilience scoring developed by Hughes and Healy, 2014 (section 
2.3.6), and; a risk scoring matrix (section 2.4.4.3). One questionnaire was 
also designed similar to the questionnaire developed by GTZ-VAG (2009). 
 
3.2.1 Workshops and Interviews as Means of Gathering Data  
Understanding of the operational and organizational practices of PAEW 
was gained through workshops (section 2.8). A workshop was held to 
undertake a comprehensive review of the security of water supply to 
consumers in Oman and for the development, optimization and 
presentation of detailed action plans for improving the security of supply.  
 
In the case studies from WHO (2009) which were examined, the threats to 
water quality were identified by conducting workshops. In one example 
from Australia, two-day workshops were convened for each major water 
supply system involving a consultant, stakeholders and facilitators.  In 
another example from the Caribbean, a two-day workshop was convened 
to identify hazards and assess risks. Hazards in the watershed, treatment 
process, water distribution system, and households were identified 
through brainstorming exercises and a review of water quality monitoring.  
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In this study, the author conducted surveys through questionnaires and 
interviews to determine the perceptions of staff of some factors regarding 
the topic. These surveys enabled the researcher to obtain data about 
practices, situations or views at one point in time. Quantitative analytical 
techniques were then used to draw inferences from these data 
(Scheyvens and Storey, 2003).   
 
Laws, Harper and Marcus (2003) write that interviews can be conducted 
in a wide variety of situations and for different purposes: 
 Knowledge is required about people’s experiences or views in depth; 
 Reliance is placed on information from small number of respondents; 
 Issues may be sensitive and people may not speak in a group;  
 Respondents may not be able to express themselves fully through a 
written questionnaire. 
 
Daphne (2000), gives the main advantage of the interview over other 
forms of data collection as the ability for the interviewer to seek further 
clarification of the responses from the respondent by probing the initial 
responses giving richness to the data and allowing many individual 
differences in opinion and reasoning to be uncovered. This feature of the 
interview as a tool for data collection was an invaluable ingredient to the 
work of this research making the qualitative data collection more natural 
and also able to be used as a primary source of data. 
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According to (Scheyvens and Storey, 2003), in the work-place context of 
this research, highly structured interviews would not have allowed good 
qualitative data to be elicited and these authors are of the view that 
interviews as tools have inherent limitations: 
 Recording of the responses is one of the weaknesses of interviewing. 
Writing while someone is speaking can put him/her off ; 
 Tape recording and later transcribing is also time consuming; and 
 Interviews can result in a one-way traffic of information from which 
only the researcher benefits. 
 
3.3  Research Techniques 
3.3.1 Introduction 
As identified by Blaxter et al. (2010) there are four basic research 
techniques namely; the study of documents, observation, questionnaires, 
and interviews. The nature of this study and the aims it sought to achieve 
required the adoption of a variety of techniques of data collection and 
analysis. The present study obtained research data from documents 
analysis, observation, questionnaires, interviews and workshops. The 
data obtained from those data collection techniques were further analyzed 
to obtain the findings of the study. The interviews and workshops are the 
best ways of getting data compare to online surveys or telephone surveys 
as the responses of the people to gather more and deeper information 
can be explored. At the same time, the researcher can observe and 
witness certain things that are necessary for his research work. 
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The first phase was a review of relevant national and international 
literature in order to identify the need for such research, its context and 
furthermore to identify current trends and common themes. It was 
important to find out; the most appropriate methods of risk analysis; the 
assessment of exceptional events; the evaluation of manmade hazards to 
water supply systems, and; the determination of a reliable Non Revenue 
Water figure or equivalent performance indicators.  
 
3.3.2 Field Work and Observation 
Both quantitative and qualitative data collection result in precise 
measurements that are amenable to quantitative data analysis. The aim 
of collecting data in research “is the production of public knowledge 
(empirical and theoretical) about specific issues which can be used by 
others in a variety of ways”, and where it is used as the main research 
method, it can be used for the collection of descriptive quantitative data 
(Sapsford and Jupp, 1996). The researcher carried out field work with staff 
and fieldworkers of the host organization Public Authority for Electricity 
and Water (PAEW) and others to look for issues related to water loss and 
risks whilst he took accompanying notes.  
 
3.3.3 Questionnaire and Interviews 
A principal source of data was the interviews that were undertaken with 
the senior staff of PAEW who are involved in water losses and non-
revenue water to determine their opinion on issues of water loss and risk 
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assessment of the water supply system. Interviews allow the researcher 
to generate a rich and varied data set in a less formal setting (Kitchen and 
Tate, 2000).  
 
Questionnaires generally produce quantitative data but can also capture 
qualitative information concerning the respondents opinion, attitude and 
perception. From the answers, the researcher generally creates 
quantitative data that he/she analyses to address the research problem 
(Neuman, 1997). One closed questionnaire was developed to gather 
information about NRW and this was followed up by semi-structured 
interviews on a one-to-one basis as discussed in section 3.5. 
 
3.3.4 Workshop 
Prior to the inception of this research, a two-day workshop had been held 
on 8th Sep. 2009, where the major risks were reviewed with PAEW 
stakeholders. A further one-day workshop held on 17 June 2013 at the 
Main Office of PAEW directly to inform this research as it undertook a 
comprehensive review of the security of water supply to consumers in 
Oman. The workshop also assisted in the development, optimization and 
presentation of detailed action plans for improving the security of supply. 
The objectives of the workshop (the results are in Chapter 6) were to: 
1. Identify all risks to the security of supply. 
2. Communicate the risk assessment process, and define the 
consequences and likelihood appropriate to PAEW. 
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3. Share some of the information on risks collected by the team of 
experts from PAEW and identify ideas to mitigate potential risks. 
 
The researcher was the chairperson of that workshop, and experts in 
various fields relevant to PAEW attended. Among the participants, were 
Heads of the chemistry and microbiology departments due to the 
importance of the risks of water pollution and contamination. Three 
projects mangers attended because they have experience in the analysis 
and assessment of risk to water utilities during the construction projects. 
The design engineers are aware of how the water systems are designed 
against possible risks. The senior desalination plant engineer and senior 
water specialist participated as they have experience in the risks to 
desalination plants and the effects of mechanical and electrical failures of 
the water utility. Staffs from the operations department as the control 
engineers and operators were invited because of their knowledge on how 
the water systems is operated and the hazards expected. The operation 
and maintenance manager of Al Ghubrah desalination plant was invited 
because he is the responsible person for day-to-day work within the 
desalination. In total, 12 key personnel attended. However, an invitation 
was extended to the general manager of operation, a senior manager 
water quality, and maintenance planning manager but they could not 
attend due to work obligations. First there was an open discussion/ 
brainstorming within two groups and each group was asked to make list of 
risks. Later the two groups joined to agree on the final list of the key risks.  
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After the key risks had been identified they were tabulated and scored for 
likelihood and consequence to provide PAEW with a prioritized list of 
potential problems that may impact on the security of the water supply. 
Risk scores were generated using a simple risk matrix to assign the 
likelihood and consequence of an event occurring. PAEW then identified 
potential mitigation measures, with technical and economic justification. 
The workshop recommended that the risk tables are periodically updated 
(for more detail also see Appendix-A). 
 
3.4 Methodology of the Water Audit  
The standard water balance is a series of simple equations. A graphical 
presentation is presented in Figure 2.2 and this is the most common 
way to view the standard water balance developed by AWWA (BD9) 
(see section 2.2.8). 
 Ganorkar et al, (2013) gives a useful critique of the methodology, showing 
that the amount of water in a system can be broken down into; 
authorized use and water losses, where; 
 
Authorized Use + Water Losses = System input            (3.1) 
 
The following relationships are used in the standard water balance:-  
 
Water Losses = Apparent Losses + Real Losses   (3.2) 
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Nonrevenue Water = Water Losses + Unbilled Authorized Use (3.3) 
Apparent Losses = Metering Inaccuracies + Unauthorized Use (3.4) 
 
These equations may be satisfied using the following the five step 
process (Ganorkar et al, 2013);  
 Source Evaluation:  A system may have multiple wells, springs or 
surface water intakes. The amount of water input to the balance is 
determined by metering at source. 
 Authorized Consumption: Revenue Water is made up of Metered 
and Unmetered Consumption. Billed Metered Consumption includes 
residential, commercial and industrial customers.  Billed Unmetered 
Consumption consists of any contracts the system has to provide 
unmetered water for a fee. 
 Evaluation of Apparent Losses: Apparent Losses of water occur 
as inaccuracies in water flow measurement, errors in water 
accounting, and unauthorized usage. Apparent Losses are 
Unauthorized Use and Metering Inaccuracies and is theft. 
 Evaluation of Real Losses: Real Losses are the physical escape of 
water from the distribution system, and include leakage and 
overflows prior to the point of end use. Real losses typically account 
for a greater volume of water lost by utilities in comparison to 
apparent losses. 
The newest and most advanced real loss indicator (recommended by 
the IWA and AWWA Water Loss Committee) is the infrastructure 
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leakage index (ILI) which is the ratio of the current annual real losses 
(real losses) to the unavoidable annual real losses (UARL) (Winarni, 
(2009). UARL is a theoretical reference value representing the lower 
limit of leakage that could be achieved if all of today’s best 
technology could be successfully applied. The ILI is a highly effective 
performance indicator for comparing (benchmarking) the 
performance of the utilities in operational management of real losses 
(Delgado, 2008; Sharma, 2008). 
 
 Performance Measurement: The final step in the water audit is the 
interpretation of the information collected. A straight percentage of 
water loss is a crude indicator unless several additional factors are 
taken into account, particularly variations in input or consumption. 
However, it is still a useful piece of information, particularly when 
there is little variability. 
 
 Financial Performance: In addition to water losses values, the 
AWWA method also calculates the financial performance indicators 
as NRW and water losses as percent of volume and cost, and the 
operational efficiency indicators as in term of infrastructure leakage 
index (ILI).  
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On the basis of all of the above points, the AWWA method is 
considered the best tool for performance measuring for water supply 
systems. 
 
3.5 Determination of Non-Revenue Water  
3.5.1 Data Sheet  
For the purpose of the present study and in order to estimate and audit the 
water losses in the water distribution networks of the study area (Al Seeb 
Wilayat, the data sheet in Table (4.9) was prepared. Data were collected 
from the engineers in charge of the water leakage detection program for 
input to the AWWA Water Audit Software.  
 
The data sheet is divided into two sections. Respondents first have to fill 
basic utility and city information. Section two is the reporting work sheet 
which includes the data about water supplies, authorized consumption, 
apparent loss, system data, and cost data. The researcher collected all the 
data through face to face interviews with the engineers.  
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Table 3.9: Data Sheet for Water Loss Information 
A- Basic Information 
 
Name of City or Utility:  Country:   
 
Reporting Year:  Start Date (MM/YYYY):  Start Date (MM/YYYY):   
 
Name of Contact Person:  E-mail:   
 
Telephone:  Fax:  Mobile:   
 
Reporting Units for Water Volume:   
 
 
B- Reporting Work Sheet 
1. Water Supplies 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1.1 Volume from Own Sources      
1.2 Master Meter Error Adjustment      
1.3 Water Imported      
1.4 Water Exported      
2. Authorized Consumption 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
2.1 Billed Metered      
2.2 Billed Unmetered      
2.3 Unbilled Metered      
2.4 Unbilled Unmetered      
3. Apparent Losses 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
3.1 Unauthorized Consumption       
3.2 Customer Metering Inaccuracies       
3.3 Systematic Data Handling Errors      
4. System Data 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
4.1 Length of Mains      
4.2 
Number of Active and Inactive 
Service Connections 
     
4.3 
Average Length of Costumer Service 
Line 
     
4.4 Average Operating Pressure      
5. Cost Data 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
5.1 
Total Annual Cost of Operating Water 
System 
     
5.2 
Costumer Retail Unit Cost (Applied to 
Apparent Losses) 
     
5.3 
Variable Production Cost (Applied to 
Real Losses 
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3.5.2 Semi-Structured and Unstructured Interviews  
Within the framework of the present research and in order to achieve one 
of the main objectives of this study, the researcher also prepared a 
questionnaire for PAEW staff. The aim of this questionnaire was to assess 
the views of stakeholder in PAEW on the current status of water losses in 
Oman from the technical and strategic point of view.  It sought to discover 
from staff who are concerned with water losses, what their perceptions are 
about the official NRW figure, their understanding of the impact and main 
causes of water loss, and their opinions on PAEW’s procedures and policy 
related to water loss reduction. 
 
The questionnaire was based on the objectives of the study and by using 
similar questionnaires as a starting point (GTZ-VAG, 2009). The 
questionnaire is given in Appendix-B. 
 
The quality of information obtained based on the quality of interaction 
between the respondents and interviewer and the quality of data depends 
on the experience, skills and dedication of the interviewer Kumar (1996). 
Since the researcher was known to all of the interviewees, a methodology 
suited to free flowing conversations and discussions was required. In 
addition to the semi-structured interviews, there was a follow-up with 
unstructured interviews with these staffs in order to obtain clearer answers 
on certain specific issues bordering on their schedules. These follow up 
meetings were particularly important because some respondents had 
difficulty in expressing themselves fully through a written questionnaire. 
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Although the interview questions were prepared in English, the questions 
were asked in the local language (Arabic). The responses and feedback 
were also translated back in English. 
 
3.5.3  Interviewing Key PAEW Staff  
Following pilot testing, thirty staff from the head office in Muscat and other 
Governorate offices of PAEW were interviewed face to face. The staff 
were mainly engineers who are concerned with water losses and some 
managers. The interviews gathered in-depth information of their 
knowledge, perceptions and experience with the current situation and 
future strategy of NRW. Further information on water losses and their 
understanding of the main causes of water loss was gathered and their 
opinions on PAEW’s procedures and policy related to water loss reduction.  
 
Twenty members of staff, both at senior and middle level from all 
departments were interviewed via semi-structured interviews. There were 
two exceptions, the leakage control manager a n d  the general manager, 
operations and maintenance section head who were in addition to the 
semi-structured interviews. There was a follow-up unstructured interview 
to obtain clearer answers on certain specific issues. For example; why 
most PAEW efforts concentrate on apparent losses as against the other 
components of NRW reduction strategies, a n d ;  the issue of 
measurement  of  NRW  in  the  system  in  the  absence  of 
comprehensive metering within in the system. 
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Information gathered from interviews and questionnaires was corroborated 
either with independent persons, or through available documentation. The 
data obtained were manipulated and presented using Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet software. The results are analyzed and explained in chapter 5. 
 
3.5.4 Reviewing Available Data within PAEW 
Document review is another source of data collection used for 
qualitative analysis of existing data. Documents, apart from being a 
means by which data can be collected on a subject area, are also 
secondary sources of data in their own rights (Scheyvens and Storey, 
2003). As mentioned earlier, the basic data and information related to 
thesis subjects were collected from Public Authority for electricity and 
Water (PAEW) archive. 
 
3.6 Risk Assessment Methodology 
3.6.1 Introduction  
Risk assessment and analysis provide useful tools for the management 
and control of the variety of hazards and hazardous events caused by 
human or natural disasters to water utility infrastructure. The discussion of 
risk assessment in Chapter 2 mentions that both qualitative and the 
quantitative methods can provide useful results, qualitative methods 
requiring less input data and other resources than  quantitative methods 
which, on the other hand, have been shown to provide more detailed 
results. The present research, used a semi quantitative approach that 
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requires less information, numerical data and resources necessary than a 
statistically significant quantitative approach.  
 
The objective was to distinguish between less and more significant risks 
and avoid being overly subjective. The most common way of carrying this 
out being to draw up a simple table to systematically record all potential 
hazardous events and associated hazards together with an estimate of the 
magnitude of each (PSC, 2012; PAEW, 2012; WHO,2009; Deere et al., 
2001; Nadebaum et al, 2004; Australian Government, 2008).  
 
When starting the risk assessment process, detailed definitions of what is 
meant by ‘possible’, ‘rare’, ‘insignificant’, ‘major’, etc. had to be drawn up 
by the utility. Of crucial importance is the need to define in advance the 
definition of risk matrix score that identifies ‘significant’ risk. The 
information to inform the risk assessment will come from the experience, 
knowledge and judgment of the utility and individual team members, 
industry good practice and technical literature and this was a function of 
the workshop (WHO, 2009).  
 
Due to the lack of adequate information and data, the present risk 
assessment of water supply systems in Oman including the desalination 
plants and transmission pipelines used the semi-quantitative risk 
assessment approach, namely; Coarse Risk Analysis (CRA) which is the 
most common approach used for risk assessment and management of 
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water supply systems (Kozisek et al, 2008; Rostum and Eikebrokk, 2009; 
Tornqvist et al., 2009. 
 
3.6.2 Estimation of Risks: Coarse Risk Analysis  
This section outlines how the risks and likelihoods of their occurrence in 
this study were assessed. The risk analysis covers the major desalination 
plants and the transmission mains taking water from the Al Ghubra 
desalination plant to Greater Muscat and to Ad Dakhliyah governorates 
respectively (see Chapter 4 for details). The study focused on the 
identification of all hazardous events, which might influence the quantity 
and quality of water distributed together with the risks to health. 
 
The scope the CRA (see sections 2.5 and 2.5.4) including risk evaluation 
and risk control consisted of (Hokstad, et al, 2009): 
1. Identifying hazardous events relating either to the total water supply 
system, or to a specific issue.  
2. Estimating the risks (probability and consequence) for each hazardous 
event and presenting the results in risk matrices. 
3. Ranking the hazardous events with respect to their risk. 
4. Assessing the need for risk reduction options. 
 
Risk were determined as the product of likelihood and consequence as: 
          Risk = Likelihood × Consequence                                               (3.5) 
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Where, likelihood is the chance that a hazard will actually compromise 
drinking water quality or quantity, and pose a public health threat. 
Consequence is the combination of the severity, nature, and duration of an 
event, the proportion of the population affected, and type of health 
consequence (MHLS, 2010).  
 
The risk estimation in a CRA is usually restricted to presenting categories 
of probability and consequence as rare, unlikely, possible, likely, and 
almost certain. In a similar way the consequence categories are negligible 
minor, moderate major, and severe. The combined likelihood-
consequence categories are inserted in a risk matrix where several 
combinations of scale are possible through assigning numbered levels that 
are multiplied to generate a numeric description of risk ratings. 
 
3.6.3 Likelihoods, Consequences and Risk Tables  
The likelihoods and consequences of a wide range of hazardous events 
that could affect the security of the potable water supply were identified at 
the workshop in June 2013. Risks were evaluated on the basis of this 
information taking into account any control measures so that the 
effectiveness of the controls and further mitigation measures could be 
easily assessed. The return periods for likelihood, and consequence of 
hazard events for the desalination plant and transmission mains along with 
scores and the color-coding for scoring were developed during the 
workshop. 
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1) Likelihood: A likelihood score for each hazard event was assigned 
from the estimated probability of its occurrence within a time period as 
presented in Table 3.2. A time frame of a maximum of 100 years was 
agreed in the workshop since some hazardous events can be less 
frequent once in 50 years, particularly natural events such as cyclones. 
 
Table 3.2: Qualitative Measures of Likelihood 
Level Description Score 
1 One in 50 to 100 years 1 
2 One in 20 to 50 years 2 
3 One in 5 to 20 years 3 
4 One in 1 to 5 years 4 
5 More than one per year 5 
Source: Security of Supply Risk Workshop, See Appendix (A) 
   
 
2) Desalination Consequence: Risks within desalination plants arise 
from multiple causes, including those arising from the sea but the result is 
always a loss of production and hence a loss of supply to customers. The 
consequence of a hazard event for desalination is presented using a 
separate table (Table 3.3). The duration of each severity was agreed in 
the workshop. A time period of seven days was used (Kozisek et al, 2008, 
Hokstad, et al, 2009). 
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Table 3.3: Consequence of Event Duration for Desalination 
Severity Definition Score 
A 
< 12 hours partial reduction in treated water 
production (>34% of design output) 
1 
B <12 hours loss of treated water production 2 
C 12 – 48 hours loss of treated water Production 4 
D 
One sites affected for > 4 days 
2 – 7 days loss of treated water production 
8 
E >7 days loss of treated water production 16 
Source: Security of Supply Risk Workshop, See Appendix (A) 
Notes:  
 Risk tables have been completed for each major desalination plant. 
  Changes in water quality or taste/odour outside the Omani standards are 
assumed to result in plant shutdown and loss of production. 
 
 
3) Transmission Consequence: The risks were identified earlier and the 
consequences (from the workshop) were assessed for transmission 
pipelines and are given in Table 3.4 (after Hokstad, et al, 2009). Multiple 
scenarios were selected to allow different events to be compared. For 
example, in severity B, 1,000 properties without water for 12 hours is 
made equivalent to 500 properties without water for 24 hours and also to 
one industrial customer. The industrial customer is assumed to have a 
greater need for water (equal to 1,000 properties) but the actual demand 
has not been considered.  
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Table 3.4: Consequence of Hazard Events for Transmission Mains 
Severity Definition Score 
A <500 properties without water for 12 hours 1 
B 
<1,000 properties without water for 12 hours or 
one industrial customer 
<500 properties without water for 24 hours 
2 
C 
<10,000 properties without water for 12 hours or 
two to ten industrial customers 
<1,000 properties without water for 24 hours or 
one industrial customer 
<500 properties without water for 48 hours 
4 
D 
<50,000 properties without water for 12 hours or 
more than ten industrial customers 
<10,000 properties without water for 24 hours or 
two to ten industrial customers 
<1000 properties without water for 48 hours or 
one industrial customer 
<500 properties without water for 2-5 days 
8 
E 
100,000 properties without water for 12 hours or 
more than one hundred industrial  customers 
<50,000 properties without water for 24 hours or 
more than ten industrial customers 
<10,000 properties without water for 48 hours or 
two to ten industrial customers 
<1000 properties without water for 2-5 days or 
one industrial customer 
<500 properties without water for >5 days 
16 
Source: Security of Supply Risk Workshop, See Appendix (A) 
Notes: 
 Storage within a customer’s premises has not been considered. 
 Customers often have internal storage tanks that provide at least 12 hours supply. 
 Many customers may have internal storage tanks with up to 3 days supply. 
 Major industrial customers may be hospitals, schools, retail or industrial premises. 
 
 
4) Risk Table (Matrix): Table 3.5 gives the resulting scoring system used 
in the risk tables (in Chapter 6). 
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Table 3.5: Consequence and Likelihood Categories to Generate Risk 
Scores  
Likelihood 
Consequences 
Severity A B C D E 
Level Score (1) (2) (4) (8) (16) 
1 (1) 1 2 4 8 16 
2 (2) 2 4 8 16 32 
3 (3) 3 6 12 24 48 
4 (4) 4 8 16 32 64 
5 (5) 5 10 20 40 80 
Risk Score ˂ 6 6-16 ˃ 16 
Colour Green Amber Red 
Risk Rating Minor Major Significant 
Source: Security of Supply Risk Workshop, See Appendix (A) 
 Green scores < 6 represent minor risks that may not need any mitigation measures. 
 
 Amber scores 6 to 16 represent major risks that may need mitigation measures. 
 
 Red scores > 16 represent significant risks that certainly need mitigation measures. 
 
 
In this methodology, the relative extent of the risk is illustrated by the scale 
of the number. The effectiveness of control measures can then be taken 
into account by revaluing the risk following the application of the risk 
mitigation measure. Control measures are considered not only for their 
long-term average performance but also for their potential to be ineffective 
over a short period. The outcomes of this work are reported in Chapter 6. 
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3.7 Development of a new Emergency Response Plan 
The importance of component parts of the water utility (e.g. desalination 
plants, well field, transmission mains, and reservoirs) relies on two 
factors: (1) The impact of their potential loss; and (2) the probability of 
failure. A consistent and widely used method, the Coarse Risk Analysis 
(CRA – see section 2.5.4) has been used to identify hazards and 
generate risk scores. These scores are used to prioritise future 
investment in the water systems such as the provision of backup 
supplies, increased preventative maintenance as well as the creation of 
emergency response plan. Further the impact of water losses on water 
systems was also studied and the performance indicators help in 
preparing the emergency response plan. 
 
The data obtained from the risk analysis process and water audit, the 
information obtained during the group discussion in the workshop and 
the system data obtained from PAEW were all used as basic inputs for 
developing options for the new emergency plan. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the philosophy, strategy and methodology used 
in conducting this research. Procedures used, research approaches and 
techniques and the methodology of risk assessment are all introduced. 
The methodologies are used in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 but first, the particular 
circumstances in Oman and the case study site are outlined in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 Case study  
 
4.1 General Background 
The case study approach forms the backbone of this research both to 
illustrate the problems of providing a water supply in a desert country and 
to indicate good practices. The country of the Sultanate of Oman is the 
general case study of the present research work. A study of non-revenue 
water and water losses in the Al Seeb Wilayat water network of Muscat 
Governorate is used to highlight waster provision and delivery issues in 
Oman. The impact of tropical cyclone Gonu has been taken as a case 
study for the analysis and assessment of risks from exceptional events.  
 
Risk analyses and assessments were carried out for major desalination 
plants taking as case study examples the Al Ghubrah Desalination plant 
located in Muscat, and for the main transmission pipelines, Muscat and 
Dakhliyah.  
 
The case study was used to examine issues related to water supply in 
Oman within its particular context using empirical enquiry (Yin, 2012) in 
real world investigations where boundaries and contexts are not clearly 
evident. Blaxter et al. (2003) added that one of the advantages of case 
studies is that it can provide a data source from which further analysis can 
be made. They can, therefore, be archived for further research work.  
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4.2  The Study Area (Oman) 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The Sultanate of Oman is a country in southwest Asia, on the southeast 
coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It borders the United Arab Emirates in the 
northwest, Saudi Arabia in the west and Yemen in the southwest.  This 
section gives a brief overview of the basic data of Oman including 
geography (location and topography, and climate), population, and 
administrative units of Oman. In addition, it outlines water availability 
(resources), and gives an overview of the water supply system and of the 
main organization in the water sector. 
 
4.2.2 The Geography of Oman 
4.2.2.1 Location and Topography 
The Sultanate of Oman is located in the south eastern corner of the 
Arabian Peninsula between Latitudes 16° 40` and 26° 20` North and 
longitudes 51° 40` and 59° 40` East as shown in Figure (4.1). Its coastal 
line extends 3,165 kilometers from the Strait of Hormuz in the North to the 
borders of the Republic of Yemen in the South.  It overlooks three major 
bodies of water: the Arabian Gulf (Persian Gulf), the Gulf of Oman, and 
the Arabian Sea (Ministry of Economy, 2008). 
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Figure 4.1 Location Map for Sultanate Oman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (PAEW, 2012) 
 
The total area of the Sultanate is approximately 310,000 km2 composed of 
varying topographic regions consisting of plains, dry river beds, and 
mountains. The most important area is the plain overlooking the Gulf of 
Oman and the Arabian Sea, with about 3% of the total area. This area is 
the most densely populated in the country, with rapid growth and 
industralization that creates a challenge for emergency management. The 
mountain ranges occupy almost 15% of the total land of Oman. The 
remaining area is mainly dry river beds and desert (about 82% of the total 
area) (Ministry of Economy, 2008). 
 
 
94 
 
4.2.2.2 Climate 
The climate varies considerably throughout the year. There are two 
seasons, the hot, dry summer during the months of May to October and 
the cool winter months from November to April. During the summer, the 
weather is hot and humid, with temperatures up to 48°C, and relative 
humidity between 85% and 90%. The interior of the country is dry except 
at high altitudes in the northeast. The average sunshine is about 10 hours 
daily, with the exception of mountainous areas and the small region that 
experiences little sunshine between mid-June to mid-September.  
 
4.2.2.3 Population 
Oman has a population of 2,967,700 (Census, 2010) and its geography 
allows habitation in only a small portion of the country. About 55% of the 
population lives in the Batinah coastal plain, where the nation’s capital, 
Muscat, is located. About 215,000 people inhabit the Dhofar region, and 
about 30,000 live in the remote Musandam Peninsula on the Strait of 
Hormuz. Oman hosts some 660,000 expatriates, most of whom are guest 
workers from South Asia, Egypt, Jordan, and the Philippines. 
 
4.2.2.4  Administrative Units   
Oman is divided into eight main administrative Governorates as shown in 
Figure (4.2). These Governorates are further subdivided into 59 “wilayats”. 
Information is given for the three governorates, which are of importance in 
this research: 
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Figure 4.2 Administrative Governorates of Sultanate of Oman 
 
Dhofar Region 
Salalah 
Sohar 
Muscat 
Musandam Governorate 
Al Buraimi Governorate 
Ad Dhakhliyah Region 
Al Wusta Region 
Sur 
Al Batinah Region 
Ad Dhahirah Region 
Muscat Governorate 
Areas not included in PAEW’s service area 
Barka 
Ash Sharqiyah Region  
 
Source: (PAEW, 2012)  
 
1. Governorate of Muscat: This is the central administrative area of the 
Sultanate and is characterized by a high population density. It 
comprises six wilayats. 
 
2. Al Batina Governorate: The Al Batinah Region is located in the 
northeast of the Sultanate and is divided into two main areas. One is 
the coastal plain that occupies the frontier with UAE for a distance of 
170 km southeast of Muscat. The other is the Western Hajar that runs 
parallel with and to the coast of the UAE in the north, and to the Wadi Al 
Maawil to the south. 
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3. Ad Dakhliyah Governorate: This area is bordered on the west by the 
Adh Dhahirah region and on the east by the Ash Sharqiyah region. It 
has a high population density. It comprises eight wilayats. 
 
The remaining governorates are; Ash Sharqiyah; Adh Dhahirah; Al Wusta;  
Dhofar, and; Musandam. 
 
4.2.2.5 Water Availability  
In Oman water is a very scarce resource; Oman is situated in one of the 
most water-stressed regions of the world where there is no surface water 
to speak of, and as a result relies heavily on groundwater and 
desalination. The main sources of fresh water in Oman are groundwater, 
most of which is non-renewable, and a limited amount of renewable near-
surface water. Non-conventional sources include desalinated seawater 
and wastewater treatment. 
 
Water supplied to the customers by the PAEW is derived from several 
different source categories (PAEW, 2012):  
1. Desalinated water from:  
 Independent Water and Power Projects (IWPP) plants at Ghubrah, 
Barka and Sohar;  
 An Independent Water Project (IWP) at Sur;  
 Plants owned and operated by the Rural Areas Electricity Company 
(RAECo), and  
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 Plants owned by the PAEW but operated by contractors, and  
2. Community based fresh, groundwater wells.  
  
The volumes into supply during 2014 are shown in Table (4.1). Not all 
water is supplied into a piped network. Some wells only feed into tanker 
filling stations (PAEW Archive). 
 
Table 4.1: 2014 Water into Supply from Differing Sources 
Water Source Output as m3/yr 
Major desalination plants 
 
Ghubrah 66,430,000 
Barka I and II 77,015,000 
Sohar 54,750,000 
Sur 33,580,000 
Local RO (RAECO & PAEW) plants 4,1200,000 
PAEW local wells including those in Muscat  51,214,000 
Local wells with unclear status 4,580,323 
Total Water into Supply 291,168,323 
Source: (PAEW Archive) 
 
4.2.3 Overview of Supply System 
4.2.3.1 Transmission System 
The Muscat, Batinah North, Batinah South, Buraimi and Dhakhliyah 
regions are all interlinked, allowing flexibility of operation and security of 
supply in the case of a failure at a major treatment work. This transmission 
system is fed by three major desalination plants at Sohar, Barka (both in 
Batinah region) and Ghubra (Muscat region) and some well fields mainly 
located in Muscat. A schematic layout of the interconnected network is 
illustrated in Figure (4.3) below (PAEW, 2012). 
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Figure 4.3: Schematic of Interconnected Network 
 
Source: (PAEW, 2012) 
 
4.2.3.2 Water Supply Network 
Generally, water is pumped through the strategic transmission network to 
major distribution reservoirs sized to (1) ensure continuity of supplies in 
the event of a failure at a desalination plant or within the transmission 
network and, (2) to “smooth out” peak daily and weekly demands for which 
the desalination plants and strategic network are sized.   
 
There are no consumer connections directly fed by the transmission 
system. All customers are fed via a service reservoir, which receives its 
flow from the transmission network. Table (4.2) summarises the 
transmission and distribution networks. 
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Table 4.2 : Network Lengths and Materials 
Region 
Network Length (km) 
By Network By Pipe Materials 
Total 
Transmission Distribution DI AC HDPE uPVC MS GI Unknown 
Muscat 230 2106 230 527 1579     2336 
Batinah 668 1249 560  824 212 321   1917 
Dakhiyah 240 618 193 87 409  42 117  858 
Buraymi 163 288 281 144   26   451 
Dhahirah 389 454 389  431    23 843 
Sharqiyah 324 139 198 131  8 94  32 463 
Al Wusta 28 11 -  27  11  1 39 
Masandam 33 165 46 115 37     198 
Total 2075 5030 1897 1004 3307 220 504 117 56 7105 
Percentage 29% 71% 27% 14% 46% 3% 7% 2% 1% 100% 
Source: (PAEW, 2012) 
 
4.2.3.3 Water Tankers 
The PAEW uses water tankers to provide a supply to those who do not 
have a piped water supply. The tankers have access to the PAEW tanker 
filling stations (TFS), of which there are some 500. Many TFS are fed by a 
local on-site well and are not connected to the centralized pipe network. 
 
Some but not all consumers without a connection are provided with a free 
supply of up to 20 gallons per person per day but, due to lack of good 
records, there is no clear picture of the volume of water supplied for 
domestic consumption by tankers, or of the number and coverage 
achieved through tanker supplies. The long-term policy of the PAEW is to 
reduce the amount of water distributed by tanker. 
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4.2.4  Main Organizations in  the Water Sector  
4.2.4.1 Ministry of Regional Municipalities and Water Resources 
(MRMWR)  
The MRMWR plays a central coordinating role among the organizations 
involved in Oman’s water sector with the task of managing and assessing 
water resources through the maintenance of the aflaj, excavation of the 
auxiliary wells, building dams, monitoring water status, implementing 
projects for the utilization of non-traditional water resources, and 
enhancing awareness on the importance of protecting water resources 
from depletion and deterioration (MRMWR, 2010) 
 
4.2.4.2  Public Authority for Electricity and Water  
The Public Authority for Electricity and Water (PAEW) was established in 
2007, by the promulgation of Sultani Decree. While the MRMWR is 
responsible for water resources as a whole, the PAEW manages 
municipal water supplies. Its primary roles include:  
1. Providing drinking water according to Omani standards and in response 
to urban expansion;  
2. Activating and strengthening government policy to develop the water 
sector, and;  
3. Encouraging the private sector to invest in the water sector. 
  
The Head Quarters office, formed of 6 Directorates, provides policies, 
strategic guidance, finance, and logistical support to the regional 
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operational offices situated in the major towns of each region.  Currently 
there are nine regional organizations: Muscat, Batinah South, Batinah 
North, Dhakhliyah, Buraimi, Dhahirah, Ash Sharqiyah, Musandam, and Al 
Wusta as shown in Figure (4.2). 
 
4.2.4.3 National Committee for Civil Defense (NCCD) 
The National Committee for Civil Defense (NCCD) is the state 
organization responsible for planning and coordinating the response to 
natural or man-made disasters or emergencies that could impact the 
people, reputation, or environment of Oman.  As with all the other 
essential service providers and agencies in Oman, PAEW falls under the 
jurisdiction of NCCD. 
 
NCCD’s powers involve guiding the planning of PAEW and other Omani 
providers of essential services and coordinating live national emergencies 
such as cyclones or oil spills. For this purpose, the NCCD has created the 
National Emergency Management Plan (NEMP) which consists of a set of 
operational procedures to be carried out by the respective sectors before, 
during and after a crisis. As soon as a state of emergency is declared the 
NCCD takes over and ensures that all government, military, and police 
sectors discharge their duties as prescribed in the NEMP. The time-line in 
Figure 4.4 indicates the corner stones of emergency management in the 
Sultanate of Oman.  
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Figure 4.4: Timeline of Emergency Management in Oman  
 
(Source: Al-Shaqi, 2011) 
 
4.2.5 The Current PAEW Emergency Response Plan  
4.2.5.1 Overview 
PAEW routine day-to-day emergencies are managed in coordination with 
PAEW contractor’s representatives and staff, at an engineer’s level and 
would not normally involve PAEW managers unless the event worsens. 
Non-routine (major) emergencies are managed via an informal grouping of 
PAEW managers. The importance given to the emergency is based 
principally on the size or importance of the asset that has failed and the 
anticipated duration of an event but does not relate to any set service 
performance targets for service to customers (PAEW, 2011).  
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The PAEW engineers and managers responsible for managing an 
emergency do not have access to a common skills, training or equipment 
database and have not been provided with specialist training in 
emergency planning, response and management (PAEW, 2011). 
 
4.2.5.2 Crisis Management Facilities and Operational Tools 
PAEW currently manages all routine and any non-routine emergencies 
from operations offices based in the Head Office in Muscat and local 
regional offices. These offices have only standard office equipment and 
facilities and have not been adapted for crisis management purposes 
(PAEW, 2011).  
 
Thus, aside from crisis management facilities, operational tools, 
mandatory for supporting emergency responses, were to be improved:  
 SCADA: integrated SCADA systems instead of uncoordinated and 
isolated systems in some cases;  
 GIS: currently, the only GIS being under development concern the 
Muscat area only;  
 Hydraulic modelling: lack of strategic hydraulic models (under 
development under the current co-management contract) and 
modelling capabilities within PAEW (PAEW, 2011). 
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4.2.5.3 O & M Sub-Contractors Responsibilities 
O&M sub-contractors are responsible for carrying out the practical actions 
to resolve the causes of emergency events. They form an important part of 
both normal and abnormal responses to emergencies arrangements. For 
this reason, each PAEW contractor is contractually obliged to have a 
formal non-normal working hour’s standby system with the ability to 
provide sufficient resources and materials at any time (PAEW, 2011). 
 
4.3 The Challenge of Reducing NRW in Oman 
4.3.1 Water Balance Information 
The available data indicate that the level of water loss is above 40% 
(PAEW, 2010). The data in Table (4.3) show that the percentage of losses 
for most of the regions are most probably due to real losses, which are 
caused by the physical properties of the components of the system. 
 
Table 4.3: 2010 Water Balance (Mm3) 
Region 
Total 
Production 
and Supply 
1×106 (m3) 
Private 
1×106 
(m3) 
Government 
1×106 (m3) 
Tankers 
1×106 (m3) 
UFW 
1×106 (m3) 
UFW 
(%) 
Muscat 106373521 46962849 11060913 4968860 43380899 36-41 
Batinah 32670249 6654371 674402 2156022 22726621 70 
Dhakhilia 14239099 2993190 983082 3271187 6991640 49 
Buraimi 8267152 3640602 505890 1523087 2597572 31 
Sharqyah 15952564 4502521 752618 2444588 8252837 52 
Dhahira 6229653 2884579 702550 914350 1728174 28 
Musandam 4485792 1399391 741658 234850 2109893 47 
Total 189376940 69080031 15428780 16649937 87759359 44-46 
Source: (PAEW, 2010) 
105 
 
4.3.2 NRW Management within PAEW 
Apart from its other responsibilities (water quality, etc.), the Water 
Operation department is in charge of the various NRW related tasks in the 
field, such as: 
 Monitoring the volume of water produced by the different sources; 
 Operating and maintaining the water infrastructures; 
 Leak detection and DMA monitoring in Muscat; 
 Supervising leak repairs; 
 Replacing meters and supporting responding to technical complaints; 
 Producing monthly and annual reports. 
 
The primary function of the operations teams is to continuously monitor 
the network performance through the tasks listed above. 
 
4.3.3 The Al Seeb Wilayat Network – Case Study Location 
The values of water losses and NRW in water distribution networks of 
Oman were estimated and audited taking Al Seeb Wilayat network of 
Muscat Governorate as a case study. Al Seeb consists of a number of 
existing older towns primarily located along the coast. The area includes a 
light industrial estate occupied by small workshops and warehouses. A 
large percentage of the houses are connected to a fully reticulated water 
supply network although some houses are still supplied by tankers and 
also some pockets within the area have development potential. 
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The water in the area is distributed directly by a network of three types 
namely, Asbestos Cement (AC), Ductile Iron (DI), and High Density 
Polyethylene (HDPE) pipes.  Some of the pipes are in bad state of 
maintenance because they are more than 20 years old. The Transmission 
mains range from 150- 800 mm in diameter and the total length pipe is 29 
kilo meters, and the distribution pipelines range from 150- 800 mm in 
diameter with total length of the network pipe is about 740 kilo meters. Al 
Seeb transmission and distribution diameters and lengths summary are 
illustrated in Table (4.4).  This information is used in the water audit in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Table 4.4: Al Seeb Transmission and Distribution Diameters and 
Lengths Summary 
Transmission Mains Distribution Mains 
Diameter (mm) Length (m) Diameter (mm) Length (m) 
150 6,000 
80 17,010 
100 183,120 
400 15,000 
150 262,760 
200 110,096 
600 - 
250 15,963 
300 45,677 
800 8,000 
400 41,443 
600 20,300 
Total 29,000 
800 31,097 
1000 13,533 
Material 
 Total 740,999 
100% DI Material 67% HDPE, 33% AC 
Reservoirs Elevated Tank = 1,  Service Reservoir = 13,  Total = 14 
 
 
 
107 
 
4.4 The Impact of tropical Cyclone Gonu 
4.4.1 Event Description 
Tropical cyclones in Oman are frequent events during the monsoon 
season from May to August every year and in June 2007 the Sultanate of 
Oman awoke to one of the worst natural disasters in its recent history. 
Cyclone Gonu hit the country, causing torrential rains and flash floods. 
The cyclone claimed the lives of 49 people and left more than 20,000 
homeless. The infrastructure services of Oman were under unprecedented 
stress for days. Like all other services in the country, Gonu severely 
stretched health care services (Al-Shaqsi, 2010, 2011). 
 
Gonu developed to tropical storm on June 3rd and then to a cyclone in the 
middle of the Arabian Sea on June 4th with a surface wind speed of (213-
232 km/h) (Al Hattaly & Al-Kindy, 2008).  
 
On June 5th it hit the southeast coast of Oman at Ras Al Had and Sur with 
a wind speed of (213-250 km/h) classifying the storm as the highest 
severity “Category 4” storm (Table 2.1). Figure (4.5) is a satellite image 
taken on June 4th. The cyclone then moved toward northeast along the 
Gulf of Oman coast destroying and flooding the area of Muscat-Quriyat 
before it started to decrease its storm intensity to become a low 
pressure/depression and moved towards the northeast to the Coast of Iran 
June 7th (Al Hattaly & Al-Kindy, 2008). 
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Figure 4.5: Tracks of Cyclonic Storms in the Northern Indian Ocean 
(1970 – 2006)   
 
Source: Aljahwari, (2011) 
 
The rainfall associated with cyclone Gonu on June 4th – 5th was the most 
extreme in the Omani records. The cumulative rainfall in Jabal Asfar- a 
mountainous station in Quriyat reached 1032 mm within 3 hours, 8 times 
higher than the annual average and having a return period of 150- 200 
years as shown in Table (4.5). Dams were filled to capacity and water 
spilled over the dam structures. The biggest of Sultanate Oman dams is Al 
khoud Dam in the Muscat region with a maximum capacity of 12 million 
cubic meters (mcm), and it was filled overflowing. The total water flood 
that held by the dams on June 5th to 6th was approximately 71 mcm, in 
which 41 mcm was in Al khoud Dam (Al Khatry and Helmi, 2011). 
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Table 4.5 Cumulative Rainfall in mm Associated with Cyclone Gonu 
over the Stations of the Affected Areas on the 05th-06th of June, 2007 
Station Location Rainfall (mm) Annual Average 
Multiple of  
Annual Average 
Jabal Asfar Sharqiyah 1032 208 8 
Jabal Abeyad Sharqiyah 924 325 6 
Hayfaad Qurayat 626 72 9 
Jabal Hilm Sharqiyah 421 211 2 
Ba’ay Qurayat 378 76 8 
Jabal Tayyin Sharqiyah 348 102 7 
Qurayat Qurayat 322 126 2.5 
Al Amarat Muscat 320 82 7.5 
Seeb Muscat 257 76 7.4 
Source: (Al Khatry & Helmi, 2011) 
 
The coast of Oman was exposed to rainfall amounts that had not been 
witnessed before. For example, the Altaeeyan Dam station recorded more 
than 900 mm. Figure (4.6) shows the total rainfall in some stations around 
the Muscat area on 6th June, while Figure (4.7) describes the wadi water 
level in the same areas from 6th to 11th June 2007 (Al-Awadhi, 2009). 
 
Figure 4.6: The Total Rainfall in Muscat on June 6th, 2007 
 
Source: (Al-Awadhi, 2009). 
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Figure 4.7: The Total Water Level (mm3) Muscat Governorate (6th –
11th June, 2007) 
 
Source: (Al-Awadhi, 2009) 
 
4.4.2 The Damage 
The Government announced state of alert on June 4th and NCCD 
implemented several procedures to manage the expected disaster. 
Cyclone Gonu caused havoc to infrastructure, buildings and properties, 
and more than 50 lives were lost in the areas of Muscat, Sur and Quriyat. 
The economic loss was approximately 1.5billion Omani Riyal. The Photos 
on the sixth of June, 2007 in Figure (4.8) show infrastructure destruction, 
flooded roads, and human responses on the affected areas. 
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Figure 4.8: Destruction Caused by Gonu Cyclone  
Source: (Al Hattaly & Al-Kindy, 2008) 
 
Flooding caused by the cyclone left much damage such as: collapsed 
bridges, the uprooted trees, collapsed houses, broken roads, etc. (See 
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 for some example of the destruction.)  A survey 
immediately after the cyclone (Table 4.6) showed that of more than 60,000 
built units surveyed, 50% were declared damaged (Al-Awadhi, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Height of Water in Al Qurm Area of Muscat 
 
 
 
Flooded Roads in Muscat  
 
Road Destruction in Muscat  
 
Human Responses 
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Figure 4.9: Heavy Rain Flooded Urban Streets and Buildings in 
Muscat 
 
Source: (Inceruh, 2009) 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Destructive Effects of Storm Floods at Muscat  
 
Source: (Inceruh, 2009) 
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Table 4.6: The Details of Destruction Survey from Cyclone Gonu 
Willayat 
House 
Surveyed 
House 
Accounted 
House 
Damaged 
Furniture 
House 
Equipments 
Personal 
Belongs 
Transport 
Vehicles 
Mutrah 4273 1135 888 718 730 542 428 
Bosher 7179 3894 2776 2680 2721 2310 4065 
A’Seeb 30498 12239 9035 7614 7888 6311 5676 
Al Amerat 5868 3468 3089 2013 2044 1419 397 
Muscat 607 500 470 387 359 369 144 
Qurayat 3512 3115 2891 2470 2478 2436 944 
Barka 828 20 552 404 414 318 188 
Dbai Al-Bayah 68 68 56 54 39 44 3 
Bidbid 95 95 86 73 61 73 5 
Sur 5984 4825 4294 3458 3132 2764 386 
Al-Qabi 7 7 7 0 1 0 0 
Dami 160 159 153 76 90 88 10 
Al-Kamil 141 134 121 15 29 33 2 
Galan Bani Bo Ali 1396 936 759 599 394 511 6 
Galan Bani Husain 213 135 117 78 17 56 1 
Wadi Bani Khalid 130 129 125 15 21 14 0 
Total 61058 31459 25419 20654 20418 17287 12255 
Source: (Al-Awadhi, 2009) 
 
4.4.3 Emergency Response to Cyclone Gonu  
4.4.3.1 Oman on Alert as Gonu Approaches 
On June 5th 2007 Oman’s emergency services were placed on full alert as 
the Sultanate braces for one of the worst cyclonic storms ever to hit the 
country. The approaching storm is likely to unleash heavy rain, gusting 
winds and tidal waves. Large coastal swathes stretching from Ras al Hadd 
to Ras Madrakah will have to bear the brunt of the storm. NCDC urges 
coastal residents to shift to safer areas Army, Air Force, schools as 
temporary shelters for people affected (Al-Yahayi, 2009 and Al-Shaqsi, 
2010).  
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The government issued a three-day cyclone alert and announced a full 
mobilization of the country’s Civil Defense apparatus, with the Sultan’s 
Armed Forces, and other security and government agencies also set to 
play a supportive role. The head of the NCDC convened a special meeting 
of the committee at the General Headquarters of the Royal Oman Police 
(ROP) at Qurum. Also in attendance were officials from various ministries 
represented on the NCDC (Al Jabri, 2012).  
 
4.4.3.2 Actions of PAEW 
Once the danger of flood waters were addressed, drinking water 
restoration became the next priority. PAEW in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Royal Oman Police (OMP) made their best 
efforts to restore water supply to the areas, which had been affected by 
the cyclone. Urgent meetings were conducted with senior directors to 
discuss the ways to be taken to mitigate the effects of the storm and it 
convened the Corporate Emergence Control Centre (CECC) at Bousher 
reservoir. Table (4.7) indicates the sequence of actions during and after 
the Gonu crisis (Al Jabri, 2012). 
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Table 4.7: Sequence of Operation of the CECC during and After Gonu 
Cyclone 
Date Activities 
4/6/2007 
Official warnings of approaching storm. Senior management hold 
emergency meeting. 
5/6/2007 PAEW convenes Corporate Emergency Coordination Centre. 
6/6/2007 The damage assessment/repair Teams were assembled at CECC.  
7/6/2007 
CECC starts working on the recovery and restoration of Generator 
deployed to PAEW water well to power the water. Identifying the 
effected pipe line to start repair work 
8/6/2007 CECC coordinates resumption of water supplies. 
9/6/2007 Water delivery by tankers to affected area  
10/6/2007 CECC met to evaluate the action which has been taken. 
11/6/2007 
Gas and electric power was restored, many of the affected systems 
have been able to restore needed services. 
15/6/2007 
About 70% of the affected drinking water facilities were again 
operating.  
30/6/2007 100%  Restoration of water to Muscat affected areas 
 
4.4.3.3 PAEW Emergency Procedures 
Based on the findings presented in the previous sections for the proposed 
organization and level of emergency, the following diagram (Figure 4.11) 
shows a summary of the chain of emergency response, from event to 
problem-solving while implementing mitigation measures and providing 
alternative supplies.  
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Figure 4.11: Emergency Procedures 
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4.4.4 Disturbance to Water Supplies 
4.4.4.1 Disturbance to Production   
The water supply for Muscat Governorate and the other governorates 
nearby is totally from the Al Ghubrah and Barka seawater desalination 
plants. Both stopped operating because of the cyclone. The gas supply 
was cut to Al Ghubrah desalination (Figure 4.12). On 6th June, as a result 
of the disruption in the gas supply, Ghubrah Power and Desalination. 
 
Figure 4.12: Al Ghubrah Desalination Plant 
 
 
 
Company (GPDC) had to switch to emergency procedures such as 
running the station on liquid fuel. Within two days the water production 
from Al Ghubrah reached 25 per cent of plant capacity and this was raised 
to 80 per cent when the gas supply was restored. 
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4.4.4.2 Disturbance to Well Fields 
Two well fields located in the Wadi Adai and Al Khoudh areas of the 
Muscat governorate are used as standby reserves. The two well fields can 
produce about 10 million gallons per day but the Wadi Adai field was 
totally washed out while the power supply to Al Khoudh field was cut due 
to the destruction of electricity poles.  
 
4.4.4.3 Disturbance to Distribution System 
Most of the transmission pipelines, distribution networks and house 
connections in the affected areas were disrupted, some of the pipe lines 
being lifted from their original alignment. As an example, the situation in 
Al-Amirat Wilayat of Muscat governorate was very severe as the 
transmission main between the Wadi Adia well field and the Al-Amirat 
reservoir was totally washed out by the flood in the wadi. 
 
At the same time, many chambers and pipelines appurtenances such as 
valves, elbows, hydrants, etc. were damaged. Many pumping stations 
stopped working through high water levels and some pumping equipment 
and electrical installations was damaged. The storage tanks and 
reservoirs were also affected in that big cracks appeared in some tanks 
and reservoirs, and complete or partial failures occurred.  
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4.5 Risk Analysis Case Study 
4.5.1 Introduction 
In this research work, risks (due to tropical cyclones, leakage problems, 
and other human related influences) to the water supply system have 
been determined as part of a larger study on stress factors in operating 
water networks and the security of water supply in the Sultanate of Oman. 
The study was focused on the identification of all hazardous events which 
may occur to the main desalination plants (source) and within the 
transmission pipelines which might influence the quality of distributed 
water either in terms of non-compliance with national drinking water quality 
standards or the danger of compromising consumer health or confidence. 
 
The risks to water supply system were analyzed using the Coarse Risk 
Analysis (CRA) method and it covers the major desalination plants and the 
main water transmission systems with the Al Ghubrah desalination plant 
and the Greater Muscat and Al Dakhliya Governorates water supply 
systems as case studies.  Brief descriptions are presented below.   
 
4.5.2 Major Desalination Plants 
The Sultanate of Oman has been using desalinated water since 1976 
when the Al-Ghubrah power and seawater desalination plant was first 
commissioned. It was installed to meet continuously growing water 
demand due to population growth and economic development and to 
reduce reliance on groundwater resources. Desalinated water usage in 
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Oman is expected to increase further in the future due to new industrial 
and tourism-related developments. 
 
 In Oman, there are six large desalination plants located in Muscat, Al 
Batina and Ash Sharqiyah Governorates, and one big plant with a capacity 
of 68000 cubic meters is proposed in Salalah south of Oman. In addition, 
there are many small scale plants in different locations. Details of the main 
existing desalination plants are presented in Table (4.8). 
 
Table 4.8: Main Existing Desalination Plants 
S.# 
Name of 
Plant 
Year of 
Commissioning 
No. 
of 
Units 
Design 
Capacity 
(m3/day) 
Actual  
capacity 
(m3/day) 
Type of 
Desalination 
1. 
Al 
Ghubra 
Unit 1 1976 
7 191000 182000 MSF 
Unit 2 1982 
Unit 3 1986 
Unit 4 1986 
Unit 5 1992 
Unit 6 1997 
Unit 7 2002 
2. Barka I 2003 3 91000 91000 MSF 
3. Barka II 2009 1 120000 120000 RO 
4. Sohar 2007 4 150000 150000 MSF 
5. Sur I 2008 1 12000 12000 RO 
6. Sur II 2009 1 80000 80000 RO 
7.  Salalah Proposed 1 68000 68000 TBC 
Total Desalination Capacity (cubic meter per day) 703000 
Source: (PAEW Archive) 
 
1) Al Ghubra Plant: The first multistage flash (MSF) desalination unit at 
Al-Ghubrah was constructed in 1976 and had a capacity of 22,750 m3/day. 
The other six MSF units each have a capacity of 26,500 m3/day. PAEW 
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has also proposed a new scheme to upgrade Al-Ghubrah by 2015 to a 
total capacity of 110,000 m3/day, built and operated by the private sector. 
The layout of the plant is presented in Figure (4.13) 
 
2) Barka Plants: The Barka power and seawater desalination plant is 
located 50 km north-west of Muscat was built in 2003. Barka I has three 
MSF desalination units each with a capacity of 30,300 m3/day. The 
capacity of the reverse osmosis Barka II is 120,000 m3/day bringing the 
total desalination capacity for Muscat to 393,000 m3/day. 
 
3) Sohar Plant: Built in 2007, Sohar Power Company supplies drinking 
water in the Batinah region and the Sohar industrial port area. It has four 
MSF desalination units, each with a capacity of 37,500 m3/day. 
 
4) Sur Plants: The new RO seawater desalination plant at Sur built in 
2009 brings an additional desalination capacity of 68,000 m3/day to satisfy 
the increasing demand of water in the Sharqiyah Governorate. The new 
Sur independent water project is located alongside the existing RO plant 
commissioned in 1993 with a capacity of 12,000 m3/day.  
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Figure 4.13:  The Layout of Al Ghubrah Power and Desalination Plant 
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4.5.3 Transmission Mains 
1) Greater Muscat: Under normal operation, Ghubrah supplies Quram, 
Muttrah, Muscat and Al Amerat, whilst Bawsher and Seeb are served from 
Barka. An outline of the system is presented in Figure (4.14). In an 
emergency, water may be supplied west from Ghubrah to the Seeb 
reservoirs or eastward from the Seeb reservoirs to Bawsher.  
 
2) Ad Dakhliyah: is served by the Barka desalination plant. Water is 
pumped from the Barka transmission main inland to supply several areas. 
An outline of the system is shown in Figure (4.15). 
 
3) Southern Batinah: is served by the Barka desalination plant. Under 
normal operation, Barka supplies two coastal and four inland wilayats. An 
outline of the system is shown in Figure (4.16). In emergencies, water may 
be pumped south from Sohar desalination plant to Musanaah. 
 
4) North Batinah and Buraymi: The Northern Batinah Region and 
Buraymi are served from the Sohar desalination plant two coastal wilayats 
via Buraymi and Sohar service and intermediate reservoirs, from which 
water flows by gravity to Sohar and three coastal wilayats (Figure 4.17). In 
an emergency, water may be pumped north from Barka desalination plant. 
 
5) Sharqiyah Regional System: is served by Sur desalination plant. 
Under normal operation, water from Sur supplies Sur town and its 
environs and is pumped to Al Kamil from and four wilayats (Figure 4.18). 
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Figure 4.14: Outline of Greater Muscat Transmission System 
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Figure 4.15: Outline of Dakhliyah Transmission System 
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Figure 4.16: Outline of Southern Batinah Transmission System 
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Figure 4.17: Outline of North Batinah Transmission System 
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Figure 4.18: Outline of Sharqiyah Transmission System 
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4.6 Limitations  
When dealing with analysis of the stress factors in operating a water 
network in an arid country taking Oman as case study it is impossible to 
include all aspects. This thesis is addressed and highlighted the stresses 
from tropical cyclones and from the problem of water losses and of other 
manmade hazards. This risk analysis and assessment of water supply 
systems focused on the major desalination plants and transmission 
pipelines. The research is based on integrated risk assessments and how 
the results from risk assessment can be used in decision analysis and in 
the preparation of a water emergency response plan. 
 
The thesis does not deal with marine hazard or risks of other exceptional 
events such as earthquakes. Furthermore, the thesis does not focus 
specifically on crisis management, although risk assessments and 
decision analyses are important when preparing for a crisis. 
 
The area where the studies are to be conducted was restricted to the Al 
Seeb Wilayat in Muscat Governorate only.  
 
4.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined the case study area used in the present 
research work and the hazards which exist in the area. Case studies have 
strength through their ability to deal with a full range of evidence such as 
documentation, artifacts, interviews, and observations. Limitations of the 
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approach centre on potential issues of validity, researcher bias and the 
difficulty in generalizing from the case study findings. However, case 
studies are an important and useful method of data collection, especially in 
cases of rare phenomena provided the data build on existing knowledge 
and ensure findings are as applicable to real life as possible. 
 
Tropical storm Gonu was a really exceptional event in which the regions 
affected in Oman were without water supply for a month. The most 
valuable lesson learned from Gonu was that all water systems are required 
to develop emergency response plans based on vulnerability assessments 
on individual systems. 
 
This experience spotlights the importance of a flood risk management plan 
which should be prepared and implemented in such cases in order to 
minimize the impact of such floods resulting from exceptional weather 
conditions. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the water audit and water losses for the 
case study using the research methodology described in chapter 3. The 
analysis of risks for the desalination plants and transmission mains, are 
presented in chapter 6.  
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Chapter 5 Water Audit and Water Loss 
 
5.1  General Background 
5.1.1 Overview 
Water losses in distribution and transmission networks have the major 
challenge of non-revenue water. This issue represents one of the main 
stress factors in operating a water network throughout the world including 
Oman utilities where the production cost of water is high due to the very 
high operating cost of operating desalination plants. In this part of the 
research, an attempt is made to identify the level of risks caused by Non 
Revenue Water (NRW) and how these risks may be reduced. For this 
purpose, values of water loss and NRW for the Al Seeb Wilayat network of 
Muscat Governorate were audited, and detailed information was obtained 
on current water loss prevention and management practices. The results 
obtained for water losses, NRW, and water balance are presented in this 
chapter along with the recommended strategy and method for water loss 
and NRW reduction. 
 
Although it is commonly accepted that any water network cannot be 
leakage free and water loss cannot be avoided, it is vital to ensure that the 
level of losses are known, monitored and controlled (IWA, 2003). The 
problem of water losses in Oman is chronic and its reduction is critical to 
efficient resource utilization, efficient utility management, enhanced 
consumer satisfaction, and postponement of capital-intensive additions to 
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capacity. During the period running up to this research, the level of water 
loss in Oman was shown to be above 40%, which is high by international 
standards PAEW (2012). 
 
5.1.2 AWWA Water Audit Tool 
The components of NRW can be determined by conducting a water 
balance based on the measurement or estimation of water produced, 
imported, exported, consumed or lost. The water balance calculation 
provides a guide to how much is lost as leakage from the network (‘real’ 
losses), and how much is due to ‘apparent’ or non -physical losses 
(Malcolm, 2010). The first step for any utility aiming to reduce water losses 
is to prepare a baseline to establish current levels of water losses through 
a water audit, a critical but often overlooked first step. 
 
In the present study, the AWWA methodology and software were used 
for water auditing as it is the recognized best practice approach (ref),  
now being adopted by a number of water agencies and authorities 
worldwide. AWWA’s Free Water Audit Software Package gives the 
drinking water industry a standardized tool to improve accountability and 
track water loss standing.  
 
Water Audit as a tool came into the picture in late 1980s to overcome 
drought related problems, water shortages, leakages and losses (EPA, 
2012).  The International Water Association (IWA) and the American 
 133 
 
Water Work Association (AWWA) initiated a large-scale effort to assess 
how to reduce the above problems through auditing (Friedman, et al, 
2009). With the help of a water audit, operators can identify and 
quantify what steps can and should be taken to reduce water use and 
losses. This also saves precious resources and public money 
(Ganorkar et al, 2013). 
 
 The AWWA Water Audit methodology is consistent with that developed 
and published in 2000 by the International Water Association (IWA) 
Water Loss Task Force, of which AWWA was a participating member. 
An important principle of the AWWA method is that all water goes to 
either consumption or loss and it includes definitions for all uses and 
water losses. It is designed to function for all units of measure, and it 
Includes performance indicators for realistic assessments, 
benchmarking, and target setting (EPA, 2012).   
 
The main advantages of IWA/AWWA Methodology are (EPA, 2012): 
 Structured to follow standard international best practice methodology 
and terminology. 
 Accounts for all water uses and calculates non-revenue water (NRW). 
 Adopts a specific method for calculating unavoidable annual real 
losses (UARL). 
 Incorporates losses per unit length of main per unit of pressure drop. 
 Water utilities worldwide can be compared on the basis of water loss 
performance indicators. 
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The software tool is in the form of a Microsoft Excel workbook, and the 
most current version of the software is Version 5.0, which is available for 
free download on AWWA’s website (WSO, 2014). Upon opening the 
spreadsheet, the user will find 12 worksheets, three of which require data 
entry, and two of those three require little information. The other nine 
sheets serve a variety of functions, including presentation of performance 
indicators, the automatically populated water balance, and helpful 
background information and definitions (WSO, 2014). 
 
 The software was developed to (Kunkel, 2006): 
 Promote the best-practice water audit method developed by the 
International Water Association and AWWA, 
 Assess water supply efficiency in a standard, reliable manner, and 
 Give utilities a simple, user-friendly way to compile and compare their 
water audit data with other utilities. 
 
5.1.3 Assumptions and Limitations of the AWWA tool 
There are two principal assumptions behind the AWWA tool. First, 
standard values are set for flow meter accuracy. The software should 
enable users to edit the meter accuracy values appropriately, and the 
software will read what the user has utilized. In other words, before the 
user starts using the software, it should be set to utility-specific information 
where available but default values are used where there are no local data. 
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Secondly, water meters do not stop registering flow rates that do not range 
within the set AWWA standard accuracy figures. The software assumes 
that water is flowing within its set range even when that is not true since 
some meters may either run below or above the set ranges depending on 
how the specific user is utilizing water. Water utilities differ from one 
customer to the other. 
The AWWA software is the best available solution to water supply and 
sanitation (Landis, 2015). However, as indicated above, the system has its 
flaws that should be worked on to improve service delivery. The software 
is used very widely by water utilities since it helps to reduce cases of water 
losses and ensures efficiency in the supply. Through use of the software, 
a best water practice in terms of auditing is achieved and reliability is 
guaranteed (Landis, 2015). 
The major limitation to the AWWA water software is its inability to detect 
cases of internal corrosion in the system. When internal corrosion of the 
pipes happens, the water supply is compromised in terms of quality since 
the water customers will get access to will be contaminated (Landis, 
2015). Through this inability to detect cases of internal corrosion within the 
water supply system, the major goal of supplying quality water at all times 
may be jeopardized. 
5.1.4  Review of NRW  Figures and Management 
The present PAEW strategy focuses mainly on NRW through improving 
infrastructure to reduce the amount of water supplied free of charge. Table 
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(5.1) show that the values of water losses varied between Governorates 
which gives the percentage of NRW on transmission and distribution 
networks (PAEW, 2010). 
 
The reasons for high levels of loss are a combination of a number of 
components: unmetered connections, leakage, operational use, metering 
errors, and inaccuracies in billing volumes. The split in the volume of water 
lost is in the ratio of 9% transmission and 91% distribution (both real and 
apparent) The average loss (both apparent and real losses at that stage) 
per km of distribution pipe per day is around 40 m3. 
 
Table 5.1: Regional Network Assessment in Terms of NRW (2010) 
Governorate 
Total 
Production 
(Mm3) 
Total 
Consumption 
(Mm3) 
NRW 
(%) 
Trans. 
Length 
(km) 
Dist. 
Length 
(km) 
Trans. 
Loss 
(%) 
Dist. 
Loss 
(%) 
Muscat 106.373 63.170 40.6 230 2116 2 98 
Dhakhliyah 14.24 7.337 48.5 230 378 10 90 
Sharqiyah 15.156 7.832 48.3 324 * 14 86 
Dhahirah 6.23 4.587 26.4 389 454 74 26 
Wusta 1.095 1.189 -8.6 28 11 - - 
Batinah 17.172 1.189 43.6 668 985 28 72 
Buraimi 8.267 5.723 30.8 160 270 20 80 
Musandam 3.923 2.446 37.7 33 154 7 93 
Total 172.456 101.962 40.9 2062 4368 9 91 
* Full length of distribution mains not known 
 
Meter reading, billing and revenue collection is subcontracted to two 
companies, OIFC (Oman Investment & Finance Company) for the Muscat 
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area, and ONEIC (Oman National Engineer and Investment Company) for 
the regions.  Meters are not read frequently and in time, the more frequent 
the meters are read the earlier defective meters will be identified and can 
be replaced. At the same time, few consumer meters are installed in meter 
boxes exposing them to all weather conditions, especially the sun. 
 
5.2 Losses in Al Seeb Water Supply System 
5.2.1 Results of Audit Using AWWA Software 
The data for water loss and NRW analysis were collected by the 
researcher, and data analysis was carried out using the AWWA water 
auditing software version 3.0. The water supply data, authorized 
consumption and system data for the last five years (2008-2012) for the Al 
Seeb water network were collected and entered into the software-reporting 
sheet and the predicted values of water losses and non-revenue water 
were obtained. 
 
A sample reporting sheet for 2012 is included as Figure (5.1) and the 
reporting sheets for years 2008, 20009, 2010 and 2011 are given in 
Figures (E.1) to (E.4) of Appendix-E. The estimated values of apparent 
losses, real losses and total water losses, along with non-revenue water 
for Al Seeb Wilayat are presented in Table (5.2).  
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Figure 5.1: Water Audit Reporting Worksheet for 2012 
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Table 5.2: The Values of Water Losses and Non-Revenue Water as 
Percent by Volume of Water Supplied for Al Seeb Wilayat 
Year 
Water Losses  Non-
Revenue 
Water (%) Apparent (%) Real (%) Total (%) 
2008 20.4 25.0 45.4 46.7 
2009 19.6 23.4 43.0 44.5 
2010 18.3 22.8 41.1 42.3 
2011 19.0 17.2 36.2 37.5 
2012 19.6 15.4 35.0 36.2 
 
The apparent losses include all types of inaccuracies associated with 
customer metering as well as data handling errors (meter reading and 
billing), plus unauthorized consumption, for example, theft or illegal use. 
At around 19%, the values of apparent losses are very high and this is 
attributed to the following reasons: 
 The performance of the Billing and Collection Company and its delay in 
issuing water consumption bills. 
 Use of estimated meter readings. 
 Transcription of the data is inaccurate and disorganized. 
 High water pressure in some parts of the network.   
 Inaccuracy of the water meters, many of which are 15 years old. 
 The lack of an integrated database that enables decision-makers to 
take the necessary measures to monitor the performance of the Billing 
and Collection Company. 
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The values of real losses are comparatively high but the data show that 
real losses have decreased from approximately 25.0% in 2008 to about 
17.2% in 2011 and 15.4% 2014. The most probable reason for the 
improvement is improved management of the water network and a more 
intensive maintenance programme.  
 
The values of NRW as a percentage by volume of water supplied (>35%) 
are very high due to the high apparent losses explained above. Unbilled 
authorized consumption is low (less than 2%). 
 
5.2.2 Performance Indicators 
The performance indicators used in this research were introduced in Section 
2.2.4 and this section develops the values gained for specific indicators. The 
performance indicators in terms of both financial and operational efficiency of 
the network are calculated in the AWWA software using the methodology 
outlined in Alegre et. al. (2006). 
 
1) Financial Indicator: 
The results for the financial indicators are given in Table (5.3). The total 
annual cost of operating the Al Seeb water system in 2012 was $30.6 
Million. The total annual operating cost in 2008, 2009, 2010, and to 2011 
was $16.5, $21.2, $23.5, and $28.3 Million respectively. 
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Table 5.3: Financial Indicator of Water Losses and NRW for Al Seeb 
Wilayat  
 
The results in Table (5.3) show that the total annual cost of apparent and 
real losses in the last five years is more that 9.0 Million USD, which is 
almost equal to one third of total annual operation cost. This value is very 
high compared to international best practice (Kingdom et al., 2006).  The 
values of NRW as percent of cost are also high and they consensus with 
the NRW as percent of volume.  The non-revenue cost in the year 2012 
was 31.7%, which means that one third of water supplied to Al Seeb 
Wilayat was considered as non-revenue water. 
 
2) Operational Indicators: 
The key operational indicators are the losses per service connection per 
day and the Infrastructure Leakage Index (ILI) as discussed in Section 3.5. 
The results of apparent and real losses per service connection per day 
and ILI are given in Table (5.4). 
 
 
 
Year 
Annual Cost of Water Losses (USD x 106) Non-Revenue Water 
as Percent of Cost 
(%) 
Apparent Real 
2008 3,46 5,77 57.8 
2009 3,40 5,60 43.9 
2010 3,80 6,45 45.0 
2011 4,07 5,02 33.5 
2012 4,50 4,79 31.7 
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Table 5.4: The Operational Efficiency Indicators for Al Seeb Network 
Year 
Losses per Service  Connection per Day 
(liter/connection/day) 
Infrastructure Leakage 
Index (ILI) (real losses/ 
UARL) 
Apparent  losses Real losses 
2008 568.1 697.54 7.0 
2009 477.9 578.6 5.8 
2010 479.8 599.4 6.0 
2011 490.6 444.1 4.5 
2012 492.7 385.8 3.9 
 
There is little change in the values of apparent losses per service 
connection per day (at around 19%) after 2008 whereas the real losses per 
service connection per day decreased from 697.5 to 385.8 
liter/connection/day between 2008 and 2012 due to improvements in the 
management of the system. The value of ILI also decreased to 3.9 in 2012 
for the same reason compared to a target value of 1.0 (Delgado, 2008). 
 
5.2.3  Al Seeb System Water Balance 
The water balance for 2012 is presented in Figure (5.2) and the values for 
2008 to 2011 are shown in Figures (C.5) to (C.8) of Appendix C.  
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Figure 5.2: Water Balance for Al Seeb Wilayat (Year 2012) 
 
Table (5.5) summarizes the water balance results for 2012. The 
percentage values are given in the final output which for 2008-2011 are 
included in Tables (C.1) to (C.4) of Appendix C. 
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Table 5.5:  Al Seeb Water Balance for Year 2012 
AWWA Water Audit Software: Water Balance Report For: Al Seeb Wilayat Report Year: 2012 
Own Sources 
(Adjusted for 
known errors) 
(100%) 
Water Exported 
(0%) 
Billed Water Exported 
(0%) 
Water Supplied 
(100%) 
Authorized 
Consumption 
(65.0%) 
Billed Authorized 
Consumption 
(63.8%) 
Billed Metered Consumption 
(63.8%) Revenue Water 
(63.8%) Billed Unmetered Consumption  
(0%) 
Unbilled Authorized 
Consumption 
(1.2%) 
Unbilled Metered Consumption 
(0%) 
Non-Revenue 
Water (NRW) 
(36.2%) 
Unbilled Unmetered Consumption 
(1.2%) 
Water Losses 
(35.0%) 
Apparent Losses 
(19.6%) 
Unauthorized Consumption 
(0.3%) 
Customer Metering Inaccuracies 
(1.3%) 
Water Imported 
(0%) 
Systematic Data Handling Errors 
(18.0%) 
Real Losses 
(15.4%) 
Leakage on Transmission and/or Distribution 
mains 
Not broken down 
Leakage and Overflow at Utility’s Storage Tank 
Not broken down 
Leakage on Service Connections 
Not broken down 
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The water balance for Al Seeb Wilayat indicates that around half of the 
water supplied in 2008 was without revenue and considered as losses, but 
the condition improved in the subsequent four years due to efficient 
management of the water network resulting in the value for revenue water 
now standing at 63.8%. At the same time the water balance data show 
that the billed unmetered water consumption and unbilled metered water 
consumption were zero for all the years meaning that these measures are 
included in the authorized consumption values. 
 
The value of apparent losses was almost constant over the five year 
period (around 19%) and are mainly attributable to data handling errors 
(18.0%) related to the performance of the billing and collection company. 
The customer metering inaccuracies and illegal connections in Al Seeb 
area were less than 2%. Unbilled authorized consumption is within 2.0%.  
 
5.3  Questionnaire Results 
A questionnaire survey was conducted as part of this research (see 
section 3.3.3). The main objective of the survey was to understand how 
NRW is perceived by key staff members. 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
As the estimated water losses in Oman are approximately 40 to 50 
percent, it was critical to the research that the reasons for such relatively 
high values should be determined. The purpose of the survey of PAEW 
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staff was first to determine current water loss accounting practices, 
secondly to gain more information on current water loss prevention and 
management practices, and finally to make recommendations for more 
consistent water use accounting and water loss management. For this 
purpose, the researcher sought to discover from those PAEW staff who 
are concerned with water losses, what their perceptions were about the 
published NRW figure, their understanding of the impact and main causes 
of water loss, and their opinions on PAEW’s procedures and policy related 
to water loss reduction. 
 
This section explains the findings and answers to the questions in the 
questionnaire regarding water losses reduction management and strategy 
along with the obstacles for fighting water losses and strategic options. 
The overall feedbacks on this matter shows that there was uncertainty in 
stating the exact value of the NRW figure because the relatively junior staff 
questioned do not know exactly the estimated value. In spite of this, the 
results in Table 5.6 were consistent with the calculated values as shown in 
Table (5.2).  The answers of the staff to the question:- ‘which aspect of 
PAEW strategy focuses of deriving water loss figure?’ as presented in 
Table (5.7) confirmed that PAEW strategy focuses mainly on NRW.  
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Table 5.6: The Estimated Percentage of NRW in the Muscat Network 
Percentage for the water losses (%) Percentage (%) 
10-20 0 
20-30 30 
30-40 60 
40-50 10 
More than 50 3.33 
Don’t know 6.67 
Total 100 
 
 
Table 5.7: Method of Driving Water Losses Figures in PAEW 
Method Percentage (%) 
Leakage Level 10 
Leakage level and UFW 50 
UFW 30 
Non-Revenue Water (NRW) 0 
UFW and NRW 10 
Don’t know 0 
Total 100 
* UFW (Unaccounted for Water) is a term no longer in wide use 
 
5.3.2 Causes, Impacts and Solutions 
The third question was:- ‘What do you think are the main factors that 
contribute to water losses?’ and the answers are listed in Table (5.8). The 
data show that staff believe the main factors that contribute to water 
losses are the inaccuracies in billing volumes and the method of 
estimating consumption through faulty meters.  
 148 
 
 
Table 5.8: The Main Factors that Contribute to Water Losses 
Answers 
Prioritize  According to Contribution (1 = very high, 6 
= very low) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Meter Inaccuracies 
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
s
ta
ff
 
(%
) 
70 20 10 0 0 0 
Losses during repair 0 10 10 50 20 10 
Age of pipes 10 30 20 30 10 0 
Illegal Connection 0 0 0 10 20 70 
Service reservoir 
overflow 
0 10 20 0 50 20 
Water pressure 20 30 40 10 0 0 
 
The other factors that contribute to water losses are water pressure in the 
network and to a lesser degree the age of the pipes. The pressure in the 
network is high in some areas where the pipes are also old causing water 
leakage problems. It seems that there are relatively few illegal connections 
in Oman but in spite of this, PAEW periodically runs campaigns to reduce 
illegal connections and water theft. Some staff mentioned that water from 
hydrants either authorized or unauthorized is not monitored and accounted 
properly and also contributes to water losses. 
 
The impact of water losses figures on network operation and cost was also 
examined. The responses to the question:- ‘What do you think are the 
possible impacts of the high water loss figures?’ are presented in Table 
(5.9). The responses emphasize that high water loss figures results in high 
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, short lifespan of existing 
resources and increased expenditure on network development. 
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Table 5.9: The Possible Impacts to High Water Losses Figures 
Answers 
Prioritize  According to Contribution(1 = very high, 
6 = very low) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Reduction in pressure 
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
s
ta
ff
 (
%
) 10 10 20 50 0 10 
Increase expenditure 
on development 
30 20 20 20 10 0 
Water contamination 0 10 10 0 30 50 
High cost of O&M 50 30 10 0 10 0 
Short lifespan of 
existing resources 
30 20 30 10 10 0 
Property damage 0 0 0 0 30 70 
 
Table (5.10) summarizes the best solutions that could be utilized to reduce 
water losses in water systems and is derived from the responses to the 
question:- ‘What do you consider to be the best solution to the reduce 
water losses in water systems’?. 60% thought that the first priority was an 
active leak detection programme and 40% thought that improving metering 
was highest priority. Other staff thought that improvement of pipe 
maintenance and replacement of old pipes was important but, there was 
no perceived need to clamp down on illegal connections. 50% of staff 
supported increased public awareness not only to encourage the use of 
water wisely but also to encourage immediate reporting of any incidents 
such as pipe bursts or leaks in the distribution network. 
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Table 5.10: The Best Solution to the Reduce Water Losses  
Answers 
Prioritize  According to Contribution(1 = very 
high, 6 = very low) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Improve pipe maintenance 
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
s
ta
ff
 (
%
) 0 30 30 20 20 0 
Clampdown on illegal  
connection 
0 0 10 0 10 80 
Pipe replacement 0 40 10 30 10 10 
Active leak detection 60 30 10 0 0 0 
Increase public Awareness 0 0 30 10 50 10 
Improve metering 40 0 20 40 0 0 
 
5.3.3 Procedures and Policy 
The second part of the questionnaire to PAEW staff related to current 
procedures and policy. Five option were given for each policy (strongly 
agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree).The responses are 
summarized in Table (5.11). 
 
Table 5.11: Procedures and Policy for Water Losses 
Procedures and Policy 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Percentage of staff (%) 
A National Water Policy 
exists which aims at 
reducing water losses. 
10 70 10 10 0 
A Water loss reduction 
program is implemented. 
70 0 20 10 0 
Pressure management is 
used to reduce water losses. 
30 50 20 0 0 
A Network Maintenance/ 
Rehabilitation Program is 
Implemented. 
0 80 20 0 0 
Measures to fight illegal 
connections are applied 
50 10 10 30 0 
Grades: Strongly agree = 5, Agree = 4, Neutral = 3, Disagree = 2, Strongly disagree = 1 
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Most of the staff agreed that a national water policy exists which aims at 
reducing water losses and water loss reduction. This means that a policy 
for water losses reduction is available in Oman and the government is 
trying to apply this policy for different areas through a water loss reduction 
program. Pressure management and control is used to reduce water 
losses and network maintenance, and a rehabilitation program has been 
implemented. 
 
Table (5.12) gives statistics for the responses. The average values are 
around 4, which means the staff agree with the available procedures and 
policy. There is also a consensus in the answers of respondents hence the 
values of the standard deviation are low. 
 
Table 5.12:  Averages and Standard Deviations for Procedures and 
Policy  
Procedures and Policy Average Value Standard Deviation 
A National Water Policy exists which 
aims at reducing water losses. 
3.8 0.79 
A Water loss reduction program is 
implemented. 
3.6 0.70 
Pressure management is used to reduce 
water losses. 
4.1 0.74 
A Network Maintenance/ Rehabilitation 
Program is Implemented. 
3.8 0.42 
Measures to fight illegal connections are 
applied 
3.8 1.4 
 
5.3.4 Obstacles to Fighting Water losses 
The last set of questions related to the obstacles to fighting water losses, 
and in the same way five options were given for each question and the 
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responses are given in Table (5.13) while table (5.14) gives relevant 
statistics. 
 
Table 5.13: Obstacles to Fighting Water Losses  
Obstacles 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Percentage Value (%) 
Institutional situation 0 0 20 50 30 
Lack of financial means 
from PAEW 
0 10 20 70 0 
Lack of appropriate 
technologies for water 
loss reduction 
30 70 0 0 0 
Maintenance system 10 50 0 20 10 
Personnel capacities 
(technicians) 
60 40 0 0 0 
Personnel awareness 20 30 10 0 40 
Public acceptance / 
awareness 
10 30 0 20 40 
Grades: Strongly agree = 5, Agree = 4, Neutral = 3, Disagree = 2, Strongly disagree = 1 
 
 
Table 5.14:  Averages and Standard Deviations for Fighting Water 
Losses 
Obstacles Average Value Standard Deviation 
Institutional situation 1.9 0.74 
Lack of financial means from PAEW 2.7 1.06 
Lack of appropriate technologies for 
water loss reduction 
3.9 1.1 
Maintenance system 3.2 1.3 
Personnel capacities(technicians) 4.6 0.51 
Personnel awareness  2.9 1.7 
Public acceptance / awareness 2.3 1.5 
 
It is clear that the main obstacle is with the leak detection staff (average 
value = 4.6). It seems there are insufficient qualified staff available to carry 
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out the activities related to leak detection.  There are also no formal or 
refresher training programmes in the use of the leakage equipment and it 
is clear that training is given a very low priority. The standard deviation for 
the responses is very small, which means that there is consensus in staff 
views on the importance of this topic. The other important factor is the lack 
of appropriate technologies for water loss reduction. 
 
There is no financial justification that prevents PAEW implementing a 
robust program to fight water losses and 60% of staff agreed that there is 
problem in system maintenance. The other factors such as personnel 
awareness and public acceptance/awareness were not seen to be 
obstacles in fighting water losses. 
 
5.4  Developing a Strategy for Reducing Water Losses 
5.4.1 Introduction  
To deal effectively with water loss it is important to understand the 
characteristics and the significance of each of the components of water 
loss. This is particularly true in countries such as Oman where scarcity of 
water resources forces the extensive use of desalination to produce 
potable water. The high costs of producing water in this way are an 
important element of operational budgets. Energy consumed in the 
process also results in a high environmental impact, compounded by the 
need to transport water over long distances, and across mountain ranges, 
from the coast to the center of Oman (Butler et al, 2006). 
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5.4.2 Understanding the Starting Point 
The best approach to start to draw up a strategy to deal with losses in any 
water supply system is to understand the sources of leakages in the 
system. The two most important components of NRW from the Al Seeb 
Case Study are the real losses and the apparent losses (IWA, 2005) 
which together need the most resource in terms of logistics, staffing and 
finance to control water losses. Farley &Trow (2003) suggests that 
strategies that might enable a better estimate of the actual losses to be 
made include; distribution input, per capita consumption, non-household 
water use and operational use. In addition, several factors influence real 
losses to a lesser or greater extent including; the pressure in the network, 
(typical flow rate and burst,) awareness time, location time, repair time 
and the level of background leakage. These factors in turn are also 
influenced by such factors as; long-term pipe network management, 
pressure management, speed and quality of repairs and active leakage 
control measures in place (Farley et al, 2003). Understanding and 
identification of these factors is a major steps towards dealing effectively 
with real losses (Butler et al, 2006).  
 
The researcher had a personal interview with Mr. Lambert O. Allan, the 
first chairman of the IWA Water Loss Task Force at the IWA World water 
Congress & Exhibition, Montreal, Canada. September 2010. Mr Allan is of 
the view that, without pressure management nothing else would work so 
far as leakage control is concerned (Personal Communication, 2010).  
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PAEW implements an ambitious strategy to monitor and reduce water 
losses throughout its water networks across the sultanate. The results of 
the questionnaire survey are interpreted to show that the strategy for 
reducing water losses should include the following; 
 
1. Integrated Management: Reducing NRW is a multi-departmental task 
that involves front line services such as Water Operations, Customer 
Services, Asset and Planning and Project Departments with Support 
Services making a substantial contribution through the recruitment and 
training of staff and procuring materials and equipment. 
 
2. Data reporting: Data reporting should be improved through a three 
pronged approach: 
 Installing and maintaining a network of devices to measure all 
inputs to and outputs from all part of the water system. 
  Implementing a fault reporting methodology. 
 Closely monitoring the performance of the Billing and Collection 
Contractors. 
 
3. Flow Monitoring: District Metered Areas should be set up by 
installing flow meters on system inlets with the outlets either isolated 
through closing valves or installing flow meters. The net volume of 
water supplied can then be compared to the volume of water 
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consumed (either measured or estimated) to assess the level of 
efficiency losses of the area. 
 
4. Leak Repair Response: At the current time all leak repairs are out-
sourced in all regions. The recommendation here is to develop limited 
in-house capability but continue to utilize external companies to 
provide the most efficient form of leak repair (cost and speed).  
 
5. Meter accuracy checking and replacement: It is also important to 
improve meter reading accuracy and identify meters that require 
maintenance. The PAEW standards and specifications contain a 
metering specification designed to improve the accuracy of meters 
and prolong their working life. 
 
6. Leakage teams: It is essential that sufficient leakage teams are to be 
created and provided with the necessary training and equipment to 
enable them to carry out their allotted tasks efficiently and to raise leak 
detection practices in Oman. 
 
5.5 Discussion on Non Revenue Water 
5.5.1 The outputs obtained 
The need for efficient management of water resources and the accurate 
metering of water flows are specific issues that require high priority 
attention in today’s international climate of environmental sustainability 
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and conservation of natural resources (Farley & Trow,  2003; WHO, 
2001).. There is need for the establishment of strong water systems for 
distributing potable water to the residents. It is observed that developing 
countries - like Sultanate of Oman - are facing some deficiencies in water 
distribution systems that cause high values of NRW and water losses 
(Lambert, 2003). The values of NRW and water losses in Oman are high 
reference to the International standards (Ref). For this reason a tool such 
as the AWWA tool that can monitor the water distribution is necessary for 
safety, reliability and low cost in the distribution system model.  
 
The first, basic step to developing a strategy for management of NRW was 
to gain a better understanding of the amount and sources of NRW and the 
factors that influence its components through calculating the water 
balance. The AWWA water audit method was used to analyze the factors 
associated with water losses and the PAEW responses to the problem. 
The results of the water audit indicate that the percentage of NRW in 
Oman is more than 35%. The level of NRW in the other Gulf countries has 
been reported to be as high as 40% for Bahrain, 35% in Saudi Arabia, and 
30% in the united Arab Emirate (Zyadin, 2013). Reducing apparent losses 
goes hand in hand with reducing real losses. Real losses arise from 
operational costs such as power, maintenance and the treatment costs 
incurred by the supply agents. Using the AWWA water software ensures 
early detection of such leakages enabling the supply agents respond 
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immediately thereby reducing the time intervals for maintenance and 
reconnection to the water supply system. 
 
The study also explored PAEW staff perceptions about the adoption of 
water-loss management procedures and identified organizational 
characteristics that may influence management’s decisions to adopt such 
strategies. The inaccuracies in billing volumes and the method of 
estimating consumptions through faulty meters had the most significant 
impacts on water losses. Therefore discourages the unscrupulous 
connecting to water supply (gaps in the billing operations) which may allow 
some customers to obtain water without payment. The software through 
improved maintenance reduces the likelihood of damage to property and 
improves and safeguards the public health. The study found that the 
number of qualified staff available to carry out the activities related to leak 
detection was low and appropriate technologies for water loss reduction 
are lacking. It was also clear that maintenance systems should be 
improved to achieve better performance of the network by decreasing 
water losses.  
 
Finally, the software reduces disruption to customers. Repairing leaks 
proactively before they develop to larger leakages or even breakages that 
may disrupt water supply services. Moreover, the software allows for 
accountability for the water utility in the community. Through this, the utility 
may secure funds aimed at sustaining upkeep of the operations in the 
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future and suggest several policy and strategy implications for reducing 
water losses.  
 
5.5.2 Limitations of the case study data. 
In the determination of the Current Real Loss values, the large meter on 
the outlet from the main storage reservoir has not been accurately 
calibrated, giving rise to potentially significant apparent losses. Further, 
domestic meters are notoriously inaccurate especially when they are not 
replaced regularly, leading to further apparent losses, although these 
inaccuracies may cancel each other out. Also excluded from the audit are 
unregulated or unauthorized use of hydrants and illegal connections.  
 
If those losses were quantified and omitted from the average daily inflow 
figures from each DMA, a much lower ILl figure might have been attained.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The study of NRW has determined the components of water loss in the 
exemplar Al Seeb network. From these water loss indicators, performance 
indicators were calculated and using with the current internationally 
accepted method of calculation (the AWWA method). For this purpose, the 
water system of Al Seeb Wilayat in Muscat was taken as a case study. 
The implementation of a rigorous Metering and Non Revenue Water 
Strategy will supply a starting point for PAEW to allow for the proper 
assessment of losses within the technical and economic limitations. 
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5.7 Next Step 
This chapter has addressed most of the issues, both technical, operational 
and financial, surrounding water losses from distribution networks in 
Oman. However, these are the day-to-day issues of operating and 
managing a water supply and distribution network. The next issue to be 
addressed in chapter 6 is the likelihood of more extreme yet less frequent 
system problems. Consequently, the issue of risks to the system follow. 
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6 Chapter  6  Risk Assessment and Analysis 
 
The risk assessment and resilience approaches that were developed in 
the literature review in Chapter 2 were applied using the methodology of 
Chapter 3 to a number of the desalination plants and transmission 
systems that are described in Chapter 4. Risk assessments and 
determination of resilience require detailed knowledge of the system under 
study and this was garnered through the workshop and questionnaire, 
both detailed in Chapter 3. This chapter concludes with comprehensive 
evaluations of the risk to and resilience of the water systems under 
consideration. (David comment here will be considered in chapter 8) 
 
6.1 Approach 
Risk analyses and assessments were carried out for the major 
desalination plants (source) and for the main water transmission systems 
(transmission). The Al Ghubrah power and desalination plant was taken as 
a case study for desalination plants, and the Greater Muscat and Al 
Dakhliya Governorates water supply systems were taken as case studies 
for transmission systems.  
 
The risks to the desalination plant and to the transmission systems were 
identified and analyzed initially without any controls and then allowing for 
mitigating measures. All scores were assigned using the semi quantitative 
approach of the workshop and interviews, or failing these activities, using 
the researcher’s comments and observations noted during the field visits. 
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For each part of the desalination plant and each section of the 
transmission mains, the risks were assessed and given values for 
likelihood, and impact (consequence) and consequently risk score in 
accordance with the likelihood and consequence tables and risk matrix 
presented in section 3.4.3. Finally, the solutions proposed to mitigate 
these risks are summarized. In the sections following, the current risk 
scores were reassessed taking into account the effectiveness of each 
existing control used to mitigate the risk. Colour coding allows significant 
hazards to be identified easily in the centre column and the effectiveness 
of the control is in the right hand column. Inadequately controlled yet 
significant risks are red in both columns. 
  
6.2 Risks to Al Ghubrah Desalination Plant 
The principal risks to the desalination plants were determined during the 
workshop (see section 3.3.4 and Appendix-A). 
 Algal blooms and jellyfish or small fish restricting the capacity of sea 
intakes. 
 Oil spills from accidents at sea and/or from land-based sources. 
 Direct ship collisions with sea intake structures. 
 Re-circulation of effluents from industry (including desalination plants) 
 Excessive suspended solids at the sea intakes from cyclones. 
 Mechanical or electrical failure within the treatment process. 
 Unavailability of power gas or chemicals. 
 Industrial action or unavailability of skilled labor. 
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The thermal desalination plant at Al Ghubrah is an integrated water and 
power plant that has been extended several times to increase capacity 
(see Figure 4.13 for layout). There are a number of surface level intakes 
but all are located in the same area and reliant on the same pumps and 
screens. This represents a pinch point where any problems can rapidly 
result in disruptions to water production. 
 
The plant has extensive maintenance systems in place but, at the time of 
the visit, the equipment, particularly the screens, were in poor condition 
and it was evident that ongoing maintenance had considerably reduced 
the amount of available standby equipment (PAEW Archive). 
 
A particular issue is the ‘Red Tide’ event which is caused by an 
accumulation of marine algae. Such events can occur up to four times per 
year and require intensive maintenance at the intake although, to date, no 
Red Tide event has closed the plant. Despite maintaining water production 
during these periods the risk from future algae blooms is significant as the 
quantity and algae species in any future event may have different impacts 
on the plant. The site at Al Ghubrah is close to an international oil port and 
hence is at significant risk from oil contamination. Although oil booms can 
be deployed and would provide some protection in the event of minor 
spillages, the surface intakes offer little protection against large spillages.
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At the time of the visit, pumps had been removed at both of the pumping 
stations for maintenance and consequently no standby was available. The 
poor condition of the pumps and lack of available spares are 
representative of the generally poor condition of the plant and of the 
consequent increased risk to supply. There is no evidence of the 
recirculation of brine causing any disruption to the production of water. 
 
The risks to Al Ghubrah desalination plant are presented in Tables (6.1), 
(6.2), and (6.3) for Sea Water Quality, Main Treatment Process, and Site 
Wide Risks respectively. The risk tables present hazardous events, their 
causes and the likelihood and consequence of their occurrence as a 
number from the risk matrix.  
 
Table (6.4) summarises the risks to Al Ghubrah desalination plant before 
and after control measures. The control measures are considered not only 
for their long term average performance but also for their potential to be 
ineffective or fail over a short period. For example, jellyfish represent a 
significant risk to desalination plant intakes but can be controlled by the 
use of appropriate nets. However, if the net is not regularly inspected and 
cleaned it will fail and so will not be an effective control when needed. 
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Table 6.1: Al Ghubrah Treatment Risks-Sea Water Quality 
Sea Water Quality 
Item Hazard 
Hazardo
us Event 
Further Details 
Likeliho
od 
Consequence L C Risk Control Measure 
Monitoring 
Procedures 
Corrective Action Likelihood Consequence L C Risk 
F
e
e
d
 W
a
te
r 
Q
u
a
li
ty
 
Loss of 
Production 
Harmful 
Algal 
Blooms 
Combinations of particular 
conditions (i.e. available 
nutrients, temperature, light), lack 
of zooplankton grazing, and 
above threshold seed population 
density. Excess nutrients are 
brought into the photo tic zone by 
i) upwelling (summer monsoon) 
transported to Gulf of Oman by 
currents, and ii) deepening of the 
mixed zone (winter). Historically 
Sohar plant shut down for five 
days during red tide. 
One in five 
to twenty 
years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
3 16 48 
Open intake will not reduce the 
likelihood of issues with surface 
species. The site was affected by the 
Red Tide in 2008 Water production 
was not lost but emergency actions 
were needed to be taken to deal with 
the high colour and odour of the 
seawater being affected with the red 
tide. 
Chlorine tables were added to the 
seawater intake, as hypo chlorination 
alone was not able to guarantee 
chlorine residual.  Limestone filters 
backwash frequency was increased to 
twice a day as filters where 
overloaded. Fluoride dosing was 
replaced with hypochlorite dosing to 
increase the hypochlorite dose to 
guarantee residual chlorine in the 
treated water. 
N/A 
Increase chlorination and 
in extreme 
circumstances shut 
down plant 
One in five to 
twenty years 
2 - 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
3 8 24 
Loss of 
Production 
Jellyfish 
Combinations of particular 
conditions (i.e. available food 
such as bacteria/ micro-
zooplankton, temperature, light), 
lack of predation, and above 
threshold seed population 
density. Bacteria and zooplankton 
density linked to phytoplankton 
density which in turn is linked to 
nutrient availability. 
One in 
twenty to 
fifty years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
2 16 32 
In 2003 a heavy ingress of jellyfish 
into the seawater intake channel was 
experienced.  All the four running 
rotary bar screens and all the four 
running travelling bad screens tripped 
on “MOTOR O/L” protection as they 
were all jammed with the incoming 
jellyfish.  Water production was lost for 
two days. 
Uncertain 
Run screens in Manual 
and increase cleaning 
frequency. If not 
successful initially 
reduce flow and in 
extreme circumstances 
shut down plant 
(consequence base 
upon reduced flow). 
One in twenty 
to fifty years 
12 - 48 hours 
loss of treated 
water production 
2 4 8 
Loss of 
Production 
Accidental 
Oil Spills 
at Sea 
Loading/Discharging 
One in five 
to twenty 
years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
3 16 48 
Implementation of site oil spill 
emergency procedure, including 
deployment of booms and avoidance 
of dispersants. Implementation of 
cleanup protocols at a National Level 
Visual 
inspection 
Shut down plant. 
One in five to 
twenty years 
2 - 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
3 8 24 
Loss of 
Production 
Accidental 
Oil Spills 
at Sea 
Collisions 
One in five 
to twenty 
years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
3 16 48 
Implementation of site oil spill 
emergency procedure, including 
deployment of booms and avoidance 
of dispersants. Implementation of 
cleanup protocols at a National Level 
Visual 
inspection 
Shut down plant. 
One in five to 
twenty years 
2 - 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
3 8 24 
Loss of 
Production 
Accidental 
Oil Spills 
at Sea 
Groundings 
One in 
twenty to 
fifty years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
3 4 12 
Implementation of site oil spill 
emergency procedure, including 
deployment of booms and avoidance 
of dispersants. Implementation of 
cleanup protocols at a National Level 
Visual 
inspection 
Shut down plant. 
One in twenty 
to fifty years 
2 - 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
3 4 12 
Loss of 
Production 
Accidental 
Oil Spills 
at Sea 
Hull Failures 
One in 
twenty to 
fifty years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
3 4 12 
Implementation of site oil spill 
emergency procedure, including 
deployment of booms and avoidance 
of dispersants. Implementation of 
cleanup protocols at a National Level 
Visual 
inspection 
Shut down plant. 
One in twenty 
to fifty years 
2 - 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
3 4 12 
Loss of 
Production 
Accidental 
Oil Spills 
at Sea 
Fires and Explosions 
One in five 
to twenty 
years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
2 4 8 
Implementation of site oil spill 
emergency procedure, including 
deployment of booms and avoidance 
of dispersants. Implementation of 
cleanup protocols at a National Level 
Visual 
inspection 
Shut down plant. 
One in five to 
twenty years 
2 - 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
2 4 8 
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Table 6.1- Cont.: Al Ghubrah Treatment Risks-Sea Water Quality 
Item Hazard 
Hazardous 
Event 
Further Details Likelihood Consequence L C Risk Control Measure 
Monitoring 
Procedures 
Corrective 
Action 
Likelihood Consequence L C Risk 
F
e
e
d
 W
a
te
r 
Q
u
a
li
ty
 
Loss of 
Production 
Operational 
Oil Spills at 
Sea 
Illegal tank washings One in five to twenty years 
12 - 48 hours 
loss of treated 
water production 
3 4 12 
Implementation of site 
oil spill emergency 
procedure, including 
deployment of booms 
and avoidance of 
dispersants. 
surveillance by 
authorities during 
daylight hours only 
Visual 
inspection 
Shut down 
plant. 
One in five to 
twenty years 
12 - 48 hours loss 
of treated water 
production 
3 4 12 
Loss of 
Production 
Operational 
Oil Spills at 
Sea 
Illegal Dumping One in five to twenty years 
12 - 48 hours 
loss of treated 
water production 
3 4 12 
Implementation of site 
oil spill emergency 
procedure, including 
deployment of booms 
and avoidance of 
dispersants. 
surveillance by 
authorities during 
daylight hours only 
Visual 
inspection 
Shut down 
plant. 
One in five to 
twenty years 
12 - 48 hours loss 
of treated water 
production 
3 4 12 
Loss of 
Production 
Operational 
Oil Spills at 
Sea 
Loading Operation Spills One in five to twenty years 
12 - 48 hours 
loss of treated 
water production 
3 4 12 
Implementation of site 
oil spill emergency 
procedure, including 
deployment of booms 
and avoidance of 
dispersants. 
surveillance by 
authorities during 
daylight hours only 
Visual 
inspection 
Shut down 
plant. 
One in five to 
twenty years 
12 - 48 hours loss 
of treated water 
production 
3 4 12 
Loss of 
Production 
Re-circulation 
of facility 
discharges 
causing 
increased 
salinity 
Poorly designed 
industrial master plan 
resulting in inefficient 
flushing of marine 
discharges in vicinity of 
desalination plant intake. 
One in five to twenty years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
3 16 48 Design of intakes. 
Seawater 
analysis. 
None 
One in twenty to 
fifty years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
2 16 32 
Loss of 
Production 
Excessive 
naturally 
occurring 
seawater 
temperatures 
(>40oC) 
Unseasonal lack of 
winds in summer in Gulf 
of Oman, exacerbated 
by effects of climate 
change. 
One in fifty to one  hundred 
years 
2 - 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
1 8 8 None 
Seawater 
analysis. 
N/A 
One in fifty to one 
hundred years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
1 8 8 
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Table 6.2: Al Ghubrah Treatment Risks-Main Treatment Process 
Main Treatment Process 
Item Hazard 
Hazardous 
Event 
Further Details Likelihood Consequence L C Risk 
Control 
Measure 
Monitoring 
Procedures 
Correctiv
e Action 
Likelihood Consequence L C Risk 
MSF 
Units 
Loss of 
Production 
Structural Failure 
of Main Process 
Unit 
There are 7 MSF Units.  
Distillers 1 and 2 were due to 
be retired in 2009 however 
the retirement has been 
postponed due to levels of 
demand.  Both distillers were 
refurbished in 2008.  No 
specific issues reported with 
existing units. Assume failure 
would be for a single unit only 
One in fifty to 
one hundred 
years 
2 - 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
1 8 8 
General plant 
monitoring 
systems. 
Multiple 
Removal of 
Unit from 
Service. 
One in fifty to one hundred 
years 
2 - 7 days loss of treated water 
production 
1 8 8 
Loss of 
Production 
Power Failure 
Multiple Units 
(steam/electricity) 
History of power failure in 
2007 due to the cyclone 
One in one to 
five years 
< 12 hours loss of 
treated water 
production 
4 2 8 
General plant 
monitoring 
systems. 
Multiple 
Shutdown of 
Plant 
One in one to five years 
< 12 hours loss of treated water 
production 
4 2 8 
Loss of 
Production 
Power Failure 
Single unit 
(steam/electricity) 
History of power failure in 
2007 due to the cyclone 
More than one 
per year 
< 12 hours partial 
reduction in treated 
water production 
(>34% of design 
output) 
5 1 5 
General plant 
monitoring 
systems. 
Multiple 
Shutdown of 
Unit 
More than one per year 
< 12 hours partial reduction in treated 
water production (>34% of design 
output) 
5 1 5 
Loss of 
Production 
Loss of Process 
Performance due 
to Scaling and 
Fouling 
Maintenance schedule 
system is in place 
One in one to 
five years 
12 - 48 hours loss of 
treated water 
production 
8 4 32 
Dosing of anti 
sealant and 
cleaning of 
units. 
Multiple 
Removal of 
Unit from 
Service for 
cleaning 
One in fifty to one hundred 
years 
12 - 48 hours loss of treated water 
production 
1 4 4 
CO2 Plant 
Loss of 
Production 
Structural Failure 
Plant is old and in fair 
conditions 
One in five to 
twenty years 
12 - 48 hours loss of 
treated water 
production 
4 4 16 
  
None 
  
NA 
Shut Down 
Plant 
One in five to twenty years 
12 - 48 hours loss of treated water 
production 
4 4 16 
Loss of 
Production 
Mechanical and 
Electrical Failure 
Duty /standby dosing pumps 
provided 
One in one to 
five years 
< 12 hours loss of 
treated water 
production 
2 8 16 
  
Standby 
Provided 
  
NA NA One in five to twenty years 
< 12 hours loss of treated water 
production 
2 4 8 
Loss of 
Production 
Process 
Performance 
Failure 
Flow and Dose of chemical 
will largely be constant and is 
not likely to change in normal 
operation. 
One in one to 
five years 
< 12 hours loss of 
treated water 
production 
2 8 16 
  
Treated 
Water 
monitored 
  
NA NA One in twenty to fifty years 
< 12 hours loss of treated water 
production 
2 2 4 
Chlorine 
Dosing 
Loss of 
Production 
Structural Failure 
Chlorine drums are used on 
site, duty/stanby dosing line 
One in five to 
twenty years 
2 - 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
4 8 32 
  
None 
  
Monitors 
Alarm 
generated 
One in five to twenty years 
2 - 7 days loss of 
treated water production 
4 8 32 
Loss of 
Production 
Mechanical and 
Electrical Failure 
Duty standby injector pumps 
and ejectors. 
One in one to 
five years 
12 - 48 hours loss of 
treated water 
production 
4 8 32 
  
Standby 
Equipment 
provided 
  
NA 
Alarm 
generated 
One in five to twenty years 
12 - 48 hours loss of treated water 
production 
4 4 16 
Process 
Performance 
Failure 
Process 
Performance 
Failure 
Chlorine residual monitored 
and high and low alarms 
generated. 
More than one 
per year 
12 - 48 hours loss of 
treated water 
production 
4 16 64 
  
Final Water 
analyzed for 
pH 
  
NA 
Alarm 
generated 
One in twenty to fifty years 
12 - 48 hours loss of treated water 
production 
2 4 8 
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Table 6.2- Cont.: Al Ghubrah Treatment Risks-Main Treatment Process 
Item Hazard Hazardous Event Further Details 
Likelih
ood 
Consequenc
e 
L C Risk 
Control 
Measure 
Monitoring 
Procedures 
Corrective 
Action 
Likelihood Consequence L C Risk 
Caustic 
Soda 
Dosing  
Loss of 
Production 
Structural Failure 
(leaks) of Tanks or 
Dosing Pipe work 
3 chemical storage tanks 
provided, 1 duty 2 standby 
One in 
five to 
twenty 
years 
12 - 48 hours 
loss of treated 
water production 
4 4 16 
Standby unit 
provided 
NA NA 
One in twenty to 
fifty years 
12 - 48 hours loss of 
treated water production 
2 4 8 
Process 
Performance 
Failure 
Mechanical and 
Electrical Failure of 
Make Up Equipment 
and Dosing Pumps 
Duty standby dosing 
pumps provided. 
One in 
one to 
five years 
12 - 48 hours 
loss of treated 
water production 
4 8 32 
Standby 
Equipment 
provided. 
NA NA 
One in five to 
twenty years 
12 - 48 hours loss of 
treated water production 
4 4 16 
Loss of 
Production 
Process Performance 
Failure (Incorrect 
Quantity Dosed) 
Chemical dosing is flow 
proportional and dosing 
line is fitted with a flow 
transmitter with high and 
low alarms. 
One in 
one to 
five years 
12 - 48 hours 
loss of treated 
water production 
4 8 32 
Treated Water 
monitored 
NA NA 
One in five to 
twenty years 
12 - 48 hours loss of 
treated water production 
4 4 16 
Sodium 
Fluoride 
Dosing  
Loss of 
Production 
Structural Failure 
(leaks) of Tanks or 
Dosing Pipe work 
3 chemical storage tanks 
provided, 1 duty 2 standby 
One in 
five to 
twenty 
years 
12 - 48 hours 
loss of treated 
water production 
4 4 16 
Fluoride Monitor 
provided on 
dosed water 
which generates 
high and low 
alarms. 
NA NA 
One in twenty to 
fifty years 
12 - 48 hours loss of 
treated water production 
2 4 8 
Loss of 
Production 
Mechanical and 
Electrical Failure of 
Make Up Equipment 
and Dosing Pumps 
Duty standby dosing 
pumps provided. 
One in 
one to 
five years 
12 - 48 hours 
loss of treated 
water production 
4 8 32 
Standby 
Equipment 
provided. 
NA NA 
One in five to 
twenty years 
12 - 48 hours loss of 
treated water production 
4 4 16 
Process 
Performance 
Failure 
Process performance 
Failure (Incorrect 
Quantity Dosed) 
Chemical dosing is flow 
proportional and dosing 
line is fitted with a flow 
transmitter with high and 
low alarms. 
One in 
one to 
five years 
12 - 48 hours 
loss of treated 
water production 
4 8 32 
Treated Water 
monitored 
NA NA 
One in five to 
twenty years 
12 - 48 hours loss of 
treated water production 
4 4 16 
Treated 
Water 
Sampling 
System 
Loss of 
Production 
Structural Failure of 
Sampling Pipe work 
NA 
  
One in 
twenty to 
fifty years 
12 - 48 hours 
loss of treated 
water production 
2 4 8 None NA NA 
Regular Spot 
Checks on treated 
Water Quality 
12 - 48 hours loss of 
treated water production 
2 4 8 
Loss of 
Production 
Mechanical and 
Electrical Failure 
NA 
  
One in 
five to 
twenty 
years 
  
12 - 48 hours 
loss of treated 
water production 
4 4 16 None NA NA 
One in five to 
twenty years 
12 - 48 hours loss of 
treated water production 
4 4 16 
Process 
Performance 
Failure 
Process Performance 
Failure (Analyzers do 
not read correctly) 
NA 
One in 
one to 
five years 
12 - 48 hours 
loss of treated 
water production 
4 8 32 
Regular Spot 
Checks on 
treated Water 
Quality 
NA NA 
One in five to 
twenty years 
12 - 48 hours loss of 
treated water production 
4 4 16 
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Table 6.3: Al Ghubrah Treatment Risks-Site Wide Risks 
Side Wide Risks 
Item Hazard 
Hazardous 
Event 
Further Details Likelihood Consequence L C Risk 
Control 
Measure 
Monitoring 
Procedures 
Corrective 
Action 
Likelihood Consequence L C Risk 
Electrical 
Power 
Supply 
System 
Loss of 
Treated 
Water 
Production 
Loss of Power 
Supply (external) 
Main supply of power is from onsite 
generation. 
One in one 
to five 
years 
12 - 48 hours 
loss of treated 
water production 
5 4 20 
Onsite 
generation of 
Power. 
Multiple 
Shut Down 
Plant 
One in one to five 
years 
< 12 hours partial reduction 
in treated water production 
(>34% of design output) 
4 2 8 
Fire 
Loss of 
Treated 
Water 
Production 
Major Fire on 
Site 
No incidents reported. Emergency 
Preparedness Procedure Manual in 
place for site. 
One in 
twenty to 
fifty years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
2 16 32 
Emergency 
procedure in 
place. 
NA NA 
One in twenty to 
fifty years 
2 - 7 days loss of 
treated water production 
2 8 16 
Flooding 
(origin 
land side) 
Loss of 
Treated 
Water 
Production 
Flooding of site 
and damage to 
key plant 
equipment 
Historical issues with loss of gas 
supply through flood damage 
One in 
twenty to 
fifty years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
2 16 32 
Emergency 
procedure in 
place. 
NA NA 
One in twenty to 
fifty years 
2 - 7 days loss of treated 
water production 
2 8 16 
Gas 
Supply 
Loss of 
Treated 
Water 
Production 
Disruption of gas 
supply to IWPP 
National reserves depleted; import 
disrupted (e.g. Dolphin Energy 
pipeline failure); domestic 
transmission and distribution 
network disrupted by extreme 
event. 
One in fifty 
to one 
hundred 
years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
1 16 16 
Use of  back 
up fuel l to 
operate 
power plant 
N/A 
Operate on 
fuel oil and/or 
diesel 
One in fifty to one 
hundred years 
2 - 7 days loss of treated 
water production 
1 8 8 
Loss of 
Labour 
Loss of 
Treated 
Water 
Production 
Loss of 
expatriate labour 
Poor employment terms and 
conditions, unsafe working 
environment, political strike 
between Oman and country where 
labour originates 
One in fifty 
to one 
hundred 
years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
1 16 16 
Ongoing 
training to 
maintain 
labour pool. 
Omanisation 
policy. 
N/A N/A 
One in fifty to one 
hundred years 
> 7 days loss of treated 
water production 
1 8 8 
Nuclear 
Threat 
Loss of 
Treated 
Water 
Production 
Nuclear 
contamination 
Military strike or engineering failure 
of nuclear power plants, facilities or 
waste transport system in Pakistan, 
India, Iran, UAE; collision involving 
nuclear powered vessels or 
warships carrying nuclear weapons. 
One in fifty 
to one 
hundred 
years 
> 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
1 16 16 None N/A 
Shut Down 
Plant 
One in fifty to one 
hundred years 
> 7 days loss of treated 
water production 
1 16 16 
Cyclones 
Loss of 
Treated 
Water 
Production 
Cyclone 
Cyclonic storm often formed in SE 
Indian Ocean that tend to develop 
when surface seawater 
temperatures are high 
One in fifty 
to one 
hundred 
years 
2 - 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
1 8 8 
Storage of 
fuel on site; 
stocks of 
chemicals on 
site; use 
alternative 
fuel for power 
plant. 
N/A 
Shut Down 
Plant; switch 
to alternative 
fuel if 
required. 
One in fifty to one 
hundred years 
2 - 7 days loss of treated 
water production 
1 8 8 
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Table 6.4: Summary of Risks to Al Ghubrah Desalination Plant 
Item Hazard Hazardous Event 
Before Control After Control 
L C Risk L C Risk 
Sea Water Quality 
Feed 
Water 
Quality 
Loss of Production Harmful Algal Blooms 3 16 48 3 8 24 
Loss of Production Jellyfish 2 16 32 2 4 8 
Loss of Production Accidental Oil Spills at Sea 3 16 48 3 8 24 
Loss of Production Accidental Oil Spills at Sea 3 16 48 3 8 24 
Loss of Production Accidental Oil Spills at Sea 3 4 12 3 4 12 
Loss of Production Accidental Oil Spills at Sea 3 4 12 3 4 12 
Loss of Production Accidental Oil Spills at Sea 2 4 8 2 4 8 
Loss of Production Operational Oil Spills at Sea 3 4 12 3 4 12 
Loss of Production Operational Oil Spills at Sea 3 4 12 3 4 12 
Loss of Production Operational Oil Spills at Sea 3 4 12 3 4 12 
Loss of Production Re-circulation causing increased salinity 3 16 48 2 16 32 
Loss of Production Excessive seawater temperature 1 8 8 1 8 8 
Main Treatment Process 
MSF 
Units 
Loss of Production Structural Failure of Main Process Unit 1 8 8 1 8 8 
Loss of Production Power Failure Multiple Units (steam/electricity) 4 2 8 4 2 8 
Loss of Production Power Failure Single unit (steam/electricity) 5 1 5 5 1 5 
Loss of Production Loss of Process Performance due to Scaling and Fouling 4 8 32 1 4 4 
CO2 Plant 
Loss of Production Structural Failure 4 4 16 4 4 16 
Loss of Production Mechanical and Electrical Failure 2 8 16 2 4 8 
Loss of Production Process Performance Failure 2 8 16 2 2 4 
Chlorine 
Dosing 
Loss of Production Structural Failure 4 8 32 4 8 32 
Loss of Production Mechanical and Electrical Failure 4 8 32 4 4 16 
Process Performance Failure Process Performance Failure 4 16 64 2 4 8 
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Table 6.4 - Cont.: Summary of Risks to Al Ghubrah Desalination Plant 
Item Hazard Hazardous Event 
Before Control After Control 
L C Risk L C Risk 
Main Treatment Process 
Caustic Soda 
Dosing  
Loss of Production Structural Failure (leaks) of Tanks or Dosing Pipe work 4 4 16 2 4 8 
Process Performance Failure 
Mechanical and Electrical Failure of Make Up 
Equipment and Dosing Pumps 
4 8 32 4 4 16 
Loss of Production Process Performance Failure (Incorrect Quantity Dosed) 4 8 32 4 4 16 
Sodium Fluoride 
Dosing  
Loss of Production Structural Failure (leaks) of Tanks or Dosing Pipe work 4 4 16 2 4 8 
Loss of Production 
Mechanical and Electrical Failure of Make Up 
Equipment and Dosing Pumps 
4 8 32 4 4 16 
Process Performance Failure Process Performance Failure (Incorrect Quantity Dosed) 4 8 32 4 4 16 
Treated Water 
Sampling System 
Loss of Production Structural Failure of Sampling Pipe work 2 4 8 2 4 8 
Loss of Production Mechanical and Electrical Failure 4 4 16 4 4 16 
Process Performance Failure 
Process Performance Failure (Analyzers do not read 
correctly) 
4 8 32 4 4 16 
Side Wide Risks 
Electrical Power 
Supply System 
Loss of Treated Water Production Loss of Power Supply (external) 5 4 20 4 2 8 
Fire Loss of Treated Water Production Major Fire on Site 2 16 32 2 8 16 
Flooding (origin 
land side) 
Loss of Treated Water Production Flooding of site and damage to key plant equipment 2 16 32 2 8 16 
Gas Supply Loss of Treated Water Production Disruption of gas supply to IWPP 1 16 16 1 8 8 
Loss of Labour Loss of Treated Water Production Loss of expatriate labour 1 16 16 1 8 8 
Nuclear Threat Loss of Treated Water Production Nuclear contamination 1 16 16 1 16 16 
Cyclones Loss of Treated Water Production Cyclone 1 8 8 1 8 8 
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6.3 Transmission Systems Risks  
6.3.1 General 
The main risks to the transmission system risks are: 
 Loss of supply from the treatment plants. 
 Failures in the transmission mains. 
 Failures of pumps. 
 Loss of power at pumping stations. 
 Failure of the Control System. 
 Inadequate storage to meet demand. 
 
The risk to main components of water supply system is as follow: 
 
1) Pipelines 
There is very little information on the failure rates in large diameter 
pipelines in Oman, except for those in Muscat. The failures on pipelines in 
Muscat for 2007 and 2008 are given in Table (6.5) below. 
 
Table 6.5: Pipe Failures in Muscat Water Supply System. 
Diameter of Pipe (mm) 100 150-200 250-300 400 600 800+ 
Length of Pipe (km) 609 1093 384 97 108 114 
Year 2007 
Number of 
Failures 
382 160 63 9 45 2 
Year 2008 
Number of 
Failure 
360 199 49 3 31 1 
Source: (PAEW Annual report, 2007 & 2008) 
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Most failures occur on small diameter pipelines, where service 
connections are vulnerable and where accidental damage from other 
works is most likely. There is a high rate of failure on 100 mm diameter 
pipes in Muscat. We believe that this is due to the poor condition of the 
600 mm DI main from Ghubrah to Muscat, which we understand was laid 
over 30 years ago with only basic external corrosion protection. Looking at 
the relationship between diameter and numbers of failures in the table 
above, we would expect a failure rate in 600mm pipes to be around 35 per 
1000 km per year, rather than the figure of 351 recorded in Muscat. 
 
The time taken to repair bursts in pipelines, from the time the burst occurs 
to when the pipeline is operational again, is taken by operation department 
of the PAEW under normal conditions to be as follows: 
 Less than 600 mm diameter 1.5 days 
 600 mm to 1000 mm diameter 2.0 days 
 Over 1000 mm diameter 3.0 days 
 
Initially the impact of mains failure assesses the loss of supply. The 
analysis then considers existing control measures in place, primarily 
downstream storage in the system. If the volume of emergency storage 
available exceeds the time to make the repair, there will be no impact on 
consumers. Where there is still a risk to supply after allowing for 
downstream storage, the severity of the impact is assessed from the loss 
of supply to the consumer after storage has been exhausted. 
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2) Pumping Stations  
Pumping stations are at risk from outages due to: 
 Failure of individual pump sets. 
 Loss of incoming power supply, affecting the whole pump station. 
 Failure of the pump control system 
 
All pumping stations include standby pumps which operate when a pump 
fails, ensuring a continuous supply is maintained. The longer the duration 
of any outage, the greater risk of simultaneous failures of individual pumps 
and it is assumed that pumps are repaired in 10 days. Loss of power at 
pump stations is not uncommon, but electrical outages are usually of short 
duration. Under normal conditions power is restored to water pumping 
stations within 24 hours but this may not be possible in extreme weather 
conditions when there is widespread damage to power lines. This is an 
example of the need to develop and maintain a reliable emergency plan to 
deal with the consequences (see Chapter 7). Pumps are controlled 
automatically by a variety of level states in the reservoirs to which water is 
delivered. Monitoring of the system ensures that any failure in the control 
system will be identified within a few hours. Pumps will then be switched to 
manual operation until the fault can be rectified. 
Initially in this research, the consequence of failure is assessed as loss of 
capacity, ignoring any standby plant and storage in the system 
downstream. As with bursts in mains, the analysis then considers control 
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measures in place, including standby pumps (assumed to be maintained 
in good working order) and storage downstream. 
 
3) Reservoirs  
There are two main risks for the reservoirs: 
 Pollution, either accidental or deliberate. 
 Structural failure. 
The risk of pollution is minimized by ensuring all reservoirs are fitted with 
lockable covers, vents are protected with mesh, compounds are securely 
fenced and the installation is fitted with appropriate alarms and/or video 
surveillance. Structural failures are very rare. 
 
4) Loss of Supply from the Desalination Plants 
The loss of supply from the desalination plant is the largest risk to the 
security of the supply to consumers. The impact of the various levels of 
severity of the outage (effectively the duration of the outage) in the risk 
matrices are considered in this research. Tables (6.6) and (6.7) summarize 
the forecasted number of hours of storage available at the desalination 
plants for the 2010 average and peak demands. 
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Table 6.6: Estimated Number of Days of Storage Available for 
Average Demands 
Desalination 
Plant 
Average 
Daily Flow 
(m3/day) 
Storage at 
Desalination 
Plant (m3) 
Storage (hours of 
supply capacity) 
 Storage (days of 
supply capacity) 
Ghubrah 158,350 163,650 25 1.0 
Barka 158,069 182,400 28 1.2 
Sohar 102,727 135,000 32 1.3 
Sur 32,718 164000 120 5 
Source: PAEW (2011) 
 
Table 6.7: Estimated Number of Days of Storage Available for Peak 
Demands 
Desalination 
Plant 
Average 
Daily Flow 
(m3/day) 
Storage at 
Desalination 
Plant (m3) 
Storage (hours of 
supply capacity) 
 Storage (days of 
supply capacity) 
Ghubrah 195,456 163,650 20 0.8 
Barka 195,211 182,400 22 0.9 
Sohar 126,739 135,000 26 1.1 
Sur 40,538 164000 97 4.0 
Source: PAEW (2011) 
 
6.3.2 Risk Tables for Transmission Mains  
6.3.2.1  Risk Tables for Greater Muscat  
The risks to Greater Muscat water supply system including transmission 
mains, pumping stations, and loss of supply from desalination plant are 
given in Tables (6.8), (6.9), and (6.10) and are summarized in Table 
(6.11). 
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Table 6.8: Risks to Transmission Mains of Great Muscat Water Supply System 
Transmission Mains 
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Burst in main 
from Barka PS 
to Seeb Res 
1600 32.4 Steel 0 2 310874 
One in one 
to five 
years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Seeb 
4 16 64 
Storage 
downstre
am. 
Repairs 
to be 
complete
d to target 
times 
Burst 
records 
Repair 
main/ 
replace 
main 
3 123762 166550 1.0 245577 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Seeb 
4 8 32 
Burst in main 
from Al 
Ghubrah to 
Qurm, 
Wattaya, 
Ruwi, Muscat, 
Mumtaz Res 
and Al Amirat 
PS (1000mm) 
1000 27.0 
Ductile 
Iron 
0 3 316959 
One in one 
to five 
years 
Loss of 
supply to 
much of 
eastern 
Greater 
Muscat 
4 16 64 
Storage 
downstre
am. 
Repairs 
to be 
complete
d to target 
times 
Burst 
records 
Repair 
main/ 
replace 
main 
3 59962 77,790 1.0 121882 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
much of 
eastern 
Greater 
Muscat 
4 8 32 
Burst in main 
from Al 
Ghubrah to 
Qurm, 
Wattaya, 
Ruwi, Muscat, 
Mumtaz Res 
and Al Amirat 
PS (600mm) 
600 27.0 
Ductile 
Iron 
9 0 316959 
More than 
one per 
year 
Loss of 
supply to 
eastern 
Greater 
Muscat 
5 16 80 
Storage 
downstre
am. 
Repairs 
to be 
complete
d to target 
times 
Burst 
records 
Repair 
main/ 
replace 
main 
2 21586 77,790 3.3 0 
More than 
one per 
year 
Loss of 
supply to 
part of 
eastern 
Greater 
Muscat 
5 2 10 
Burst in main 
from Al 
Ghubrah to 
Bausher 
Wilayat 
(Waver, 
Airport, Ghala, 
Bousher Res) 
1000 35.0 
Ductile 
Iron 
0 2 218740 
One in one 
to five 
years 
Loss of 
supply to 
eastern 
Greater 
Muscat 
4 16 64 
Storage 
downstre
am. 
Repairs 
to be 
complete
d to target 
times 
Burst 
records 
Repair 
main/ 
replace 
main 
3 76802 
132,00
0 
1.4 123752 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
eastern 
Greater 
Muscat 
4 8 32 
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Table 6.9: Risks to Pumping Stations of Great Muscat Water Supply System 
Pumping Stations 
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Pump failure - Barka to Seeb PS 
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1S 
172800 
One in one 
to five years 
loss of supply 
to Seeb 
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Maintain 
standby, through 
implementation of an 
appropriate 
maintenance, repair and 
replacement policy 
Pump fail 
alarm, 
condition 
monitoring 
Pump  
replacement/   
repair 
Inspectio
n Records 
123762 166550 10 1.0 1111910 
One in 
fifty to 
one 
hundred 
years 
loss of 
supply to 
Seeb 
4 4 16 
Loss of power - Barka to Seeb PS - 172800 
More than 
one per year 
Loss of supply 
to Seeb 
5 16 80 
Downstream storage. 
Ensure repair of lost 
supply within 24 hours 
Alarm 
Repair of 
supplies to 
water facilities. 
These should 
have a high 
priority. 
- 123762 166550 1 1.0 0 
More 
than one 
per year 
 Partial loss 
of supply to 
Seeb 
5 1 5 
Failure of control systems - Barka 
to Seeb PS 
- 172800 
One in one 
to five years 
Loss of supply 
to Seeb 
4 16 64 
Downstream storage. 
Alarms and manual 
override implemented 
within 12 hours. 
Alarm/Manu
al checking 
Repair or 
replace faulty 
supplies 
- 123762 166550 1 1.0 0 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Partial loss 
of supply to 
Seeb 
4 2 8 
Pump failure - Ghubrah PS 
8D + 
1S 
192000 
More than 
one per year 
loss of supply 
to Eastern Gt. 
Muscat 
5 16 80 
Maintain standby, 
through implementation 
of an appropriate 
maintenance, repair and 
replacement policy 
Pump fail 
alarm 
Pump 
replacement/ 
repair 
Inspectio
n Records 
81548 77790 10 0.6 764599 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Partial loss 
of supply to 
Eastern Gt. 
Muscat 
4 8 32 
Loss of power - Ghubrah PS - 192000 
More than 
one per year 
Loss of supply 
to Eastern Gt 
Muscat 
5 16 80 
Downstream storage. 
Ensure repair of lost 
supply within 24 hours 
Alarm 
Repair of 
supplies to 
water facilities. 
These should 
have a high 
priority. 
- 81548 77790 1 0.6 30669 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Eastern Gt 
Muscat 
5 8 40 
Failure of control systems - 
Ghubrah PS 
- 192000 
One in one 
to five years 
Loss of supply 
to Eastern Gt 
Muscat 
4 16 64 
Downstream storage. 
Alarms and manual 
override implemented 
within 12 hours. 
Alarm/Manu
al checking 
Repair or 
replace faulty 
supplies 
- 81548 77790 1 0.6 30669 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Eastern Gt 
Muscat 
4 8 32 
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Table 6.10: Risks to Great Muscat Water Supply System Due to Loss of Supply from Desalination Plant 
Loss of Supply from Desalination Plant 
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Min Max 
Loss of Supply from 
Ghubrah DP 
208644 158350 163650 19 0 0 
One in one 
to five 
years 
< 12 hours partial 
reduction in  
treated water 
production (>34% 
of design output) 
4 2 8 
Downstrea
m storage 
Inflow 
from DP 
Restore 
DP 
output 
Inflows 
from DP 
158350 209790 1.0 0 
One in one 
to five 
years 
<12 hours 
loss of 
treated water 
production 
4 2 8 
Loss of Supply from 
Ghubrah DP 
208644 158350 163650 19 0 0 
One in one 
to five 
years 
<12 hours loss of 
treated water 
production 
4 2 8 
Downstrea
m storage 
Inflow 
from DP 
Restore 
DP 
output 
Inflows 
from DP 
158350 209790 1.0 0 
One in one 
to five 
years 
<12 hours 
loss of 
treated water 
production 
4 2 8 
Loss of Supply from 
Ghubrah DP 
208644 158350 163650 19 0 153050 
One in one 
to five 
years 
12 – 48 hours loss 
of treated water 
production 
4 16 64 
Downstrea
m storage 
Inflow 
from DP 
Restore 
DP 
output 
Inflows 
from DP 
158350 209790 1.0 0 
One in one 
to five 
years 
<12 hours 
loss of 
treated water 
production 
4 2 8 
Loss of Supply from 
Ghubrah DP 
208644 158350 163650 19 153050 944801 
One in one 
to five 
years 
2 – 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
4 16 64 
Downstrea
m storage 
Inflow 
from DP 
Restore 
DP 
output 
Inflows 
from DP 
158350 209790 1.0 735011 
One in one 
to five 
years 
2 – 7 days 
loss of 
treated water 
production 
4 8 32 
Loss of Supply from 
Ghubrah DP 
208644 158350 163650 19 944801 >>944801 
One in five 
to twenty 
years 
>7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
3 16 48 
Downstrea
m storage 
Inflow 
from DP 
Restore 
DP 
output 
Inflows 
from DP 
158350 209790 1.0 >735011 
One in five 
to twenty 
years 
>7 days loss 
of treated 
water 
production 
3 8 24 
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Table 6.11:  Summary of Risks to Great Muscat Water Supply System 
Hazard Consequence 
Before Control After Control 
L C Risk L C Risk 
Transmission Mains 
Burst in main from Barka PS to Seeb Res Loss of supply to Seeb 4 16 64 4 8 32 
Burst in main from Al Ghubrah to Qurm, Wattaya, 
Loss of supply to much of eastern Greater Muscat 4 16 64 4 8 32 
Ruwi, Muscat, Mumtaz Res and Al Amirat PS (1000mm) 
Burst in main from Al Ghubrah to Qurm, Wattaya, 
Loss of supply to part of eastern Greater Muscat 5 16 80 5 2 10 
Ruwi, Muscat, Mumtaz Res and Al Amirat PS (600mm) 
Burst in main from Al Ghubrah to Bausher Wilayat (Waver, Airport, 
Ghala, Bousher Res) 
Loss of supply to part of eastern Greater Muscat 4 16 64 4 8 32 
Pumping  stations 
Pump failure - Barka to Seeb PS Partial loss of supply to Seeb 4 16 64 4 4 16 
Loss of power - Barka to Seeb PS Loss of supply to Seeb 5 16 80 5 1 5 
Failure of control systems - Barka to Seeb PS Loss of supply to Seeb 4 8 32 4 2 8 
Pump failure - Ghubrah PS Partial loss of supply to Eastern Gt. Muscat 5 16 80 4 8 32 
Loss of power - Ghubrah PS Loss of supply to Eastern Gt Muscat 5 16 80 5 8 40 
Failure of control systems - Ghubrah PS Loss of supply to Eastern Gt Muscat 4 16 64 4 8 32 
Loss of Supply from Desalination Plant 
Loss of Supply from Ghubrah DP 
< 12 hours partial reduction in treated water production 
(>34% of design output) 
4 2 8 4 2 8 
Loss of Supply from Ghubrah DP <12 hours loss of treated water production 4 2 8 4 2 8 
Loss of Supply from Ghubrah DP 12 – 48 hours loss of treated water production 4 16 64 4 2 8 
Loss of Supply from Ghubrah DP 2 – 7 days loss of treated water production 4 16 64 4 8 32 
Loss of Supply from Ghubrah DP >7 days loss of treated water production 3 16 48 3 8 24 
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6.3.2.2 Risk Tables for Dakhilya 
The risks to Al Dakhilya water supply system are presented in Tables 
(6.12) - (6.14) and summarized in Table (6.15).  
 
The risks for the other regional water supply systems were just determined 
without any further controls or suggested solutions and the results are 
included in Appendix (F). 
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Table 6.12: Risks to Transmission Mains of Al Dakhilya Water Supply System 
Transmission Mains 
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Burst Barka PS 
to MPS 
(Dakhliyah 
1100 0.4 
Mild 
Steel 
0 189 278689 
One in 
fifty to 
one 
hundred 
years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
1 16 16 
Storage 
dwnstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burst records 
Repair main/ 
replace main 
3 21081 63816 2.7 6385 
One in 
fifty to 
one 
hundred 
years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
1 8 8 
Burst MPS Res 
to ch 17.8km 
1100 17.9 
Mild 
Steel 
0 4 278689 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 16 64 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burst records 
Repair main/ 
replace main 
3 21081 53616 2.2 16585 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 8 32 
Burst ch 17.8km 
to BPS1 Res 
1016 11.7 
Mild 
Steel 
0 3 278689 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 16 64 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burst records 
Repair main/ 
replace main 
3 21081 53616 2.2 16585 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 8 32 
Burst BPS1 Res 
to BPS2 Res 
1016 21.4 
Mild 
Steel 
0 1 278689 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 16 64 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burst records 
Repair main/ 
replace main 
3 21081 50944 2.1 19257 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Partial loss 
of supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 2 8 
Burst BPS2 Res 
to Samail Res 
1016 3.3 
Mild 
Steel 
0 1 254683 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Samail 
4 16 64 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burst records 
Repair main/ 
replace main 
3 9535 50560 5 0 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Partial loss 
of supply to 
Samail 
4 2 8 
Burst BPS3 Res 
to Break Tank 
900 6.9 
Mild 
Steel 
0 1 204430 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Izki, Adam, 
Manah, 
Bahla, Al 
Hamra, 
Nizwa 
4 16 64 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burst records 
Repair main/ 
replace main 
2 5706 40461 6.8 0 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Partial loss 
of supply to 
Izki, Adam, 
Manah, 
Bahla, Al 
Hamra, 
Nizwa 
4 2 8 
Burst BPS3 Res 
to Break Tank 
800 7 
Mild 
Steel 
0 1 204430 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Izki, Adam, 
Manah, 
Bahla, Al 
Hamra, 
Nizwa 
4 16 64 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burst records 
Repair main/ 
replace main 
2 5706 40461 6.8 0 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Partial loss 
of supply to 
Izki, Adam, 
Manah, 
Bahla, Al 
Hamra, 
Nizwa 
4 2 8 
Burst Break Tank 
to ch48.89 
900 19.5 
Mild 
Steel 
0 1 204430 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Izki, Adam, 
Manah, 
Bahla, Al 
Hamra, 
Nizwa 
5 16 80 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burst records 
Repair main/ 
replace main 
2 5706 40261 6.7 0 
More 
than one 
per year 
Partial loss 
of supply to 
Izki, Adam, 
Manah, 
Bahla, Al 
Hamra, 
Nizwa 
5 2 10 
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Table 6.12 - Cont.: Risks to Transmission Mains of Al Dakhilya Water Supply System 
Transmission Mains 
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Burst ch 48.89 to 
Firq Res take-off 
800 27 MILD STEEL 0 1 171133 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Izki, Adam, 
Manah, 
Bahla, Al 
Hamra, 
Nizwa 
5 16 80 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burs
t 
reco
rds 
Repair 
main/ 
replace 
main 
2 4397 40261 8.8 0 
More 
than one 
per year 
Partial loss of 
supply to Izki, 
Adam, Manah, 
Bahla, Al Hamra, 
Nizwa 
5 2 10 
Burst Firq Res to 
take off to Manah 
Res 
700 1.4 MILD STEEL 0 1 171133 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Manah 
5 16 80 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burs
t 
reco
rds 
Repair 
main/ 
replace 
main 
2 4397 31461 6.8 0 
More 
than one 
per year 
Partial loss of 
supply to Manah 
5 2 10 
Burst Manah take 
off to Adam Res 
600 61 DI 2 0 14419 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Adam 
5 8 40 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burs
t 
reco
rds 
Repair 
main/ 
replace 
main 
2 1222 5980 4.6 0 
More 
than one 
per year 
Partial loss of 
supply to Adam 
5 2 10 
Burst take-off to 
Manah Res to 
BPS4 
700 9.7 MILD STEEL 0 1 144703 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Niza, Al 
Hamra, 
Bahla 
5 16 80 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burs
t 
reco
rds 
Repair 
main/ 
replace 
main 
2 12319 31031 2.2 0 
More 
than one 
per year 
Partial loss of 
supply to Niza, Al 
Hamra, and Bahla 
5 2 10 
Burst take-off to 
Manah Res to 
BPS4 
600 2.4 DI 0 1 144703 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Niza, Al 
Hamra, 
Bahla 
5 16 80 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burs
t 
reco
rds 
Repair 
main/ 
replace 
main 
2 12319 31031 2.2 0 
More 
than one 
per year 
Partial loss of 
supply to Niza, Al 
Hamra, and Bahla 
5 2 10 
Burst to take-off to 
BPS5 
600 27 DI 1 0 67416 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Al Hamra, 
Bahla 
5 16 80 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burs
t 
reco
rds 
Repair 
main/ 
replace 
main 
2 d 2637 9749 3.4 0 
More 
than one 
per year 
Partial loss of 
supply to Al Hamra, 
and Bahla 
5 2 10 
Burst from take-off 
to BPS5 to Bahla 
500 10 DI 0 0 51758 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Bahla 
5 16 80 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burs
t 
reco
rds 
Repair 
main/ 
replace 
main 
2 2027 3160 1.2 1562 
More 
than one 
per year 
Partial loss of 
supply to Bahla 
5 8 40 
Burst BPS4 to 
Nizwa (Sypa Res) 
300 1.9 DI 0 1 77287 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Nizwa 
5 16 80 
Storage 
downstream. 
Repairs to be 
completed to 
target times 
Burs
t 
reco
rds 
Repair 
main/ 
replace 
main 
2 9682 15938 1.3 6620 
More 
than one 
per year 
Partial loss of 
supply to  Nizwa 
5 8 40 
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Table 6.13: Risks to Pumping Stations of Al Dakhilya Water Supply System 
Pumping Stations 
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Pump failure - MPS 
PS 
2D+2S 49728 
One in 
one to 
five years 
loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 16 64 
Maintain standby, through 
implementation of an 
appropriate maintenance, 
repair and replacement 
policy 
Pump fail 
alarm, 
condition 
monitoring 
Pump 
replacement/rep air 
Inspection 
Records 
21081 63816 10.0 2.7 153954 
One in fifty 
to one 
hundred 
years 
loss of supply to 
Dakhliyah 
1 16 16 
Loss of power - 
MPS PS 
None - 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
5 16 80 
Downstream storage. 
Ensure repair of lost supply 
within 24 hours 
Alarm 
Repair of supplies 
to water facilties.  
These should have 
a high priority. 
- 21081 63816 1.0 2.7 0 
More than 
one per 
year 
Partial loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
5 2 10 
Failure of control 
systems to MPS PS 
None - 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 16 64 
Downstream storage. Alarms 
and manual override 
implemented within 12 
hours. 
Alarm/Man
ual 
checking 
Repair or replace 
faulty supplies 
- 21081 63816 1.0 2.7 0 
One in one 
to five 
years 
Loss of supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 2 8 
Pump failure - 
BPS1 
2D+2S 20160 
One in 
one to 
five years 
loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 16 64 
Maintain standby, through 
implementation  of an 
appropriate maintenance, 
repair and replacement 
policy 
Pump fail 
alarm, 
condition 
monitoring 
Pump 
replacement/rep air 
Inspection 
Records 
21081 50944 10.0 2.1 166826 
One in fifty 
to one 
hundred 
years 
Partial loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
1 1 1 
Loss of power - 
BPS1 
None - 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
5 16 80 
Downstream storage. 
Ensure repair of lost supply 
within 24 hours 
Alarm 
Repair of supplies 
to water facilties.  
These should have 
a high priority. 
- 21081 50944 1.0 2.1 0 
One in five 
to twenty 
years 
Partial loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
3 1 3 
Failure of control 
systems to BPS1 
PS 
None - 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 16 64 
Downstream storage. Alarms 
and manual override 
implemented within 12 
hours. 
Alarm/Man
ual 
checking 
Repair or replace 
faulty supplies 
- 21081 50944 1.0 2.1 0 
One in five 
to twenty 
years 
Partial loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
3 1 3 
Pump failure - 
BPS2 
2D+2S 15792 
One in 
one to 
five years 
loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 16 64 
Maintain standby, through 
implementation  of an 
appropriate maintenance, 
repair and replacement 
policy 
Pump fail 
alarm, 
condition 
monitoring 
Pump 
replacement/rep air 
Inspection 
Records 
9535 50560 10.0 5.0 47938 
One in fifty 
to one 
hundred 
years 
loss of supply to 
Dakhliyah 
1 16 16 
Loss of power - 
BPS2 
None - 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
5 16 80 
Downstream storage. 
Ensure repair of lost supply 
within 24 hours 
Alarm 
Repair of supplies 
to water facilties.  
These should have 
a high priority. 
- 9535 50560 1.0 5.0 0 
More than 
one per 
year 
Partial loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
5 2 10 
Failure of control 
systems to BPS2 
PS 
None - 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 16 64 
Downstream storage. Alarms 
and manual override 
implemented within 12 
hours. 
Alarm/Man
ual 
checking 
Repair or replace 
faulty supplies 
- 9535 50560 1.0 5.0 0 
One in one 
to five 
years 
Partial loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 2 8 
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Table 6.13 - Cont.: Risks to Pumping Stations of Al Dakhilya Water Supply System 
Pumping Stations 
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Pump failure - BPS3 
4D+1
S 
83290 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 16 64 
Maintain standby, through 
implementation n of an 
appropriate maintenance, 
repair and replacement 
policy 
Pump fail 
alarm, 
condition 
monitoring 
Pump 
replacement/rep air 
Inspection 
Records 
5706 40461 10.0 6.8 18480 
One in five 
to twenty 
years 
loss of supply to 
Dakhliyah 
3 8 24 
Loss of power - BPS3 None - 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
5 16 80 
Downstream storage. 
Ensure repair of lost supply 
within 24 hours 
Alarm 
Repair of supplies to 
water facilties.  
These should have a 
high priority. 
- 5706 40461 1.0 6.8 0 
More than 
one per 
year 
Partial loss of 
supply to Dakhliyah 
5 2 10 
Failure of control 
systems to BPS3 PS 
None - 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Dakhliyah 
4 16 64 
Downstream storage. Alarms 
and manual override 
implemented within 12 
hours. 
Alarm/Manu
al checking 
Repair or replace 
faulty supplies 
- 5706 40461 1.0 6.8 0 
One in one 
to five 
years 
Partial loss supply 
to Dakhliyah 
4 2 8 
Pump failure - BPS4 
5D+1
S 
43546 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Nizwa 
5 16 80 
Maintain standby, through 
implementation of an 
appropriate maintenance, 
repair and replacement 
policy 
Pump fail 
alarm, 
condition 
monitoring 
Pump 
replacement/rep air 
Inspection 
Records 
9682 15938 10.0 1.3 84074 
One in five 
to twenty 
years 
Loss of supply to 
Nizwa 
3 8 24 
Loss of power - BPS4 None - 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to 
Nizwa 
5 16 80 
Downstream storage. 
Ensure repair of lost supply 
within 24 hours 
Alarm 
Repair of supplies to 
water facilties.  
These should have a 
high priority. 
- 9682 15938 1.0 1.3 0 
More than 
one per 
year 
Partial loss of 
supply to Nizwa 
5 2 10 
Failure of control 
systems to BPS4 PS 
None - 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to 
Nizwa 
4 16 64 
Downstream storage. Alarms 
and manual override 
implemented within 12 
hours. 
Alarm/Manu
al checking 
Repair or replace 
faulty supplies 
- 9682 15938 1.0 1.3 0 
One in one 
to five 
years 
Partial loss of 
supply to Nizwa 
4 2 8 
Pump failure - BPS5 
3D+1
S 
9331 
One in 
one to 
five years 
loss of 
supply to Al 
Hamra 
4 16 64 
Maintain standby, through 
implementation n of an 
appropriate maintenance, 
repair and replacement 
policy 
Pump fail 
alarm, 
condition 
monitoring 
Pump 
replacement/rep air 
Inspection 
Records 
2758 1500 10.0 0.2 26994 
One in 
twenty to 
fifty years 
loss of supply to Al 
Hamra 
2 16 32 
Loss of power - BPS5 None - 
More 
than one 
per year 
Loss of 
supply to Al 
Hamra 
5 8 40 
Downstream storage. 
Ensure repair of lost supply 
within 24 hours 
Alarm 
Repair of supplies to 
water facilties.  
These should have a 
high priority. 
- 2758 1500 1.0 0.2 2169 
More than 
one per 
year 
Loss of supply to Al 
Hamra 
5 4 20 
Failure of control 
systems to BPS5 PS 
None - 
One in 
one to 
five years 
Loss of 
supply to Al 
Hamra 
4 8 32 
Downstream storage. Alarms 
and manual override 
implemented within 12 
hours. 
Alarm/Manu
al checking 
Repair or replace 
faulty supplies 
- 2758 1500 1.0 0.2 2169 
One in one 
to five 
years 
Loss of supply to Al 
Hamra 
4 4 16 
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Table 6.14: Risks to Al Dakhilya Water Supply System Due to Loss of Supply from Desalination Plant 
Loss of Supply from Desalination Plant 
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Min Max 
Loss of 
Supply from 
Barka DP 
210000 21081 182400 21 0 0 
One 
in one 
to five 
years 
< 12 
hours 
partial 
reduction 
in treated 
water 
production 
(>34% of 
design 
output) 
4 2 8 
Downstream 
storage 
Inflow 
from 
DP 
Restore 
DP 
output 
Inflows 
from 
DP 
21081 63816 2.7 0 
One 
in one 
to five 
years 
<12 hours loss of treated water 
production 
4 2 8 
Loss of 
Supply from 
Barka DP 
210000 21081 182400 21 0 0 
One 
in one 
to five 
years 
<12 hours 
loss of 
treated 
water 
production 
4 2 8 
Downstream 
storage 
Inflow 
from 
DP 
Restore 
DP 
output 
Inflows 
from 
DP 
21081 63816 2.7 0 
One 
in one 
to five 
years 
<12 hours loss of treated water 
production 
4 2 8 
Loss of 
Supply from 
Barka DP 
210000 21081 182400 21 0 23852 
One 
in one 
to five 
years 
12 – 48 
hours loss 
of treated 
water 
production 
4 16 64 
Downstream 
storage 
Inflow 
from 
DP 
Restore 
DP 
output 
Inflows 
from 
DP 
21081 63816 2.7 0 
One 
in one 
to five 
years 
<12 hours loss of treated water 
production 
4 2 8 
Loss of 
Supply from 
Barka DP 
210000 21081 182400 21 23852 129259 
One 
in one 
to five 
years 
2 – 7 days 
loss of 
treated 
water 
production 
4 16 64 
Downstream 
storage 
Inflow 
from 
DP 
Restore 
DP 
output 
Inflows 
from 
DP 
21081 63816 2.7 65443 
One 
in one 
to five 
years 
2 – 7 days loss of treated water 
production 
4 8 32 
Loss of 
Supply from 
Barka DP 
210000 21081 182400 21 129258.6 >>129259 
One 
in five 
to 
twenty 
years 
>7 days 
loss of 
treated 
water 
production 
4 16 64 
Downstream 
storage 
Inflow 
from 
DP 
Restore 
DP 
output 
Inflows 
from 
DP 
21081 63816 2.7 >>65443 
One 
in five 
to 
twenty 
years 
>7 days loss of treated water 
production 
3 8 24 
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Table 6.15: Summary of Risks to Al Dakhilya Water Supply System 
Hazard Consequence 
Before Control After Control 
L C Risk L C Risk 
Transmission Mains 
Burst Barka PS to MPS (Dakhliyah Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 1 16 16 1 8 8 
Burst MPS Res to ch 17.8km Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 4 16 64 4 8 32 
Burst ch 17.8km to BPS1 Res Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 4 16 64 4 8 32 
Burst BPS1 Res to BPS2 Res Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 4 16 64 4 2 8 
Burst BPS2 Res to Samail Res Loss of supply to Samail 4 16 64 4 2 8 
Burst BPS3 Res to Break Tank Loss of supply to Izki, Adam, Manah, Bahla, Al Hamra, Nizwa 4 16 64 4 2 8 
Burst BPS3 Res to Break Tank Loss of supply to Izki, Adam, Manah, Bahla, Al Hamra, Nizwa 4 16 64 4 2 8 
Burst Break Tank to ch48.89 Loss of supply to Izki, Adam, Manah, Bahla, Al Hamra, Nizwa 5 16 80 5 2 10 
Burst ch 48.89 to Firq Res take-off Loss of supply to Izki, Adam, Manah, Bahla, Al Hamra, Nizwa 5 16 80 5 2 10 
Burst Firq Res to take off to Manah Res Loss of supply to Manah 5 16 80 5 2 10 
Burst Manah take off to Adam Res Loss of supply to Adam 5 8 40 5 2 10 
Burst take-off to Manah Res to BPS4 Loss of supply to Niza, Al Hamra, Bahla 5 16 80 5 2 10 
Burst take-off to Manah Res to BPS4 Loss of supply to Niza, Al Hamra, Bahla 5 16 80 5 2 10 
Burst to take-off to BPS5 Loss of supply to Al Hamra, Bahla 5 16 80 5 2 10 
Burst from take-off to BPS5 to Bahla Loss of supply to Bahla 5 16 80 5 8 40 
Burst BPS4 to Nizwa (Sypa Res) Loss of supply to Nizwa 5 16 80 5 8 40 
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Table 6.15 - Cont.: Summary of Risks to Al Dakhilya Water Supply System 
Hazard Consequence 
Before Control After Control 
L C Risk L C Risk 
Pumping  stations 
Pump failure - MPS PS loss of supply to Dakhliyah 4 16 64 1 16 16 
Loss of power - MPS PS Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 5 16 80 5 2 10 
Failure of control systems to MPS PS Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 4 16 64 4 2 8 
Pump failure - BPS1 loss of supply to Dakhliyah 4 16 64 1 1 1 
Loss of power - BPS1 Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 5 16 80 3 1 3 
Failure of control systems to BPS1 PS Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 4 16 64 3 1 3 
Pump failure - BPS2 loss of supply to Dakhliyah 4 16 64 1 16 16 
Loss of power - BPS2 Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 5 16 80 5 2 10 
Failure of control systems to BPS2 PS Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 4 16 64 4 2 8 
Pump failure - BPS3 Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 4 16 64 3 8 24 
Loss of power - BPS3 Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 5 16 80 5 2 10 
Failure of control systems to BPS3 PS Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 4 16 64 4 2 8 
Pump failure - BPS4 Loss of supply to Nizwa 5 16 80 3 8 24 
Loss of power - BPS4 Loss of supply to Nizwa 5 16 80 5 2 10 
Failure of control systems to BPS4 PS Loss of supply to Nizwa 4 16 64 4 2 8 
Pump failure - BPS5 loss of supply to Al Hamra 4 16 64 2 16 32 
Loss of power - BPS5 Loss of supply to Al Hamra 5 8 40 5 4 20 
Failure of control systems to BPS5 PS Loss of supply to Al Hamra 4 8 32 4 4 16 
Loss of Supply from Desalination Plant 
Loss of Supply from Barka DP 
< 12 hours partial reduction in treated water production 
(>34% of design output) 
4 2 8 4 2 8 
Loss of Supply from Barka DP <12 hours loss of treated water production 4 2 8 4 2 8 
Loss of Supply from Barka DP 12 – 48 hours loss of treated water production 4 16 64 4 2 8 
Loss of Supply from Barka DP 2 – 7 days loss of treated water production 4 16 64 4 8 32 
Loss of Supply from Barka DP >7 days loss of treated water production 4 16 64 3 8 24 
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6.4 Interpretation of Risk Analysis Tables 
6.4.1 Introduction 
The severity of the risks depends first on the likely outcomes, should an 
event occur but also on the capacity of the mitigation measures to reduce 
the risks posed. Where the mitigation measures fail to reduce the risk from 
severe there is a serious residual problem that may require to be 
addressed using an alternative strategy. In this light, the following 
discussion interprets the outcomes of the risk tables. A risk score greater 
than 16 is considered severe and mitigation will required. 
 
6.4.2 Al Ghubrah Desalination Plant and Transmission Mains 
The values of risks presented in the tables show that even after control 
measures the risks values remain the same, which means some potential 
solution has to be found and adopted to mitigate the effect of specified 
risks. Table 6.16 shows a summary of significant hazards and the relative 
risks associated with Al Ghubrah Desalination Plant, and Greater Muscat 
and Al Dakhilya Water Supply Systems at different stages of the water 
supply system that makes it easy to identify which stage has the worse 
risk. The following conclusions can be drawn risk tables and Table 6.16: 
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Table 6.16: Number of Severe Risks to Water Supply Utilities 
 
Utility 
 
Stage 
Number with Severe Risk 
Before mitigation After mitigation 
 
Al Gubrah Desalina- 
tion Plant 
Sea Water quality 5 4 
Main Treatment 
process 
  9 1 
Side wide risk 3 0 
Total 17 5 
 
Great Muscat Water 
Supply System 
Transmission Main 4 3 
Pumping Stations 6 3 
Loss of supply from 
Desalination Plant 
3 2 
Total 13 8 
 Al Dakhilya Water 
Supply System  
Transmission Main 15 4 
Pumping Stations 18 5 
Loss of supply from 
Desalination Plant 
3 2 
Total 36 11 
 
 The risk to the main treatment processes and side wide works of the Al 
Ghubrah plant can be controlled, but the risk due to feed water quality 
could remain high even after applying the mitigation measures, 
because Al Ghubrah is close to an international oil port and hence it is 
at significant risk from oil contamination. At the same time it is always 
exposed to harmful Algal Blooms. 
 In total Al Ghubrah Desalination Plant is faced with 17 severe risks, 
however most are reduced after mitigation. The remaining 5 hazardous 
ratings are less serious indicating that even after the mitigation 
measures put in place they are still at high risk. 
 As evident from table (6.16), risks associated with transmission mains 
and pumping stations are worse compared to those associated with the 
loss of supply from the desalination plant. The most severe risks are 
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those associated with pipe rather than with the pump failure since 
when pump failure is caused by lack of power supply, there can be 
another source of supply. However, where a single pipe fails it must 
either be repaired or replaced. 
 At Muscat Water supply’s transmission main there are 4 high hazard 
situations, the highest having a risk score of 80 and the remaining 3 
having risk scores of 64. After mitigation measures the 3 remain with 
high risk although the score decreases to 32 and remain severe risks. 
 The equivalent high risks associated with the Al Dakhilya Water Supply 
System are transmission main (15), pump failure (18) and loss of 
supply from the desalination plant (3). Some of these risks can be 
mitigated significantly such that they are no longer a threat to the water 
supply. However, after mitigation 4 high risk events at the transmission 
main, 5 resulting from pump failure, and 2 resulting from loss of supply 
from desalination plant remain resistant to the mitigation measures 
thus still posing high risk to the system. 
 Irrespective of the corrective measures put in place, pump failure, loss 
of power, and failure of control systems at Ghubrah PS will still pose 
extreme risks that will almost certainly need urgent action.  
 Lastly, there are low risks associated with loss of power at Barka to 
Seeb PS after corrective measure have been implemented. 
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6.5  System Resilience  
6.5.1 Evaluation of Resilience  
Based on the results of a risk assessment, the resilience of a system can 
be evaluated and the resultant risk score is translated to a level of 
resilience. A simple scoring method developed by Hughes and Healy 
(2014) outlined in section 2.3.6 was adapted for use in this study by 
replacing the risk descriptors by risk scores from the above analysis. The 
resulting translation procedure is given in Table (6.17), and generates a 
resilience score ranging from 4 (very high resilience) to 1 (low resilience). 
  
Table 6.17: Translation of Risk Score to level of resilience 
Risk Score Level of Resilience (score) Resilience Ranking 
1-5 4  very high 
6-15 3  High 
16 -32 2  Moderate 
> 32 1 Low 
Adapted from Hughes and Healy (2014) 
The resilience scores have been assigned as follow:  
4  Very high resilience: The risks to the system are very low.  
3  High resilience: The risks to the system are acceptable. 
2  Moderate resilience: The risks to the system are major. 
1 Low resilience: The risks to the system are significant or extreme. 
 
The risks to each parts of the water supply systems were identified and 
the impact of each risk is assessed and assigned score from 1 to 80 
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depending on the level of risk as described in Table 3.5. For each risk the 
desalination plant and the transmission system were given a score based 
upon its level of resilience using figures given in Table (6.17), and as  
mentioned earlier, high score represents good resilience while low scores 
represent poor resilience. The total or overall resilience score for each part 
was produced by weighting these scores for the differing risks. The overall 
resilience scores were estimated before and after control (mitigation) 
measures. The levels of resilience for Al Ghubrah desalination plant are 
presented in Table (6.18). The Level of Resilience for Great Muscat and Al 
Dakhilya Water Supply Systems are illustrated in Table (6.19) and (6.20). 
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Table 6.18: The Level of Resilience for Al Ghubrah Desalination Plant 
Item Hazard Hazardous Event 
Before Control After Control 
Risk Resilience Score Risk Resilience Score 
Sea Water Quality 
Feed Water 
Quality 
Loss of Production Harmful Algal Blooms 48 1 24 2 
Loss of Production Jellyfish 32 2 8 3 
Loss of Production Accidental Oil Spills at Sea 48 1 24 2 
Loss of Production Accidental Oil Spills at Sea 48 1 24 2 
Loss of Production Accidental Oil Spills at Sea 12 3 12 3 
Loss of Production Accidental Oil Spills at Sea 12 3 12 3 
Loss of Production Accidental Oil Spills at Sea 8 3 8 3 
Loss of Production Operational Oil Spills at Sea 12 3 12 3 
Loss of Production Operational Oil Spills at Sea 12 3 12 3 
Loss of Production Operational Oil Spills at Sea 12 3 12 3 
Loss of Production Re-circulation causing increased salinity 48 1 32 2 
Loss of Production Excessive seawater temperature 8 3 8 3 
Overall Sea Water Quality Resilience Score                                2.3 (moderate)                          2.7 (high) 
Main Treatment Process 
MSF Units 
Loss of Production Structural Failure of Main Process Unit 8 3 8 3 
Loss of Production Power Failure Multiple Units (steam/electricity) 8 3 8 3 
Loss of Production Power Failure Single unit (steam/electricity) 5 4 5 4 
Loss of Production Loss of Process Performance due to Scaling and Fouling 32 2 4 4 
CO2 Plant 
Loss of Production Structural Failure 16 2 16 2 
Loss of Production Mechanical and Electrical Failure 16 2 8 3 
Loss of Production Process Performance Failure 16 2 4 4 
Chlorine Dosing 
Loss of Production Structural Failure 32 2 32 2 
Loss of Production Mechanical and Electrical Failure 32 2 16 3 
Process Performance Failure Process Performance Failure 64 1 8 3 
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Table 6.18 - Cont.: The Level of Resilience for Al Ghubrah Desalination Plant 
Item Hazard Hazardous Event 
Before Control After Control 
Risk Resilience Score Risk Resilience Score 
Main Treatment Process 
Caustic Soda 
Dosing  
Loss of Production Structural Failure (leaks) of Tanks or Dosing Pipe work 16 2 8 3 
Process Performance Failure 
Mechanical and Electrical Failure of Make Up Equipment and 
Dosing Pumps 
32 2 16 2 
Loss of Production Process Performance Failure (Incorrect Quantity Dosed) 32 2 16 2 
Sodium 
Fluoride Dosing  
Loss of Production Structural Failure (leaks) of Tanks or Dosing Pipe work 16 2 8 3 
Loss of Production 
Mechanical and Electrical Failure of Make Up Equipment and 
Dosing Pumps 
32 2 16 3 
Process Performance Failure Process Performance Failure (Incorrect Quantity Dosed) 32 2 16 2 
Treated Water 
Sampling 
System 
Loss of Production Structural Failure of Sampling Pipe work 8 3 8 3 
Loss of Production Mechanical and Electrical Failure 16 2 16 2 
Process Performance Failure Process Performance Failure (Analyzers do not read correctly) 32 2 16 2 
Overall main Treatment Process Resilience Score                       2.2 (moderate)                         2.8 (high) 
Side Wide Risks 
Electrical Power 
Supply System 
Loss of Treated Water Production Loss of Power Supply (external) 20 2 8 3 
Fire Loss of Treated Water Production Major Fire on Site 32 2 16 2 
Flooding (origin 
land side) 
Loss of Treated Water Production Flooding of site and damage to key plant equipment 32 2 16 2 
Gas Supply Loss of Treated Water Production Disruption of gas supply to IWPP 16 2 8 3 
Loss of Labour Loss of Treated Water Production Loss of expatriate labour 16 2 8 3 
Nuclear Threat Loss of Treated Water Production Nuclear contamination 16 2 16 2 
Cyclones Loss of Treated Water Production Cyclone 8 3 8 3 
Overall Side Wide Risks Resilience Score                        2.1 (moderate)                          2.6 (high) 
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Table 6.19:  The Level of Resilience for Great Muscat Water Supply System 
Hazard Consequence 
Before Control After Control 
Risk Resilience Score Risk Resilience Score 
Transmission Mains 
Burst in main from Barka PS to Seeb Res Loss of supply to Seeb 64 1 32 2 
Burst in main from Al Ghubrah to Qurm, Wattaya, 
Loss of supply to much of eastern Greater Muscat 64 
1 
32 
2 
Ruwi, Muscat, Mumtaz Res and Al Amirat PS (1000mm) 1 2 
Burst in main from Al Ghubrah to Qurm, Wattaya, 
Loss of supply to part of eastern Greater Muscat 80 
1 
10 
3 
Ruwi, Muscat, Mumtaz Res and Al Amirat PS (600mm) 1 3 
Burst in main from Al Ghubrah to Bausher Wilayat (Waver, Airport, 
Ghala, Bousher Res) 
Loss of supply to part of eastern Greater Muscat 64 1 32 2 
Overall Transmission Mains Resilience Score                   1.0 (low)                     2.3 (moderate) 
Pumping  Stations 
Pump failure - Barka to Seeb PS Partial loss of supply to Seeb 64 1 16 2 
Loss of power - Barka to Seeb PS Loss of supply to Seeb 80 1 5 4 
Failure of control systems - Barka to Seeb PS Loss of supply to Seeb 64 1 8 3 
Pump failure - Ghubrah PS Partial loss of supply to Eastern Gt. Muscat 80 1 32 2 
Loss of power - Ghubrah PS Loss of supply to Eastern Gt Muscat 80 1 40 1 
Failure of control systems - Ghubrah PS Loss of supply to Eastern Gt Muscat 64 1 32 2 
Overall Pumping Stations Resilience Score                      1.0 (low)                     2.3 (moderate) 
Loss of Supply from Desalination Plant 
Loss of Supply from Ghubrah DP 
< 12 hours partial reduction in treated water production 
(>34% of design output) 
8 3 8 3 
Loss of Supply from Ghubrah DP <12 hours loss of treated water production 8 3 8 3 
Loss of Supply from Ghubrah DP 12 – 48 hours loss of treated water production 64 1 8 3 
Loss of Supply from Ghubrah DP 2 – 7 days loss of treated water production 64 1 32 2 
Loss of Supply from Ghubrah DP >7 days loss of treated water production 48 1 24 2 
Overall Loss of Supply from Desalination Plant Resilience Score                1.8 (moderate)                      2.6 (high) 
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Table 6.20: The Level of Resilience for Al Dakhilya Water Supply System 
Hazard Consequence 
Before Control After Control 
Risk Resilience Score Risk Resilience Score 
Transmission Mains 
Burst Barka PS to MPS (Dakhliyah Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 16 2 8 3 
Burst MPS Res to ch 17.8km Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 64 1 32 2 
Burst ch 17.8km to BPS1 Res Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 64 1 32 2 
Burst BPS1 Res to BPS2 Res Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 64 1 8 3 
Burst BPS2 Res to Samail Res Loss of supply to Samail 64 1 8 3 
Burst BPS3 Res to Break Tank Loss of supply to Izki, Adam, Manah, Bahla, Al Hamra, Nizwa 64 1 8 3 
Burst BPS3 Res to Break Tank Loss of supply to Izki, Adam, Manah, Bahla, Al Hamra, Nizwa 64 1 8 3 
Burst Break Tank to ch48.89 Loss of supply to Izki, Adam, Manah, Bahla, Al Hamra, Nizwa 80 1 10 3 
Burst ch 48.89 to Firq Res take-off Loss of supply to Izki, Adam, Manah, Bahla, Al Hamra, Nizwa 80 1 10 3 
Burst Firq Res to take off to Manah Res Loss of supply to Manah 80 1 10 3 
Burst Manah take off to Adam Res Loss of supply to Adam 80 1 10 3 
Burst take-off to Manah Res to BPS4 Loss of supply to Niza, Al Hamra, Bahla 80 1 10 3 
Burst take-off to Manah Res to BPS4 Loss of supply to Niza, Al Hamra, Bahla 80 1 10 3 
Burst to take-off to BPS5 Loss of supply to Al Hamra, Bahla 80 1 10 3 
Burst from take-off to BPS5 to Bahla Loss of supply to Bahla 80 1 40 1 
Burst BPS4 to Nizwa (Sypa Res) Loss of supply to Nizwa 80 1 40 1 
Overall Transmission Mains Resilience Score                     1.1 (low)                         2.6 (high) 
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Table 6.20 – Cont: The Level of Resilience for Al Dakhilya Water Supply System 
Hazard Consequence 
Before Control After Control 
Risk Resilience Score Risk Resilience Score 
Pumping  Stations      
Pump failure - MPS PS loss of supply to Dakhliyah 64 1 16 2 
Loss of power - MPS PS Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 80 1 10 3 
Failure of control systems to MPS PS Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 64 1 8 3 
Pump failure - BPS1 loss of supply to Dakhliyah 64 1 1 4 
Loss of power - BPS1 Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 80 1 3 4 
Failure of control systems to BPS1 PS Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 64 1 3 4 
Pump failure - BPS2 loss of supply to Dakhliyah 64 1 16 2 
Loss of power - BPS2 Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 80 1 10 3 
Failure of control systems to BPS2 PS Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 64 1 8 3 
Pump failure - BPS3 Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 64 1 24 2 
Loss of power - BPS3 Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 80 1 10 3 
Failure of control systems to BPS3 PS Loss of supply to Dakhliyah 64 1 8 3 
Pump failure - BPS4 Loss of supply to Nizwa 80 1 24 2 
Loss of power - BPS4 Loss of supply to Nizwa 80 1 10 3 
Failure of control systems to BPS4 PS Loss of supply to Nizwa 64 1 8 3 
Pump failure - BPS5 loss of supply to Al Hamra 64 1 32 2 
Loss of power - BPS5 Loss of supply to Al Hamra 40 1 20 2 
Failure of control systems to BPS5 PS Loss of supply to Al Hamra 32 2 32 2 
Overall Pumping Stations Resilience Score                       1.1 (low)                         2.8 (high) 
Loss of Supply from Desalination Plant      
Loss of Supply from Barka DP 
< 12 hours partial reduction in treated water production (>34% of 
design output) 
8 
3 
8 
3 
Loss of Supply from Barka DP <12 hours loss of treated water production 8 3 8 3 
Loss of Supply from Barka DP 12 – 48 hours loss of treated water production 64 1 8 3 
Loss of Supply from Barka DP 2 – 7 days loss of treated water production 64 1 32 2 
Loss of Supply from Barka DP >7 days loss of treated water production 64 1 24 2 
Overall Loss of Supply from Desalination Plant Resilience Score                           1.8 (moderate)                       2.6 (high) 
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6.5.2 Interpretation of System Resilience 
The average values of resilience scores for the main components of Al 
Gubrah desalinization plant, and Great Muscat and Al Dakhiliya water 
supply systems are presented in table 6.21.  
 
Table 6.21: The Average Resilience Scores to Water Supply Utilities 
 
Utility 
 
Stage 
The Average Resilience Score 
Before Control After Control 
 
Al Gubrah Desalina- 
tion Plant 
Sea Water quality 2.3 2.7 
Main Treatment process 2.2 2.8 
Side wide risk 2.1 2.6 
 
Great Muscat Water 
Supply System 
Transmission Main 1.0 2.3 
Pumping Stations 1.0 2.3 
Loss of supply from 
Desalination Plant 
1.8 2.6 
 Al Dakhilya Water 
Supply System  
Transmission Main 1.1 2.6 
Pumping Stations 1.1 2.8 
Loss of supply from 
Desalination Plant 
1.8 2.6 
 
It seems that the existing resilience of desalination plants is higher than 
the water supply systems, and the resilience of the transmission mains 
and pumping station is very low.  However, by associated mitigation 
measures the resilience of the water utilities could be reach to  more than 
70%. 
The results of this analysis demonstrates that the overall resilience scores 
for Al Ghubrah desalination plant before mitigation measures is moderate 
(average = 2.2), and by applying mitigation measures the level of 
resilience is high (resilience score = 2.7).  The current resilience of Great 
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Muscat and Al Dakhilya Water Supply Systems is low, but could be 
increased by adopting different control measures. 
 
6.6 Limitations of the Risk and Resilience Assessments 
The complexity of water supply systems mainly arises from the fact that 
the water supply system has a large number of components or 
subsystems (including sources, treatment, distribution, etc.). The water 
supply system has uncertain operation and environmental conditions. This 
complexity introduces uncertainties in any risk assessment. When dealing 
with risk assessment methods for drinking water systems it is difficult to 
include all aspects. This thesis has focused on risk assessments of the 
major parts of the water supply system – treatment and transmission 
mains  and how the results from the risk assessment can be used in 
decision (Mays, 2004). 
 
Uncertainty is a further important factor in complex risk assessments. In 
this research, difficulties were found (Ang and Tang, 1984) both in 
representing risk information accurately and describing the risk 
mechanisms. Risk ranking (e.g. Burgman, 2005; Cox, 2008) was 
particularly useful when comparing risks to pipelines and pumping stations 
but it has several limitations since, for example, uncertainties are typically 
not included and chains of events and interactions between events are not 
easily considered. 
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The work suffered from the two main uncertainties which are frequently 
mentioned by analysts (El-Baroudy and Simonovic, 2004); insufficient data 
for statistic inferences and vagueness and variations of risk information. 
However, the detail of the risk analyses carried out in the tables above and 
the inclusion in the analysis of two pipeline networks is considered to 
compensate for any lack of statistical evaluation. Natural hazards usually 
belong to the former, while human-caused failures are in the latter 
category. 
 
Determination of resilience used an approach from the transportation 
sector (Hughes and Healy, 2014). These authors took a relatively 
simplistic approach which may limit its validity. Further, due to the time 
constraints in this research, further approaches to resilience determination, 
for example from other sectors, could not be considered. Additional work is 
desirable to consolidate the resilience scores found. 
 
6.7 Summary  
The anticipation and management of risk is one step towards increasing 
resilience of water supply systems subject to different hazards. The results 
of this research show that the water utilities in Oman are exposed to 
significant risks that will certainly need mitigation measures to improve 
system resilience ahead of any future event such a tropical storm. The 
output of the risk assessment has been used to link to the resilience 
assessment and translate to a level of resilience. The results reveal that 
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the level of resilience is moderate and it could reach a high level by 
applying the solutions and mitigation measures suggested in this study.    
 
Increasing the resilience of the system requires effective, flexible, agile 
and rapid implementation of response and recovery actions. The final 
element of this thesis in Chapter 7 is to develop the emergency response 
plan using the outcomes of the risk and resilience analysis. 
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Chapter 7 Emergency Response Plan  
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the proposed strategy for the response to routine 
and non-routine water related emergencies in Oman. The results of the 
water audit and the risk assessments show that the water losses and risks 
to the water supply systems are high and the resilience, particularly of 
parts of the system is low. The research has shown that additional 
mitigation measures are urgently required as is an emergency response 
plan. The actions and strategies noted in the literature in order to enhance 
the resilience for water systems have been considered in this study to 
mitigate consequence of risks and enhance resilience of water systems in 
Oman (section 2.3). The additional mitigation and the emergency 
response plan outlined in this chapter have been developed by combining 
the research outputs of chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis with PAEW’s 
existing plan in an effort to better meet PAEW’s vision, mission and 
objectives.  
 
Current emergency response practice in Oman is focused principally on 
resolving the cause of the problem as quickly as possible. No detailed risk 
analysis had been carried out to prioritize mitigation works, develop 
specific response protocols or protect vulnerable customers. This chapter 
addresses the proposed strategy for the response to routine emergencies 
such as leakage causing damage and non-routine emergencies such as 
tropical cyclones. 
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7.2 Events that Cause Emergency  
7.2.1 Types of emergency 
Various types of events may cause a state of emergency to arise in any 
given area. Whybark (2015) argues that they can be grouped as follows: 
 Credible Threats - The major credible threats expected are acts of 
terrorism. As an example, bomb explosions can disrupt water systems 
hindering the supply and circulation of water. 
 Major disasters - include destructive events such as hurricanes and 
tornadoes, storms and earthquakes which are beyond human 
understanding and can cause considerable damage to the water 
system. 
 Catastrophic events - incidences that leave behind a considerable 
number of casualties. The damage and disruption may affect the 
population, infrastructure and even government functions and, in 
particular may cause considerable damage to the water system.  
 
7.2.2 Level of emergency 
All emergencies require some form of response. However, the major 
determinant which could trigger an emergency response is gauged against 
the potential damage that it may cause and loss of life (Manuel, 2014). 
Also of importance is the extent of area affected in relation to the 
population of that area. The level of emergency in response to water 
supply depends on the threat posed. Some problems such as blockages 
are not a major threat and not need a rapid response compared to threats 
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from terrorists. Manuel (2014) considers a response is necessary in both 
cases but prompt and fast actions are required for major emergencies 
while a more planned set of actions are appropriate in others. 
 
7.2.3 Response actions for specific events 
In an emergency response plan, a category of response must be defined 
for each specific type of event. For example, in the outbreak of cholera in 
the Philippines discussed in Chapter 2 (Brower, Magno & Diling, 2014), 
the cause of the outbreak was initially wrongly attributed resulting in an 
inappropriate initial response. The response required was institutional 
where several agencies both private and governmental were tasked with 
formulating an institutionalizing the water supply and sanitation in the area 
resulting in a decrease and later disappearance of the disease. 
 
7.2.4 Alternative water supplies 
During emergencies, alternative measures must be put in place to ensure 
that customers still get access to water until the time when the system is 
restored. Most countries depend on the water supply system put in place 
by the government and rarely have alternative to water supply but many 
developing countries such as (Kihila, 2014) depend only on harvested rain 
water as an alternative to their supply. America and The Philippines have 
alternative water supply measures in place, which play a greater role in 
cases of emergencies. 
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In Oman, the emergency committee at the Public Authority of Electricity 
and Water (PAEW) has identified the most important mechanism to 
prepare for any threat that may occur. The committee is always briefed on 
the status of each district and the mechanisms in place in the event of a 
disaster affecting the Sultanate (Almarez, Peòaroya & Rubio, 2015). The 
alternative water sources include surface water reservoirs and well fields 
which are capable of supplying water during the period of the disaster. 
 
7.2.5 Outage Scenarios 
At times, there are cases when the water supply is cut either due to 
maintenance practices or emergencies causing an outage in that particular 
area. In this case the emergency response should be to ensure that the 
supply is back to normal as quickly as possible through an outage back up 
plan (Manuel, 2014). 
 
7.2.6 Mitigation Measures 
The analysis leading to the Emergency Response Plan (ERP) has clearly 
defined mitigation measures; first, an improved response to a crisis which 
ensures early restoration of service and a good relation with the 
customers, and secondly, the assessment helps avert harmful acts by the 
citizens to the existing water systems (Lum & Margesson, 2014). Thirdly, 
there should be proper site review to reduce the effect of the natural 
disaster. Finally, the response and recovery methods should be well 
defined such that restoration of services becomes the top most priority in 
cases of crisis. 
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7.3 Proposed Emergency Response Strategy   
7.3.1 Introduction 
Risk analysis and mitigation is always the first line of defense for a water 
utility as it is better to avoid an emergency than to deal with all its impacts, 
however, non-routine emergencies will always occur. The analysis of data 
and the results of risk assessments and water auditing show the need to 
develop an emergency response plan to rapidly resolve any possible 
water emergency event and ensure that customers affected by any 
emergency are kept informed and directed to alternative sources of 
potable water when required. 
 
In this section of the study the researcher proposed a set of actions and 
procedures that PAEW are recommended to take into account when 
developing the detailed emergency response plan based on data obtained 
from the risk analysis process and from the water audit. The proposed 
actions comprehensively address the needs of PAEW at this stage of its 
development and are designed to support the business. Thus, the aims of 
the emergency response plan are to:  
 Improve efficiency and standards of service  
 Provide high quality water services throughout Oman  
 Increase staff knowledge and skills  
 Achieve international recognition as a high quality supplier of utility 
services.  
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PAEW shall continue to manage day to day operations but in other more 
serious non-routine situations or any other natural hazards as in the case 
of tropical cyclone (Ex. Gonu), PAEW should adopt an integrated 
approach to emergency management and: 
 
 Support the NCCD of Oman in live emergencies and exercises and 
comply with its requirements;  
 Train and equip regional PAEW staff to be as self-sufficient as possible 
in an emergency;  
 Have national and regional Crisis Management Teams trained to deal 
instinctively with any type of emergency;  
 Target the regional deployment of emergency response equipment and 
resources based on a robust risk assessment of common events in 
each region.  
 
7.3.2 Key Change Components in the Proposed Strategy 
The analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 show that a significant overhaul of parts 
of the PAEW supply system are required to produce a satisfactory level of 
resilience while others require minor improvement. The parts requiring 
overhaul are; Manuals, Plans and Procedures; Emergency Alternative 
Water Supplies, and; Planning and Preparedness. Some improvement is 
also desirable on the Emergency Response Organizational Structure. 
Consequently, the strategy requires that the response management 
should address the following issues: 
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1) Manuals, Plans and Procedures: New PAEW Emergency Response 
Manuals with the following contents should developed  
 Management: This section shall contain emergency definition codes, 
and the structure, responsibilities and roles of the Crisis Management 
Team;  
 Contact Information: for all staff, sites, suppliers and service 
providers, external agencies and priority customers;  
 Regional Information: specific to the local region and shall contain a 
description and schematic plan of the region’s operating regime;  
 Regional Event Response Plans: specific to the local region 
containing plans for responding to known events that occur in the 
region;  
 PAEW Emergency Procedures: the PAEW generic procedures for 
managing the overall system.  
 
2) Emergency Alternative Water Supplies: This strategy presents the 
methods that form part of the Alternative Water Supplies Procedures 
and include, in addition to the delivery of water by tankers, making 
water available for Public Collection at selected Schools (NCCD 
Designated Refuges), Mosques and other locations using static water 
tanks and bottled water provided via prior agreement with a consortium 
of Omani bottled water producers. 
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3) Planning and Preparedness: PAEW shall formally organize and 
manage its interactions with government and non-government 
agencies, business and customers via memorandums of understanding 
and in the cases of essential suppliers and service provider’s contracts 
which include rigid sections regarding emergency response times. In 
support of this a PAEW advisory service shall be offered to priority 
establishment to enable them to improve their resilience to water 
related emergencies. 
 
4) Emergency response organizational structure: 
 Create a PAEW emergency response working group: that agree 
common emergency terms and definitions, emergency level coding, 
minimum quantities emergency drinking water, emergency 
management document structure and hierarchy, crisis management 
structure for all levels, and set service performance targets. 
 Create an executive steering group: A PAEW Executive Steering 
Group under the chairmanship of His Excellency the Chairman with 
the support of the three permanent general managers. The 
Executive Steering Group will consider the strategic, legal, financial 
and reputational impacts to PAEW of major emergencies. 
 Create national and regional management teams: Crisis 
Management Teams shall have the responsibility for managing all 
the practical and tactical elements of non-routine emergencies. 
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7.4 Recommended Further Mitigation Measures 
7.4.1 Urgent and Desirable Mitigation measures 
The resilience analysis in Chapter 6 shows that average scores for many 
components within the water supply system are in the range 2.2 to 2.8 
indicating that the system is only moderately resilient (Hughes and Healy, 
2014) even after control measures have been implemented. Furthermore, 
some risk elements have scores less that 2 (low resilience) indicating that 
urgent mitigation measures are desirable. Tables 6.18 to 6.20 summarize 
the resilience scores and all scores of 2 or less are considered to require 
further mitigation measures in addition to the control measures identified in 
Chapter 6. The principles of these mitigation measures were discussed in 
workshop and this research has detailed (in Table 7.1) the reductions of 
risk by the mitigation measures.  
 
From the research it was clear that significant risks might still be present 
and a further set of future enhancements would be desirable, these being 
listed in the right column of Table (7.1). Five different options of outages of 
the two desalination plants have been considered, to show the 
effectiveness of the mitigation measures for supplying parts of those areas 
which are normally supplied from the Al Ghubra and/or Barka desalination 
plants. The work undertaken in this research has highlighted the mitigation 
measures desirable but there is a clear case for further resilience 
evaluation and consideration in the future of alternative mitigation 
measures. 
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7.4.2 Outage Responses 
The outage responses for different scenarios are presented in Table (7.1) 
and the alternative sources of water in case of emergency are based on 
the analysis of risk and resilience discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  The 
risk data show that the loss of water supply from desalination plants (main 
sources) due to complete or partial disruption of the plants is one of the 
major problems that could occur as explained in the risk and resilience 
tables in chapter 6. The researcher proposed different mitigation 
measures in order to reduce risks and enhance resilience. Further 
advanced mitigation measures and emergency actions are also proposed 
in this chapter along with alternative sources of water as illustrated in 
Tables (7.1) and (7.2)    
 
7.4.3 Additional Water Sources 
Table (7.2) evaluates a range of further system enhancements in the form 
of procurement of additional water sources. Normally new sources are 
implemented because demand predictions show that existing supplies will 
be insufficient at some time horizon.  However, in this case, where the 
system has low resilience, the author has concluded that additional 
sources are highly desirable to meet demands in emergencies improve 
resilience. 
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Table 7.1: Mitigation Measures to Address Outages of Al Ghubra and Barka Desalination Plants 
Sr. Scenario 
Deficit 
(%) 
Action /Response   Urgent Mitigation Measure Advance Mitigation measure.  
1 
Complete 
disruption 
of Al   
Ghubra 
desalinatio
n plant 
60 
Full reliance on 
produced water from 
Barka desalination 
plant and from Wadi 
Aday and Al Khoud 
well fields. 
 Monitoring and control of the marine environment to 
prevent potential threats leading to loss of production at 
the coastal desalination plants. 
 Online monitors for algae and hydrocarbons to ensure 
that seawater quality is continuously assessed. 
Procedures should be prepared for action when 
seawater quality changes. 
 Increase the storage capacity in distribution reservoir and 
within transmission system to cover the shortage during 
the interruption. 
 Speed up the repair time as quick as possible and insure 
an adequate spares are available on site. 
 Additional supply can be secured by the interconnection 
between Sohar and Barka.     
 Ensure the Wadi Adai and Al Khoud wellfield are well 
maintained and ready to put on line at any time. 
 Providing customers with is clear information with what is 
happening. Requesting to save water during the outage.  
 The resilience of the desalination plants can be 
improved, lowering the risk of long term loss of 
production, but not eliminated it.    
 Measures to reduce the impact of marine 
environmental threats on the coastal 
desalination plants and/or the land based 
transmission systems. 
 
 Improvements to the existing desalination plants 
to increase reliability, this could include the 
provision of two intakes, additional screens, 
duplicate electrical power lines, additional 
chemical and gas storage etc. 
 
 Provide additional desalination plant capacity 
elsewhere along the coast, and enhance 
security of supply by increasing redundancy. 
 
 The potential for increasing the capacity of the 
existing wellfield. In addition develop inland 
wellfield in brackish groundwater area with 
desalination facility as emergency source 
 
 Strategic grid, A strategic grid linking all the 
water production (desalination) plants would 
provide flexibility and give resilience in the event 
of any failure at the desalination plants. This 
allows treated water to be moved easily around 
the transmission system allowing the majority of 
the population to be served from at least two 
desalination plants. Combined with sufficient 
local storage it provides the level of security 
essential to counter risks to the desalination 
plant production from the marine environment or 
catastrophic plant failure. 
2 
Partial 
disruption 
of Al 
Ghubra 
desalinatio
n plant 
30-50 
Full reliance on 
produced water from 
Al Ghubra and 
Barka desalination 
plants, and from 
Wadi Aday and Al 
Khoud well fields. 
3 
Complete 
Disruption 
of  Barka 
desalinatio
n Plant 
25 
Full reliance on 
produced water from 
Al Ghubra 
desalination plant 
and Wadi Aday and 
Al Khoud well fields. 
4 
Partial  
Disruption 
of  Barka 
desalinatio
n Plant 
10-20 
Full reliance on 
produced water from 
Al Ghubra and 
Barka desalination 
plants, and from 
Wadi Aday and Al 
Khoud well fields. 
5 
Full 
uspension 
of  Al 
Ghubra 
and Barka 
desalinatio
n plants 
80-85 
Full reliance on 
produced water from 
Al Khoudh and Wadi 
Aday well fields . 
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 Table 7.2 Recommendations for Providing Alternative Sources of Water to Improve System Resilience  
Sr. Alternative Source of water  Objective  Explanations 
1. 
 
 
 
 
Wadi Dayqah Project  
Construction of a new purification 
works, transmission mains and booster 
station to utilize water from the Wadi 
Dayqah. 
 Provide additional water to meet the increasing 
demand in Muscat, 
 Provide an alternative source other than 
desalinated water for security of supply 
 Provide a cheaper and more sustainable 
alternative to desalinated water. 
 This strategic project will be able to 
provide Muscat with sufficient quantity of 
water in case of outage of Al Ghubrah 
desalination plant.  
2. Interconnections  
Reinforcement the connection of the 
transmission Systems between 
Ghubrah to Barka Bark to Sohar. 
Security of water supply by additional 
interconnections between transmission systems 
and reinforcement of existing connections.  
 To transfer water to the area affected by 
water scarcity in exceptional events by 
securing water supply to different areas. 
3. Construct Emergency Reservoirs 
Water storage in different parts of the 
Governorate of Muscat. This will 
increase service reservoir capacity 
downstream. 
This is probably the optimum solution for 
interruptions in the supply due to the outage of Al 
Ghubrah desalination plant or failure in the 
pumps station or transmission maim between Al 
Ghubrah and distribution reservoir.  
 To secure water storage with sufficient 
capacity for 7 days of supply till year 2025, 
and for the predicted future water demand 
for 2 days until year 2035.  
4. Wellfield 
 Develop inland wellfield in brackish 
groundwater area with desalination. 
facility as emergency source.  
 
 Develop inland brackish groundwater  
area together with desalination plant 
facilities as emergency sources. 
 
This will provide water for emergency source. 
 The well fields are an important source of 
water supply, but as desalination capacity 
is extended the well fields will be retained 
as emergency backup during serious 
disruptions to the local water supply.  
 It may also be feasible to use the well fields 
as storage for desalinated water to provide 
extended supplies over a longer period. 
This would be a useful addition to the 
security of supply strategy. 
5. Portable Water Treatment Plants  
To take non-potable water from 
streams, gullies, and wells etc. and 
make it suitable for human 
consumption. 
For alternative water supply during an 
emergency.  
 
 The well fields will be retained as an 
emergency backup in the event of serious 
disruptions to the local water supply. 
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7.5 Emergency Response Plan to Address Outages 
The findings of the water audit in chapter 5 and the risk analyses in 
chapter 6 have been used to develop an Emergency Response Plan 
(ERP) and the actions that should be taken in case of emergency outages 
of the Al Ghubra and Barka desalination plants. A range of failure modes 
of these plants would result in a range of deficits of supply, based on the 
output capacity of the plants. These deficits are factored into the analysis, 
as are the continued operation (or not) of the two wellfields. The outcomes 
of the analysis are presented in Tables (7.3) to (7.5). 
 
The ERP sits alongside the mitigation measures since, should an 
emergency occur, such as the loss of a source, an immediate 
rearrangement of the water supplies to meet consumers’ demand is 
required. Consequently, the ERP is not shown directly by the risk tables 
but, since risks are high, then the only response possible is to make the 
best use of the water available by alternative arrangements. 
 
Table (7.3) evaluates the case where one or more prime source of water 
has suffered from an outage and emergency pumping responses are 
necessary. In each case water would be pumped in an emergency from 
parts of the system and/or from the two wellfields which will still have 
sufficient water, to those areas which are normally supplied from the Al 
Ghubra and/or Barka desalination plants.  
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Table 7.3: Pumping Response Strategies to Address Outages of Al Ghubra and Barka Desalination Plants 
Sr. Scenario 
Deficit 
(%) 
Available Resource Pumping method 
1 
Complete disruption of Al   
Ghubra desalination plant 
60 
Full reliance on produced water 
from Barka desalination plant 
and well fields. 
 Pumping the water from Barka Desalination plant and Al Khoudh well field 
to western side through Al Seeb, Rusail and Al Khoudh reservoirs. 
 Pumping the water to the eastern side from Wadi Aday well field to 
through Al Ghubra reservoirs  
 Supplying airport and Bousher reservoirs in the eastern side with water 
from Al Mawaleh pumping station.  
2 
Partial disruption of Al 
Ghubra desalination plant 
30-50 
Full reliance on limited 
produced water from Al Ghubra 
and Barka desalination plants, 
and from Wadi Aday and Al 
Khoud well fields. 
 Pumping the water from Wadi Aday well field to Al Ghubra reservoirs to 
cover the deficit in water supply to the eastern side. 
 Cover the water supply to western side through Barka desalination plant. 
3 
Complete Disruption of  
Barka desalination Plant 
25 
Full reliance on produced water 
from Al Ghubra desalination 
plant and Wadi Aday and Al 
Khoud well fields. 
 The water will pumped to the western side from Al Ghubra desalination 
plant and Al Khoudh well field. 
 The eastern side will be supplied with water from Al Ghubra desalination 
plant and Wadi Aday well field. 
4 
Partial Disruption of  Barka 
desalination Plant 
10-20 
Full reliance on produced water 
from Al Ghubra and Barka 
desalination plants, and from 
Wadi Aday and Al Khoud well 
fields. 
 The water will be pumped from Al Khoud well field and partially from Al 
Ghubra desalination plant to western side. 
 The water supply to eastern side will be covered by Al Ghubra 
desalination plant and Wadi Aday well field. 
5 
Full suspension of  Al 
Ghubra and Barka 
desalination plants 
80-85 
Full reliance on produced water 
from well fields in Wadi Aday 
and Al Khoudh 
 The water will be pumped to the western side from Al Khoudh well field. 
 The water will be pumped to the eastern side from Wadi Aday well field. 
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Table 7.4: Responses to Failures within the Transmission Systems  
Sr. Hazard Corrective measure Mitigation Measures 
1 Burst of mains. Increase the volume of downstream 
storage. Repairs to be completed to 
the target times. 
 Interlink system, this will be appropriate where systems are close 
together. 
 Increase the downstream storage, In most systems there is already a 
significant volume of storage and in many cases only a small 
additional volume may be required. 
 Local storage within the transmission system, Treated water storage 
within the transmission system allows customers to receive a 
guaranteed water supply independent of any interruptions at the 
desalination plants. It therefore provides a resilient solution for short 
term interruptions. 
 Provide alternative source of supply, This is more likely to be 
economic if prolonged outages are foreseen. It should be possible to 
keep existing wellfields on standby at low cost. In addition to that 
tinkering should developed.  
 Reliance on storage in the system, an appropriate measure in 
conjunction with keeping spare pumps and motors in store as 
replacement. One more spare units is recommended where an 
existing pump station has no space for additional pumps. 
 Minimize times to identify and rectify failures: As with pipeline failures, 
it is necessary to be realistic about achievable repair time, to ensure 
that action can be taken as quickly as possible to repair faults and 
restore supplies.  
 Standby generators, at the present time most pumping stations do not 
have standby generators. This should be considered if the power 
outages may be expected to exceed the length of time covered by 
downstream storage in the system. 
 
2 Pumps failure; 
 Breakdowns of pump and 
motor. 
 loss of incoming supply. 
 failure of control system. 
Maintain standby, through 
implementation of an appropriate 
maintenance, repair and 
replacement policy. 
3 Loss of power. Downstream storage. Ensure repair 
of lost supply within 24 hours. 
4 Service reservoirs. 
 
Downstream storage. Alarms and 
manual override implemented within 
12 hours. 
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Table 7.5: Intermittent Supply Strategies in Response to three Emergency Outage Scenarios. 
Sr. Scenario Water availability Periods Remarks 
1 Full or partial 
suspension of the 
Ghubra purification 
station. 
20 million gallons/day from Barka DP, 10 million 
gallons/day from AL Khoudh and Wadi Adai wells 
field and 12 million gallon/day from Sohar DP. 
Al Seeb. 
FS-2, FS-4 and FQ15 Continues supply. 
FS-1, from day 1 to day 2 (7am-7aam). 
FS-3, from day 4 to day 5 (7am – 7am). 
FS-16, from day 2 to day 3 (7am-7am). 
FS11, from day 6 to day 8 (7am-7am). 
4 TFS are available to server others by tankers. 
Bausher. 
FQ-1, FQ-5 and FQ-6 continue supply. 
FQ-2, from day 1 to day 2 (7am-7am) 
FQ-4, from day 5 to day 6 (7am-7am). 
FQ-7 and FQ-11 Continues supply.  
FQ-8 from day 2 to day 3 (7am-7am). 
FQ-9 from day 6 to day 7 (7am-7am). 
FQ-13, FW-1 and FW-4 Continues supply. 
FQ-1, from day 7 to day 5 (7am-7am). 
FQ-19 from day 7 to day 8 (7am-7am). 
FQ-10, FQ-13,FQ16FQ-17 and FW-3 Continues supply. 
FQ-14, from day 3 to day 4 (7am-7am). 
FQ-15, from day 7 to day 8 (7am to 7am). 
1 TFS is available to server others by tankers. 
Muttrah 
FR-8, FR-9, FM-1 and FM-4 Continues supply. 
FR-10 from day 2 to day 4 (7am-7am). 
FR-12, FR-11 from day 4 to day 5 (7am-7am). 
FR-1, FR-2, FR-5, FR-6, CBD and FM-3 Continues supply. 
FR-3, from day 2 to day 4 (7am to 7am). 
FR-4, from day 5 to day 7 (7am-7am). 
FR-13, FR-14, FM-7, FW-2 and FW-5 Continues supply. 
FM-5 from day 3 to day 4 (7am-7am). 
FM-6 from day 7 to day 7 (7am-7am). 
1 TFS is available to server others by tankers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All hospitals, police 
station and school 
well getting 
continues supply. 
 
2 Full or partial 
suspension of Barka 
purification station. 
42 million gallons /day from Ghubra DP, 10 million 
gallons /day from Al Khoudh and Wadi Adai well 
field and 12 million gallon/day from Sohar DP 
3 Full suspension of the 
Ghubra and Barka 
purification stations. 
12 million gallons/day from sohar DP and 10 
million gallons/day from AL Khoudh and Wadi Adai 
wells field. 
 
 219 
 
 
 
It will be noted that the system has particularly low resilience to bursts (see 
for example Table (6.20)). Table (7.4) considers further scenarios where 
components of the transmission system have failed but the sources are 
still operational. Thus, a range of emergency responses to transmission 
system failures within Muscat and Al Dakhliya are presented in this table. 
  
A further category of response to an emergency outage, when one or 
more of the sources fail to deliver the quantity of water required, is to 
supply consumers intermittently on a rota basis and this category of 
response is outlined in Table (7.5). It will be noted that the same failure 
modes are considered in all of the analyses. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the proposed Emergency Response Plan 
(ERP) to both routine and non-routine water related emergencies. In 
addition to the ERP a number of additional mitigation measures were 
evaluated. These have the effect of improving resilience and are 
recommended to be implemented before the ERP is finalized. The 
responses have been developed directly from the data and results of the 
water audit and risk analyses of the water supply systems in Oman. The 
chapter has also outlined the strategically important emergency scenarios 
which cause outages of available water sources and transmission 
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systems, and the emergency response actions that have to be 
undertaken. The main conclusions drawn from this work and from chapters 
5 and 6 are discussed in chapter 8.  
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Chapter 8 Discussion and Conclusions  
 
8.1 Introduction 
This research analyzed the stress factors encountered when operating a 
water network in an arid country with Oman taken as a case study. Two 
particular stress factors were investigated, namely non-revenue water, and 
as an example of an extreme natural event, a tropical cyclone, the 
analysis being focused on the improvement of the resilience of water 
systems to  manmade and natural hazards. The impact of tropical cyclone 
Gonu was highlighted in chapter four and the problem of non-revenue 
water in chapter five. In chapter six, the author analyzed risks on water 
desalination plants and supply systems to improve the resilience of the 
water systems and in chapter seven, a strategy for the response to routine 
and non-routine water-related emergencies is presented. 
 
8.2  Non Revenue Water 
The principal strategy for management of NRW was to use the AWWA 
water audit method. The AWWA software is the best available solution to 
water supply and sanitation (Landis, 2015), was found to be easy to apply 
in Oman and is widely used, particularly in the United States (Alliance for 
Water Efficiency, 2016). However, the main benefit of using the software 
was that the researcher was forced to look for data that would not 
otherwise be held or readily available by PAEW. The software also 
allowed a critical evaluation to be made of operational practices. For 
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example, understanding how to improve repair response time, investigate 
meter accuracy and increase management awareness were all improved 
through the use of the software. 
 
The AWWA Water Audit Method features rational terms and definitions 
and several strong performance indicators (Kunkel, G. 2006) which were 
valuable to the research. These indicators are more consistent and 
reliable than the traditional unaccounted-for water percentage. Since all 
water supplied to a distribution system should be consumed by valid users 
or wasted through loss, the software further enabled the identification of 
apparent losses which in practice in Oman arise mainly from commercial 
bad practice. 
 
 The audit results indicate that the percentage of NRW in Oman is more 
than 35% but this compares favorably with other Gulf countries where the 
values are as high as 40% for Bahrain, 35% in Saudi Arabia, and 30% in 
the United Arab Emirates (Zyadin, 2013).  
 
The study explored the perceptions of PAEW staff about the adoption of 
water-loss management procedures and identified organizational 
characteristics that influence management’s decisions. The study also 
revealed that the inaccuracies in billing volumes and the method of 
estimating consumption through faulty meters had the most significant 
impacts on water losses. The study found that there were insufficient 
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qualified staff available to carry out leak detection activities and they lack 
appropriate technologies. It was also clear that improved maintenance 
regimes would achieve better network performance by decreasing water 
losses. 
 
8.3 Water System Risks 
This study developed a comprehensive risk assessment and analysis for 
water utilities applicable in arid countries that identifies the various risks 
posed by both natural and manmade disasters and puts forward practical 
risk management strategies to mitigate these risks.  
 
The research has contributed to understanding the risks to desalination 
plants and this is particularly relevant and transferrable since all gulf 
countries rely on desalting seawater. It was found that the risks to the 
main treatment processes (Table 6.4) can be controlled but the risk due to 
feed water quality might remain high even after implementing mitigation 
measures because (in the case of Muscat) the intake is close to an 
international oil port with a significant risk of oil contamination. It is also 
always exposed to harmful algal blooms. In total the Al Ghubrah 
Desalination Plant is faced with 17 severe risks but most are reduced after 
control measures are implemented. The remaining 5 hazardous ratings 
pose risks indicating that even after the mitigation measures are put in 
place they are still at high risk. This compares well with data from the 
United Arab Emirates (Walid Elshorbagy, Abu-Bakr Elhakeem ( 2007). 
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The risks associated with the transmission mains and pumping stations 
(Tables 6.11 and 6.15) are worse compared to those associated with the 
loss of supply from the desalination plant. The analysis showed that the 
most severe risks are those associated with pipe rather than pump failure 
since when pump failure is caused by lack of power supply, there can be 
another source of supply. However, where a single pipe fails it must either 
be repaired or replaced. This is in line with international experience 
(Alliance for Water Efficiency, 2016). 
 
8.4 Resilience of the water systems 
Chapter 6 of this thesis presents nine tables of detailed determination of 
risks to the water systems in Oman, work which is new to Arab countries. 
These tables, together with three summary tables are in themselves an 
advancement of knowledge since no other such detailed evaluations are 
available. Furthermore, the thesis proposes a method of translating the 
detailed risk evaluations into resilience scores using a methodology used 
in transportation networks. The average resilience scores are given in 
table 8.1 (replicated from Table 6.2.1).  
 
The research has shown that the resilience of the desalination plants is 
currently higher than the water supply systems, and the resilience of the 
transmission mains and pumping station is very low.  By implementing 
mitigation measures the resilience of the water utilities could reach 70% 
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compared to theoretical approaches to evaluating water network resilience 
which produce scores of greater than 60% (Dziedzic and Karney, 2014). 
 
Table 8.1: The Average Resilience Scores to Water Supply Utilities 
 
Utility 
 
Stage 
The Average Resilience Score 
Before Control After Control 
 
Al Gubrah Desalina- 
tion Plant 
Sea Water quality 2.3 2.7 
Main Treatment process 2.2 2.8 
Side wide risk 2.1 2.6 
 
Great Muscat Water 
Supply System 
Transmission Main 1.0 2.3 
Pumping Stations 1.0 2.3 
Loss of supply from 
Desalination Plant 
1.8 2.6 
 Al Dakhilya Water 
Supply System  
Transmission Main 1.1 2.6 
Pumping Stations 1.1 2.8 
Loss of supply from 
Desalination Plant 
1.8 2.6 
 
 
8.5 Emergency Response Plan   
The proposed Emergency Response Plan (ERP) to both routine and non-
routine water related emergencies has been disused. In addition to the 
ERP a number of additional mitigation measures were evaluated. It was 
found that these have the effect of improving resilience and are 
recommended to be implemented at a national level (by NCCD) before the 
ERP is finalized. The responses were developed directly from the data 
and results of the water audit and risk analyses of the water supply 
systems. Furthermore, the emergency response actions that have to be 
undertaken were developed from the outline of the strategically important 
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emergency scenarios which cause outages of available water sources. 
The proposed ERP has been built on the experiences of other countries 
and is considered to be well ahead of international practice (Whybark, 
2015, Lum and Margesson 2014, McEntire, 2014). 
The research has shown that the system is only moderately resilient 
(Hughes and Healy, 2014) even after control measures have been 
evaluated and implemented. Furthermore, some risk elements (with all 
scores of 2 or less) have very low resilience indicating that urgent 
mitigation measures are desirable in addition to the control measures 
identified. The workshop was found to be a particularly valuable tool for 
identifying risks and mitigation approaches and this research has detailed 
(in Table 7.1) the reductions of risk by the mitigation measures. The 
techniques of the workshop are considered to be most appropriate for use 
in other Gulf countries. 
Five different options of outages of the two desalination plants were 
considered but the research shows that there is a clear case for further 
resilience evaluation and consideration in future, of alternative mitigation 
measures, a message which could also be usefully learned in other arid 
countries. Normally new sources are implemented because demand 
predictions show that existing supplies will be insufficient at some time 
horizon.  However, in this case, where the system has low resilience, the 
author has concluded that additional sources are highly desirable to meet 
demands in emergencies and improve resilience. It should be noted that 
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implementation of this conclusion will take time because of the investment 
required.  
8.6  Conclusions 
The conclusions have been drawn to address how this study addressed 
and covered the five research objectives. The main conclusions drawn 
from the present study are: 
 
1) The financial impact posed by Non-Revenue Water (NRW) was found 
to be 32% of the total revenue budget.  This is high in comparison with 
international norms (WHO, 2011). Six potential methods of 
improvement were identified which should be capable of reducing the 
impact by 90%.  
 
2) The risks to the Omani water network associated with natural and 
manmade hazards were identified through a workshop. The detailed 
risk scoring and ranking together with the identification of the security 
of supplies and communication of the risk assessment process has 
contributed to an advancement of knowledge which can be applied to 
water networks in the Middle East and other arid countries. 
 
3) The results emphasize that exceptional events can have a severe 
impact on water system management. This type of risk is difficult to 
recognize in advance and, if predicted, the actual risk associated with 
every exceptional event is very difficult to assess. 
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4) The study concluded that resilience of parts of the water system in 
Oman is low and mitigation measures are certainly needed. The 
suggested solutions will help in anticipating and managing risk and 
improving the resilience of the water supply systems in the face of 
different hazards. 
 
5) The study developed an emergency response strategy suitable for 
available resources and the water systems in place. This strategy 
enhances the existing approach used by the water undertaker (PAEW) 
and describes the actions to be undertaken in emergencies. The study 
concluded that the proposed outage scenarios will certainly help in 
reducing risk and enhance the resilience of water systems in Oman. 
 
8.7  Prospective Research 
In this research, difficulties were found (Ang and Tang, 1984) both in 
representing risk information accurately and describing the risk 
mechanisms. Risk ranking (e.g. Burgman, 2005; Cox, 2008) was 
particularly useful when comparing risks to pipelines and pumping 
stations. The work suffered from the two main uncertainties which are 
frequently mentioned by analysts (El-Baroudy and Simonovic, 2004); 
insufficient data for statistic inferences and vagueness and variations of 
risk information. However, the detail of the risk analyses carried out in the 
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tables above and the inclusion in the analysis of two pipeline networks is 
considered to compensate for any lack of statistical evaluation. 
 
The approach used to determine resilience (Hughes and Healy, 2014) is 
relatively simplistic which may limit its validity and additional research is 
recommended to consolidate the resilience approach. This might be 
undertaken in collaboration with water utilities in other Gulf countries. 
 
A formal process for risk management should be established to enable 
continuing on-going risk assessments to add detail to the present study, 
respond to unforeseen risks and hazards that arise, and develop capacity 
within PAEW for risk management and planning. 
 
The strategy developed in this study can be implemented in a country 
similar to Oman that may have risks from exceptional events and 
experiencing NRW. Other developing and arid countries may also 
experience such risks but with different magnitude and the risk evaluation 
tables could provide a useful format for this further work. 
 
Since all Gulf countries depend entirely on desalinated sea water for 
potable supplies, and since well fields should only be used during 
emergencies and considered as strategic reserves, further marine studies 
to identify and evaluate risks of sea water contamination are highly 
desirable. Of particular value would be marine water quality models. 
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Finally, this research was prompted by the near catastrophe caused by the 
tropical cyclone Gonu. It is self-evident that an increased understanding of 
the origin and tracks of future cyclones would be highly desirable, 
particularly in the face of climate change. This would must be conducted at 
a regional scale. 
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Appendix- A 
Security of Supply Risk Workshop 
A -1 Programme and attendee list 
Title: Security of Supply Risk Workshop 
Follow-up on: workshop conducted by Mott MacDonald on 8 Sep. 2009 
Location and Date: PAEW Main Office, Muscat, 17 June 2013 
Scope of the Workshop: 
- Identify security of supply risk. 
- Communicate the risk assessment process. 
- Share information on risks. 
Sponsor and Organizer: Public Authority for Electricity and Water (PAEW) 
 Organizing Committee Members: 
- Kassim Al Jabri, Senior Manager for Project Design - Chairperson 
- Majed Abusharkh,  Water Network Design Expert 
- Ibrahem Osman, Senior Desalination Plant engineer 
- Ziad Al ASwad, Senior Design Engineer 
Workshop Agenda:  
09:00 - 09:30 Opening of the workshop. 
09:30 - 10:00 Introduction and purpose of the workshop.  
10:00 - 11:00 Main outcome of the previous workshop. 
11:00 - 11:30 Coffee break. 
11:30 - 01:00 Treatment (desalination) & land based transmission risks.  
01:00 - 02:00 Lunch. 
02:00 - 02:30 Risk matrix review and discussion on likelihood and 
consequence tables. 
02:30 - 03:00 Risk table review and comments on potential mitigation 
measures to reduce the risk. 
03:00 - 03:30 Summary of the workshop. 
03:30 - 04:00 Closing session  
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Attendees: 
Name Position Organization 
Ahmed Al Abri Project Manager PAEW 
Ahmed Taleb      Control Engineer  PAEW 
Ali Al Bulashey Operation manager. Al Gubrah desalination plant. 
Humaid Al-Khusaibi Head of Microbiology PAEW 
Ibrahem Osman Senior Desalination Plant Eng. PAEW 
Kassim Al Jabri Senior Manager for Project Design PAEW 
Majed Abusharkh Water Network Design Expert PAEW 
Mohed AlKalbani    Project Manager PAEW 
Padmasiri Dissanayake Senior Water specialist PAEW 
Sulaiman Al-Safy Head of section 
Previously with Al Guhbaria 
desalination plantae, now 
with PAEW. 
Sharifa Al-Mazroui Head of Chemistry  PAEW 
Ziad Al Aswad Senior Design Engineer PAEW 
 
A - 2 Methodology – work groups 
The attendees were divided into two working group based on their specialty and 
experience, see table (A1.&A2.). The first group was assigned to the desalination 
plant, while the second one was assigned to the transmission pipe lines. For 
further details about the methodology used in the workshop refer to chapter 
3section 3.3.4. 
Table A1. Group one for land based transmission risks. 
Name Position  Organization 
Ahmed Al Abri Project Manager PAEW 
Ziad Al Aswad     Senior Design Engineer PAEW 
Padmasiri Dissanayake Senior Water specialist PAEW 
Sharifa Al-Mazroui Head of section PAEW 
Kassim Al Jabri Senior Manager for Project Design PAEW 
Majed Abusharkh Water Network Design Expert PAEW 
 
Table A2. Group two for Treatment (desalination). 
Name Position  Organization 
Mohed AlKalbani    Project Manager PAEW 
Ahmed Taleb      Control Engineer PAEW 
Ali Al Bulashey Operation manager. Al Ghprah 
Humaid Al-Khusaibi Head of Microbiology PAEW 
Ibrahem Osman Senior Desalination Plant Eng. PAEW 
Sulaiman Al-Safy Head of section PAEW 
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A - 3 Output from workshop 
The risks identified by the two working group are given in tables A3, A4, A5 and 
A6. 
Table A3. Desalination plant – key risk identified in the workshop. 
Hazard Cause 
Harmful algae 
blooms. 
 Produce toxins which considered risk to human health. 
 Increase suspended organic matters and blocks intake 
membranes and filters. 
 Unpleasant odor  
Jellyfish blooms.  Clog and damage intake screen and restrict intake. 
 Block seawater cooling intakes. 
Accidental oil 
spills at sea. 
 Contamination of the intake. 
 Making the product water non potable. 
 Unpleasant odor. 
Failure of the 
intake system. 
 Total shutdown of the plant 
Mechanical or 
electrical failure. 
 Failure of both duty and standby units 
 Failure of Membranes 
 Failure of Control System. 
 Structural failure of MSF units. 
 Chemical mixing and dosing equipment. 
Chemical Spills 
 
Table A4. Transmission pipelines (mains) – key risks identified in the workshop. 
Hazard Cause 
Burst in mains 
- Ageing/deterioration of pipes. 
- Corrosion. 
- Lack of proper maintenance. 
- Deterioration due to temperature change. 
- Poor quality/material of pipeline. 
- External sabotage/vandalism of pipelines. 
- Operational issues – valve closures leading to surge. 
- Growth of iron in mains resulting in internal pitting. 
- Failure to ensure maintenance of air valves, failure in joints and 
fittings. 
- Natural disasters; e.g. flooding. 
- General losses and leakage in mains leading to bursts. 
Contamination 
of mains 
- Inadequate chlorination of mains. 
- Contamination from sewage. 
- Bacterial growth in mains. 
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Table A5. Pumping stations – key risks identified in the workshop. 
Hazard Cause 
Pump failure 
- Interlock failure as a result of over running of pumps. 
- Mechanical failure; e.g. damage to impellor (split casing 
pumps). 
- Cavitation. 
- Flooding of pump stations. 
- Non availability of vendors and hence long response 
times to fix pumps. 
- Non availability of spares. 
- Pumps over run when used daily. 
Loss of power 
- Power failure. 
- Low voltage problems. 
Failure of control 
system 
- Failure of starters, motors. 
- Operational errors. 
- Remote monitoring failure 
 
Table A6. Reservoirs – key risks identified in the workshop.  
Hazard Cause 
Pollution 
- External pollution as a result of open covers/cracked vents due to birds/ 
reptiles falling in. 
- Algal growth leading to stagnant water. 
- Failure of online chemical dosing. 
- Lack of proper monitoring leading to bacterial growth. 
- Fouling due to sedimentation. 
- External threats – deliberate polluting. 
- Dead pockets in reservoirs that change its course over time. 
Structural 
- Improper waterproofing. 
- Failure due to incorrect location of reservoirs resulting from wadi flows 
that change its course time. 
Operational 
- Incorrect adherence to operational management of reservoir storage 
resulting in lack of storage available in reservoirs. 
- Over reliance on well water that when outages occur in the well fields 
there is an increase in demand on reservoirs that result in its drawdown. 
 
A - 4 General comments of the workshop. 
 
Following identification of key risk by the two groups in Table A1- A4, a 
discussion of the general comments that were made during the workshop is given 
in Table A5. Those comments were further validated by reviewing the daily and 
monthly reports of the desalination plant.   
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Table A7. General comments raised during the workshop discussion.  
# Comment 
1 Difficulty in obtaining reliable data to make informed decisions. 
2 Due to the delay in commissioning of projects and lack of co-ordination between 
production and supply; there is a delay water delivery to costomers. 
3 Lack of operation and maintenance contractual requirements. 
4 Lack of proper maintenance of assets. 
5 There is a risk of over reliability on control systems that may yield incorrect results 
leading to failure of control systems. 
6 Well-fields only to be used in the event of an emergency and not under normal 
operating conditions. 
7 The participants strongly agree on the need for risk matrix to evaluate the risk 
potential. 
8 High risk levels should have minimum mitigation measures that have to be 
undertaken to minimize the effect and consequences of risks. 
 
 
A – 5 Risk matrices 
A risk guidance has been developed following consultation with risk experts from 
different sections. It is supported by background guidance along with the findings 
from workshop and previous consultations for PAEW. Consequence and 
Likelihood Categories to Generate Risk Scores are given Table A8. 
 
Table A8. Consequence and likelihood categories and risk scores generated 
during the Security of Supply Risk Workshop. 
Likelihood 
Consequences 
Severity A B C D E 
Level Score (1) (2) (4) (8) (16) 
1 (1) 1 2 4 8 16 
2 (2) 2 4 8 16 32 
3 (3) 3 6 12 24 48 
4 (4) 4 8 16 32 64 
5 (5) 5 10 20 40 80 
Risk Score ˂ 6 6-16 ˃ 16 
Colour Green Amber Red 
Risk Rating Minor Major Significant 
Green scores: < 6 represent minor risks that may not need any mitigation measures. 
Amber scores: 6 to 16 represent major risks that may need mitigation measures. 
Red scores: > 16 represent significant risks that certainly need mitigation measures. 
 
The workshop also addressed the frequency of risks using a scale of 1–5 and the 
result is given in Table A9. 
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Table A9. Periods and the scores of likelihood. 
Level Description Score 
1 One in 50 to 100 years. 1 
2 One in 20 to 50 years. 2 
3 One in 5 to 20 years. 3 
4 One in 1 to 5 years. 4 
5 More than one per year. 5 
 
The identified hazards is assessed and agreed on during the workshop in order to 
determine the consequence score. 
The consequence  of the severity of hazards of different durations is made 
available from the following sources: 
- Annual reports, 
- Action Plan for Sudden Ingress of Jellyfish. 
- Emergency Plan 2 - Black Out. 
- Emergency Plan 3 - Oil Contamination. 
- Operation Incident Report. 
- Process Description. 
- Intake Documentation. 
- Technical Data Sheet - Trichlorisocyanuric Acid 
- Operation & Maintenance Report.  
The score of the consequences for desalination plant and transmission main are  
illustrated in Table A10 and A11 
 
Table A10.  Severity level and consequences of durations of outages of the 
desalination plants. 
Severity 
level 
Consequence Score 
A 
< 12 hours partial reduction in treated water production (>34% 
of design output). 
1 
B <12 hours loss of treated water production. 2 
C 12 – 48 hours loss of treated water Production. 4 
D 
One sites affected for > 4 days. 
2 – 7 days loss of treated water production. 
8 
E >7 days loss of treated water production. 16 
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Table A11. Severity level and consequences of transmission main outages. 
Severity 
level 
Consequence Score 
A <500 properties without water for 12 hours. 1 
B 
<1,000 properties without water for 12 hours or one industrial 
customer. 
<500 properties without water for 24 hours. 
2 
C 
<10,000 properties without water for 12 hours or two to ten industrial 
customers. 
<1,000 properties without water for 24 hours or one industrial 
customer. 
<500 properties without water for 48 hours. 
4 
D 
<50,000 properties without water for 12 hours or more than ten 
industrial customers. 
<10,000 properties without water for 24 hours or two to ten industrial 
customers. 
<1000 properties without water for 48 hours or one industrial 
customer. 
<500 properties without water for 2-5 days. 
8 
E 
100,000 properties without water for 12 hours or more than one 
hundred industrial  customers. 
<50,000 properties without water for 24 hours or more than ten 
industrial customers. 
<10,000 properties without water for 48 hours or 2 to 10 industrial 
customers. 
<1000 properties without water for 2-5 days or one industrial 
customer. 
<500 properties without water for >5 days 
16 
 
As an outcome of the workshop comments and discussion, the risk assessment 
table (Form), Table (A12)  was developed. This table was used by the 
management of both the desalination plants and PAEW and the output forms the 
basis of the risk tables ( Tables 8.1) 
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Appendix- B 
Questionnaire for PAEW Staff 
This questionnaire has been prepared within the framework of the 
research project entitled “Analysis of the Stress Factors in Operating a 
Water Network in an Arid Country” that carried out by Eng. Kassim Mana 
Abdulla Al Jabri for partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from University of Abertay Dundee. 
 
As the levels of water losses in Oman are estimated at approximately 40 
to 50 percent, one of the main purpose of this research works is to survey 
a cross section of the public water system in Muscat Governorate, to first 
determine current water loss accounting practices and resulting loss 
estimates, gain more information on current water loss prevention and 
management practices, and then to make recommendations for more 
consistent water use accounting and water loss management.  
 
The aim of this questionnaire is to assess the views of stakeholder in 
PAEW (staff) on the current status of water losses in of Oman from 
technical and strategic aspects. It seeks to discover from PAEW staff who 
are concerned with water losses, what their perceptions are about the 
stated NRW figure, their understanding of the impact and main causes of 
water loss, and their opinions on PAEW’s procedures and policy related to 
water loss reduction. 
The questionnaire consists of primary and secondary questions and sub-
divided into two main sections. The first section addresses the basic 
information, and the second one deals with water losses water networks. 
 
The researcher is highly appreciative of your cooperation in completing 
this questionnaire. Your contribution of great importance in providing the 
researcher with correct and accurate data that reflect the current reality of 
the various water losses and the level of NRW in Oman. 
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Note that all data contained in this questionnaire is for the purpose of 
scientific research, and the researcher took the permission of His 
Excellency the president of PAEW for the collection of this information. 
Information provided will remain anonymous – the researcher has asked 
for your name and contact details only so he can contact you if further 
clarification should be required. 
 
Eng. Kassim Mana Al Jabri 
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 Definition of Terms: 
 
Unaccounted for 
Water (UFW) or 
Water Losses 
The difference between the volumes of water delivered into a network and the 
volume of water that can be accounted for by legitimate consumption (the difference 
between system input and authorized consumption). 
Water Losses or UFW = Apparent Losses + Real Losses 
Apparent Losses 
Includes all type of inaccuracies associated with customer metering as well as data 
handling errors (meter reading and billing), plus unauthorized consumption (theft or 
illegal use).  
Apparent Losses = Unauthorized consumption + Meter Under Registration + 
Data Handling Errors  
Real Losses 
The annual volume lost through all types of leaks, breaks and overflow depends on 
frequencies, flow rates, and average duration. 
Real Losses = Leakage  on Mains + Overflow of Tanks + Leakage on  
                        Service Connections 
Revenue Water 
(RW) 
Water which is charged to customer to provide revenue to the utility. 
Non-Revenue 
Water (NRW) 
The difference between the volumes of water delivered into a network and billed 
consumption (water which does not provide any revenue to the utility). 
NRW = Water Losses (UFW) + Unbilled Authorized Consumption 
 
Water Balance and Terminology  
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Basic Information 
 
 Name of Contact Person:   
 
Position:  Department:   
   
Job Related  to Water Loss   
 
Telephone:  Fax:  Mobile:   
 
E-mail:   
 
 
A- Water Loss in Muscat Networks 
1. General Information 
1.1 What is your estimated percentage for the water losses (UFW) in Muscat Networks? 
 10-20%  20-30%  30-40% 
 40-50%  More than 50%   Don’t know 
1.2 What do you think the main factors that contribute to water losses? Please prioritize the 
factors according to their contribution (1 = very high, 6 = very low) 
 Meter Inaccuracies   Losses during repair  Age of pipes  
 Illegal Connection  Service reservoir overflow   Water pressure 
Your opinion based on 
your experience: 
 
1.3 What do you consider to be the best solution to the reduce water losses in water systems? 
Please prioritize the measures according to their efficiency(1 = very high, 6 = very low) 
 Improve pipe 
maintenance 
 Clampdown on illegal  connection  Pipe replacement 
 Active leak detection  Increase public Awareness   Improve metering 
Your opinion based on 
your experience: 
 
1.4 In which method of PAEW strategy focuses of deriving water loss figure: 
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 Leakage Level (%)  Leakage level (%) and UFW   UFW 
 Non-Revenue Water   UFW and NRW  Don’t know 
1.5 What do you think the possible impacts to high water losses figures? Please prioritize the 
impacts according to their effect (1 = very high, 6 = very low) 
 Reduction in pressure 
 Increase expenditure on 
development 
 Water contamination 
 High cost of O&M  Short lifespan of existing resources   Property damage 
2. Procedures and Policy 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
2.1 
A National Water Policy exists which aims 
at reducing water losses. 
     
2.2 
A Water loss reduction program is 
implemented. 
     
2.3 
Pressure management is used to reduce 
water losses. 
     
2.6 
A Network Maintenance/ Rehabilitation 
Program is Implemented. 
     
2.7 
Measures to fight illegal connections are 
applied 
     
3. 
Obstacles for Fighting Water 
Losses 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
3.1 Institutional situation      
3.2 Lack of financial means from PAEW      
3.3 
Lack of appropriate technologies for water 
loss reduction. 
     
3.4 Maintenance system      
3.5 Personnel capacities(technicians)      
3.6 Personnel awareness      
3.7 Public acceptance / awareness      
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B- Staff Opinion 
Please state your opinion on the issue of water losses in Oman: 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix- C 
Water Audit reporting Worksheets and Water Balances 
 
Figure C.1: Water Audit Reporting Worksheet for Year 2008 
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Figure C.2: Water Audit Reporting Worksheet for Year 2009 
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Figure C.3: Water Audit Reporting Worksheet for Year 2010 
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Figure C.4: Water Audit Reporting Worksheet for Year 2011 
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Figure C.5: Water Balance for Al Seeb Wilayat (Year 2008) 
 
 
Figure C.6: Water Balance for Al Seeb Wilayat (Year 2009) 
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Figure C.7: Water Balance for Al Seeb Wilayat (Year 2010) 
 
 
Figure C.8: Water Balance for Al Seeb Wilayat (Year 2011) 
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Table C.1:  Al Seeb Water Balance for Year 2008 
AWWA Water Audit Software: Water Balance Report For: Al Seeb Wilayat Report Year: 2008 
Own Sources 
(Adjusted for 
known errors) 
93.7% 
Water Exported 
0.00 
Billed Water Exported 
(0%) 
Water Supplied 
100% 
Authorized 
Consumption 
(54.6%) 
Billed Authorized 
Consumption 
(53.3%) 
Billed Metered Consumption 
(53.34%) 
Revenue Water 
(53.3%) Billed Unmetered Consumption  
(0%) 
Unbilled Authorized 
Consumption 
(1.3%) 
Unbilled Metered Consumption 
(0%) 
Non-Revenue Water 
(NRW) 
(46.7%) 
Unbilled Unmetered Consumption 
(1.3%) 
Water Losses 
(45.4%) 
Apparent Losses 
(20.4%) 
Unauthorized Consumption 
(0.3%) 
Customer Metering Inaccuracies 
(1.1%) 
Water Imported 
6.3% 
Systematic Data Handling Errors 
(19.0%) 
Real Losses 
(25.0%) 
Leakage on Transmission and/or Distribution mains 
Not broken down 
Leakage and Overflow at Utility’s Storage Tank 
Not broken down 
Leakage on Service Connections 
Not broken down 
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Table C.2:  Al Seeb Water Balance for Year Year 2009 
AWWA Water Audit Software: Water Balance Report For: Al Seeb Wilayat Report Year: 2009 
Own Sources 
(Adjusted for 
known errors) 
87.9% 
Water Exported 
0.00 
Billed Water Exported 
(0%) 
Water Supplied 
100% 
Authorized 
Consumption 
(56.8%) 
Billed Authorized 
Consumption 
(55.5%) 
Billed Metered Consumption 
(55.5%) 
Revenue Water 
(55.5%) Billed Unmetered Consumption  
(0%) 
Unbilled Authorized 
Consumption 
(1.3%) 
Unbilled Metered Consumption 
(0%) 
Non-Revenue Water 
(NRW) 
(44.5%) 
Unbilled Unmetered Consumption 
(1.3%) 
Water Losses 
(43.2%) 
Apparent Losses 
(19.6.0%) 
Unauthorized Consumption 
(0.3%) 
Customer Metering Inaccuracies 
(1.1%) 
Water Imported 
12.1% 
Systematic Data Handling Errors 
(18.2%) 
Real Losses 
(23.6%) 
Leakage on Transmission and/or Distribution mains 
Not broken down 
Leakage and Overflow at Utility’s Storage Tank 
Not broken down 
Leakage on Service Connections 
Not broken down 
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Table C.3:  Al Seeb Water Balance for Year 2010 
AWWA Water Audit Software: Water Balance Report For: Al Seeb Wilayat Report Year: 2010 
Own Sources 
(Adjusted for known 
errors) 
(100%) 
Water Exported 
0.00 
Billed Water Exported 
(0%) 
Water Supplied 
(100%) 
Authorized Consumption 
(58.9%) 
Billed Authorized 
Consumption 
(57.7%) 
Billed Metered Consumption 
(57.7%) 
Revenue Water 
(57.7%) Billed Unmetered Consumption  
(0%) 
Unbilled Authorized 
Consumption 
(1.2%) 
Unbilled Metered Consumption 
(0%) 
Non-Revenue Water 
(NRW) 
(42.3%) 
Unbilled Unmetered Consumption 
(1.2%) 
Water Losses 
(41.1%) 
Apparent Losses 
(18.2%) 
Unauthorized Consumption 
(0.2%) 
Customer Metering Inaccuracies 
(1.2%) 
Water Imported 
(0%) 
Systematic Data Handling Errors 
(16.8%) 
Real Losses 
(22.9%) 
Leakage on Transmission and/or Distribution mains 
Not broken down 
Leakage and Overflow at Utility’s Storage Tank 
Not broken down 
Leakage on Service Connections 
Not broken down 
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Table C.4:  Al Seeb Water Balance for Year 2011 
AWWA Water Audit Software: Water Balance Report For: Al Seeb Wilayat Report Year: 2011 
Own Sources 
(Adjusted for 
known errors) 
(100%) 
Water Exported 
0.00 
Billed Water Exported 
(0%) 
Water Supplied 
(100%) 
Authorized 
Consumption 
(63.8%) 
Billed Authorized 
Consumption 
(62.5%) 
Billed Metered Consumption 
(62.5%) 
Revenue Water 
(62.5%) Billed Unmetered Consumption  
(0%) 
Unbilled Authorized 
Consumption 
(1.3%) 
Unbilled Metered Consumption 
(0%) 
Non-Revenue Water 
(NRW) 
(37.5%) 
Unbilled Unmetered Consumption 
(1.3%) 
Water Losses 
(36.2%) 
Apparent Losses 
(19.0%) 
Unauthorized Consumption 
(0.2%) 
Customer Metering Inaccuracies 
(1.3%) 
Water Imported 
(0%) 
Systematic Data Handling Errors 
(17.5%) 
Real Losses 
(17.2%) 
Leakage on Transmission and/or Distribution mains 
Not broken down 
Leakage and Overflow at Utility’s Storage Tank 
Not broken down 
Leakage on Service Connections 
Not broken down 
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Appendix- D 
Risks for Regional Water Supply Systems 
D.1 Risks to Southern Batinah Transmission System 
1) Transmission Mains 
Currently there is adequate planned storage throughout the southern Batinah 
region to cover the expected outage times due to bursts in the mains. The current 
demand on the system is small in comparison to the storage, mainly because the 
distribution systems supplying the existing wilayats have not been connected to 
the transmission main. Plans to construct the distribution systems within the 
wilayats are in the concept design stage and expected to be installed in the next 
few years.  A serious failure in the main from Barka to Musanaah may be 
compensated for by transfers from Sohar desalination plant through the 
emergency connection between Suwayq and Musanaah. 
 
2) Pumping Stations 
All the pumping stations have adequate standby and provided this standby 
capacity is maintained, there is a minimal risk of supply to consumers due to 
failure of the pumps. 
 
3) Loss of supply from Barka Desalination Plant 
Loss of supply from Barka desalination plant may be covered by a 
combination of transfers from Sohar and storage in the system. Only 
prolonged outages, longer than seven days, pose any risk to the supply to 
consumers. 
 
4) Mitigation Measures 
At present, pipeline bursts, pump failures, or outages at the desalination plant 
for less than 7 days do not pose a high risk. There is currently sufficient 
storage available within the system to mitigate these risks. 
The risks to the southern Batinah water supply system are summarized in 
Table (D. 1). 
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Table D.1: Risks to the Southern Batinah Water Supply System 
  Pumping Stations 
Hazard 
Standby 
Arrangement 
Operational 
Capacity (m3/d) 
Likelihood (L) Consequence L C Risk 
Pump failure - Barka to Musanaah PS 
1 operational + 1 
standby 
45000 One in one to five years Loss of supply to south Batinah 4 16 64 
Loss of power - Barka to Musanaah PS None 45000 More than one per year Partial loss of supply to south Batinah 5 8 40 
Failure of control systems - Barka to Musanaah PS  - 45000 One in one to five years Partial loss of supply to south Batinah 4 8 32 
Pump failure - Barka to Hubra PS 
2 operational + 1 
standby 
6739 One in one to five years Loss of supply to Wadi Al Maawil and Nakhal 4 16 64 
Loss of power - Barka to Hubra PS None 6739 More than one per year 
Disruption of supply to Wadi Al Maawil and 
Nakhal 
5 8 80 
Failure of control systems - Barka to Hubra PS  - 6739 One in one to five years 
Disruption of supply to Wadi Al Maawil and 
Nakhal 
4 8 32 
Pump failure - Hubra to Nakhal PS 
2 operational + 1 
standby 
6048 One in one to five years Loss of supply to Nakhal 4 8 32 
Loss of power - Hubra to Nakhal PS None 6048 More than one per year Disruption of Loss of supply to Nakhal 5 8 40 
Failure of control systems - Hubra to Nakhal PS  - 6048 One in one to five years Disruption of Loss of supply to Nakhal 4 8 32 
Pump failure - Musanaah to Hazm PS 3 operational + 1 standby 25142 One in one to five years Loss of supply to Rustaq, Al Awabi 4 16 64 
 
Transmission Mains 
Hazard 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Length 
(km) 
Material 
Expected Nr 
of failures/yr 
Cumulativ
e Nr of 
failures 
Expected 
Nr 1:x yr 
failures 
Populatio
n 
Likelihood Consequence L C Risk 
Burst Barka Res to Barka SR 900 8.6 Steel 0 0 9 254523 
One in five to twenty 
years 
Loss of supply to south Batinah 3 16 48 
Burst Barka SR to Musanaah SR 800 31.2 Steel 0 1 2 130090 One in one to five years 
Loss of supply to Al Musanaah, 
Rustaq, Al Awabi 
4 16 64 
Burst New Barka to Hubra Res 500 12.3 Steel 0 1 2 29893 One in one to five years 
Loss of supply to Wadi Al 
Maawil and Nakhal 
4 8 32 
Burst Hubra Res to Nakhal Res 400 11.3 Ductile Iron 1 1 1 17776 More than one per year Loss of supply to Nakhal 5 8 40 
Burst Musanaah to Al Hazm Res 800 29.0 Steel 0 1 1 56708 One in one to five years 
Loss of supply to Rustaq, Al 
Awabi 
4 16 64 
Burst Al Hazm to Rustaq 700 15.4 Steel 0 1 1 56708 One in one to five years 
Loss of supply to Rustaq, Al 
Awabi 
4 16 64 
Burst Rustaq to Wadi Assan 400 12.7 Ductile Iron 1 2 1 15906 More than one per year Loss of supply to Al Awabi 5 8 40 
Burst Wadi Assan to Al Awabi 300 5.8 Ductile Iron 1 3 0 15906 More than one per year Loss of supply to Al Awabi 5 8 40 
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Table D.1 - Cont.: Risks to the Southern Batinah Water Supply System 
Hazard Standby Arrangement 
Operational 
Capacity 
(m3/d) 
Likelihood (L) Consequence L C Risk 
Loss of power - Musanaah to Hazm PS None 25142 More than one per year Disruption of supply to Rustaq, Al Awabi 5 8 40 
Failure of control systems - Musanaah to Hazm PS -  25142 One in one to five years Disruption of supply to Rustaq, Al Awabi 4 8 32 
Pump failure - Hazm to Rustaq PS 2D+1S 14170 One in one to five years Loss of supply to Rustaq, Al Awabi 4 16 64 
Loss of power - Hazm to Rustaq PS None 14170 More than one per year Disruption of supply to Rustaq, Al Awabi 5 8 40 
Failure of control systems - Hazm to Rustaq PS  - 14170 One in one to five years Disruption of supply to Rustaq, Al Awabi 4 8 32 
Pump failure - Rustaq to Wadi Assan PS 2D+1S 8294 One in one to five years Loss of supply to Al Awabi 4 8 32 
Loss of power - Rustaq to Wadi Assan PS None 8294 More than one per year Disruption of supply to Al Awabi 5 4 20 
Failure of control systems - Rustaq to Wadi Assan PS  - 8294 One in one to five years Disruption of supply to Al Awabi 4 8 32 
Pump failure - Wadi Assan to Al Awabi PS 2D+1S 3283 One in one to five years Loss of supply to Al Awabi 4 8 32 
Loss of power - Wadi Assan to Al Awabi PS None 3283 More than one per year Disruption of supply to Al Awabi 5 4 20 
Failure of control systems - Wadi Assan to Al Awabi PS  - 3283 One in one to five years Disruption of supply to Al Awabi 4 8 40 
 Loss of Supply from Desalination Plant 
Hazard 
Operati
onal 
Capacit
y (m3/d) 
Average 
Daily Flow 
(m3/d) 
Storage at 
Desalination 
Plant (m3) 
Storage 
(hours of 
supply 
capacity) 
Potential loss of 
Supply (m3) 
Likelihood Consequence L C Risk 
Mini Max. 
Loss of Supply from Barka DP 210000 13226 182400 21 0 0 
One in one to 
five years 
< 12 hours partial reduction in 
treated water production 
(>34% of design output) 
4 1 4 
Loss of Supply from Barka DP 210000 13226 182400 21 0 0 
One in one to 
five years 
<12 hours loss of treated 
water production 
4 1 4 
Loss of Supply from Barka DP 210000 13226 182400 21 0 14965 
One in one to 
five years 
12 – 48 hours loss of treated 
water production 
4 16 64 
Loss of Supply from Barka DP 210000 13226 182400 21 14965 81096 
One in one to 
five years 
2 – 7 days loss of treated 
water production 
4 16 64 
Loss of Supply from Barka DP 210000 13226 182400 21 81096 >>81096 
One in five to 
twenty years 
>7 days loss of treated water 
production 
3 16 48 
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D.2 North Batinah and Buraymi Transmission System 
1) Transmission Mains:  
The most serious outstanding risks are bursts in the main from Sohar DP 
(IWPP) to the Sohar intermediate and service reservoirs, as well as along 
the main from the MPS2 reservoir to the Buraymi service reservoir. 
The long single transmission mains will always be at risk from failure and it 
will be necessary to ensure provision of supplies whilst the main is 
repaired. At the present time the downstream storage in the system should 
these mains fail provides 1.4 days supply should failure occur along the 
Sohar IWPP to Sohar intermediate and service reservoirs. Similarly there 
is 1.8 days of downstream storage available in the event that there is a 
burst on the main from MPS 2 reservoir to Buraymi service reservoir. 
The supply to the Batinah coast between Saham and Suwayq is protected 
by the emergency link that enables water from Barka desalination plant to 
be transferred to these towns from Musanaah. 
 
2) Pumping Stations:  
The main pumping station delivering water from the desalination plant to 
the Sohar intermediate and service reservoirs has three duty pumps and 
one standby. We estimate that such an arrangement could result in two 
pumps breaking down at the same time once in about 25 years. The 
remaining pumping stations all have adequate standby and provided this 
standby capacity is maintained, there is a minimal risk of loss of supply to 
consumers due to failure of the pumps.  
 
3) Loss of Supply at Sohar IWPP:  
The system currently has at least one day’s emergency storage 
throughout. The supplies to Saham, Khabourah and Suwayq may be 
ensured by use of water from Barka desalination plant via the emergency 
link from Al Musanaah. There is, however, a potential risk of loss of supply 
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to Sohar due to loss of power supply at the main pumping station or failure 
of the control system. 
A combination of reserve storage and the emergency connection to the 
Barka desalination plant ensure security against the loss of supply from 
the Sohar desalination plant for at least 48 hours. Only more prolonged 
outages are likely to affect consumers. 
 
4) Mitigating Measures:  
Duplicating the existing 1200 mm main from Sohar IWPP to the Sohar 
intermediate and service reservoirs will ensure that if there is a failure 
along one of the mains that a supply to the southern areas of Sohar town, 
Saham, Khaburah and Suwayq is still maintained. However, this may be 
economic as demand within the wilayats south of Sohar can be met from 
Barka DP through the existing Suwayq to Al Musanaah connection. 
 
As there is not sufficient downstream storage available to mitigate the risk 
of a pipeline failure along the transmission main from MPS 2 Reservoir to 
Buraymi Service Reservoir for longer than 2 days, duplicating the main will 
ensure security of supply. In all instances, ensuring that timely repairs to 
bursts are made will remove the risks immediately. 
 
Providing additional stand-by pump capacity at the Sohar IWPP to Sohar 
IR will mitigate risks in the event that there is more than one pump failing 
at any time. 
The risks to the North Batinah and Buraymi water supply system are 
summarized in Table (D.2). 
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Table D.2: Risks to the North Batinah and Buraymi Water Supply System 
 
Transmission Mains 
Hazard 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Length 
(km) 
Material 
Expected 
Nr of 
failures/yr 
Cumulative 
Nr of 
failures 
Expected 
Nr 1:x yr 
failures 
Population Likelihood Consequence L C Risk 
Burst in main from Sohar DP 
(IWPP) to Liwa Service Res 
600 19.2 Ductile Iron 1 1 1.5 75596 
One in one to 
five years 
Loss of supply to Shinas and 
Liwa 
4 16 64 
Burst in main from Liwa SR to 
Shinas IR 
600 15.8 Ductile Iron 1 1 0.8 50978 
More than one 
per year 
Loss of supply to Shinas 5 16 80 
Burst in main from Shinas IR to 
Shinas SR 
500 10.5 Ductile Iron 0 2 0.6 50978 
More than one 
per year 
Loss of supply to Shinas 5 16 80 
Burst in main from Sohar DP 
(IWPP) to Sohar IR &SR 
1200 18.8 Mild Steel 0 0 4.0 434739 
One in one to 
five years 
Loss of supply to Sohar, 
Saham, Al Khaburah,  and 
Suwayq 
4 16 64 
Burst in main from Sohar IR & SR 
to Saham SR 
1200 39.9 Mild Steel 1 1 1.3 280508 
One in one to 
five years 
Loss of supply to Saham, Al 
Khaburah,  and Suwayq 
4 16 64 
Burst in main from Saham SR to 
Al Khaburah SR 
1000 30.0 Mild Steel 0 1 0.9 151450 
More than one 
per year 
Loss of supply to Al Khaburah 5 16 80 
Burst in main from Al Khaburah 
SR to Suwayq SR 
900 44.9 Mild Steel 1 2 0.6 138122 
More than one 
per year 
Loss of supply to Suwayq 5 16 80 
Burst in main from Sohar DP 
(IWPP) to MPS1 Res 
700 30.7 Mild Steel 0 0 2.5 75023 
One in one to 
five years 
Loss of supply to Buraymi 4 16 64 
Burst in main from MPS1 Res to 
MPS2 Res 
700 13.9 Mild Steel 0 1 1.7 75023 
One in one to 
five years 
Loss of supply to Buraymi 4 16 64 
Burst in main from MPS2 Res to 
Buraymi IR 
700 24.9 Mild Steel 0 1 1.1 75023 
One in one to 
five years 
Loss of supply to Buraymi 4 16 64 
Burst in main from Buraymi IR to 
Buraymi SR 
600 15.5 Ductile Iron 1 1 0.7 75023 
More than one 
per year 
Loss of supply to Buraymi 5 16 80 
Burst in main from Buraymi IR to 
Buraymi SR 
500 23.5 Ductile Iron 1 2 0.4 75023 
More than one 
per year 
Loss of supply to Buraymi 5 16 80 
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Table D.2 - Cont.: Risks to the North Batinah and Buraymi Water Supply System 
Pumping Stations 
Hazard Standby Arrangement 
Operational Capacity 
(m3/d) 
Likelihood (L) Consequence L C Risk 
Pump failure - Sohar to Shinas PS 2 operational + 1 standby 26112 One in one to five years Loss of supply to Shinas and Liwa 4 16 64 
Loss of power - Sohar to Shinas PS None 26112 One in one to five years Disruption of supply to Shinas and Liwa 4 16 64 
Failure of control systems - Sohar to Shinas PS - 26112 One in one to five years Disruption of supply to Shinas and Liwa 4 16 64 
Pump failure - Sohar DP to Sohar IR PS 3 operational + 1 standby 147744 One in one to five years 
Loss of supply to Sohar, Saham, Al Khaburah,  and 
Suwayq 
4 16 64 
Loss of power - Sohar DP to Sohar IR PS None 147744 More than one per year 
Disruption of supply to Sohar, Saham, Al 
Khaburah,Suwayq 
5 16 80 
Failure of control systems - Sohar DP to Sohar 
IR PS 
- 147744 One in one to five years 
Disruption of supply to Sohar, Saham, Al Khaburah, and 
Suwayq 
4 16 64 
Pump failure - Mountain PS1 2 operational + 1 standby 34896 One in one to five years Loss of supply to Buraymi 4 16 64 
Loss of power - Mountain PS1 None 34896 More than one per year Disruption of supply to Buraymi 5 16 80 
Failure of control systems - Mountain PS1 - 34896 One in one to five years Disruption of supply to Buraymi 4 16 64 
Pump failure - Mountain PS2 2 operational + 1 standby 34896 One in one to five years Loss of supply to Buraymi 4 16 64 
Loss of power - Mountain PS2 None 34896 More than one per year Disruption of supply to Buraymi 5 16 80 
Failure of control systems - Mountain PS2 - 34896 One in one to five years Disruption of supply to Buraymi 4 8 32 
Loss of Supply from Desalination Plant 
Hazard 
Operational 
Capacity (m3/d) 
Average Daily 
Flow (m3/d) 
Storage at 
Desalination Plant 
(m3) 
Storage (hours of 
supply capacity) 
Potential loss of Supply 
(m3) 
Likelihood Consequence L C Risk 
Mini Max. 
     
Loss of Supply from Sohar DP 151000 102727 135000 21.5 0 0 One in one to five years 
< 12 hours partial 
reduction in treated 
water production 
(>34% of design 
output) 
4 1 4 
Loss of Supply from Sohar DP 151000 102727 135000 21.5 0 0 One in one to five years 
<12 hours loss of 
treated water 
production 
4 2 8 
Loss of Supply from Sohar DP 151000 102727 135000 21.5 0 113612 One in one to five years 
12– 48 hours loss of 
treated water 
production 
4 4 16 
Loss of Supply from Sohar DP 151000 102727 135000 21.5 113611.6 627245 One in one to five years 
2 – 7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
4 8 32 
Loss of Supply from Sohar DP 151000 102727 135000 21.5 627244.8 >>627245 One in five to twenty years 
>7 days loss of 
treated water 
production 
3 16 48 
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D.3 As Sharqiya Transmission System  
1) Transmission Mains:  
There is a medium risk in the system should a burst occur along the length of 
transmission mains in the Sharqiyah Region. The long single transmission main will 
always be at risk from failure and it will be necessary to ensure provision of supplies 
whilst the main is repaired. Currently there is sufficient storage available however in 
the reservoirs to meet the average demand in the event of a burst. 
 
2) Pumping Stations:  
The pumping stations all have adequate standby and provided this standby capacity is 
maintained, there is a minimal risk of loss of supply to consumers due to failure of the 
pumps. The system has at least one day’s emergency storage throughout, which we 
expect to be adequate time to resolve any loss of power supply and control system 
failures. Only more prolonged outages are likely to affect consumers. 
 
3) Loss of Supply at Sur Desalination Plant:  
There is adequate storage in the system to cover for the loss of supply from the 
Sur desalination plant for up to 48 hours. 
 
4) Mitigating Measures:  
The risks associated with pipeline bursts and pump failures within the Ash Sharqiyah 
region is not high. Currently there is sufficient storage capacity within the system to 
cater for short term outages. In the event of longer term outages, increasing the 
capacity of storage will mitigate against loss of supply. This can be done either by 
increasing the volume of storage at the existing desalination plant or further 
downstream closer to the supply areas. 
The Ash Sharqiyah Region is an isolated zone where the only other source of supply 
is from the Sharqiyah Sands wellfields. An interconnection between Izki in Dakhliyah 
to Lizq may prove to be a possible economic solution to providing security of supply. 
The risks to Ash Sharqiyah water supply system are summarized in Table (D.3). 
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Table D.3: Risks to the As Sharqiya Water Supply System 
Pumping Stations 
Hazard Standby Arrangement 
Operational 
Capacity 
(m3/d) 
Likelihood (L) Consequence L C Risk 
Pump failure - Sur PS 4 operational + 2 standby 68640 One in one to five years Partial loss of supply to whole system 4 16 64 
Loss of power - Sur PS None 68640 More than one per year Loss of supply to whole system 5 16 80 
Control system None 68640 One in one to five years Loss of supply to whole system 4 16 64 
Pump failure - Al Fulayj PS 4 operational + 2 standby 68640 One in one to five years Partial loss of supply to whole system 4 16 64 
Loss of power - Al Fulayj PS None 68640 More than one per year 
Partial loss of supply to Bidiyah, Al Qabil, Ibra 
and Mudaybi 
5 16 80 
Control system None 68640 One in one to five years 
Loss of supply to Bidiyah, Al Qabil, Ibra and 
Mudaybi 
4 16 64 
Pump failure - Al Kamil PS 1 operational + 1 standby 7104 One in one to five years 
Partial loss of supply to Al Qabil, Ibra and 
Mudaybi 
4 16 64 
 
Transmission Mains 
Hazard 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Length 
(km) 
Material 
Expected 
Nr of 
failures/y
r 
Cumulativ
e Nr of 
failures 
Expected 
Nr 1:x yr 
failures 
Likelihood Consequence L C Risk 
Burst in main from Sur to Al Fulayj 914 19.5 Steel 0 0 4 
One in one to five 
years 
Loss of supply to whole system 4 16 64 
Burst in main from Al Fulayj to Ma'ayah 
Pass 
914 24.2 Steel 0 1 2 
One in one to five 
years 
Loss of supply to Bidiyah, Al 
Qabil, Ibra and Mudaybi 
4 16 64 
Burst in main from Ma'ayah Pass to Al 
Kamil 
914 22.7 Steel 0 1 1 
One in one to five 
years 
Loss of supply to Bidiyah, Al 
Qabil, Ibra and Mudaybi 
4 16 64 
Burst in main from Al Kamil to Shariq 800 52.0 Ductile Iron 1 2 1 
More than one per 
year 
Loss of supply to Al Qabil, Ibra 
and Mudaybi 
5 8 40 
Burst in main from Shariq to Al Qabil 700 21.2 Ductile Iron 0 2 1 
More than one per 
year 
Loss of supply to Ibra and 
Mudaybi 
5 8 40 
Burst in main from Al Qabil to Ibra 400 19.7 Ductile Iron 1 3 0 
More than one per 
year 
Loss of supply to Ibra 5 8 40 
Burst in main from Al Qabil to Mudaybi 600 18.5 Ductile Iron 1 2 0 
More than one per 
year 
Loss of supply to Mudaybi 5 8 40 
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Table D.3 - Cont.: Risks to the As Sharqiya Water Supply System 
Hazard Standby Arrangement 
Operational 
Capacity 
(m3/d) 
Likelihood (L) Consequence L C Risk 
Loss of power - Al Kamil 
PS 
None 7104 More than one per year Loss of supply to Al Qabil, Ibra and Mudaybi 5 8 40 
Control system None 7104 One in one to five years Loss of supply to Al Qabil, Ibra and Mudaybi 4 16 64 
Pump failure - Shariq PS 
2 operational + 2 standby 
 
20717 One in one to five years Partial loss of supply to Al Qabil, Ibra and Mudaybi 4 16 64 
Loss of power - Shariq PS - 20717 More than one per year Loss of supply to Al Qabil, Ibra and Mudaybi 5 8 40 
Control system None 68640 One in one to five years Loss of supply to Al Qabil, Ibra and Mudaybi 4 8 32 
Pump failure - Al Qabil 
PS to Ibra 
2 operational + 2 standby 5760 One in one to five years Partial loss of supply to Ibra 4 16 64 
Loss of power - Al Qabil 
PS  
5760 More than one per year Loss of supply to Al Qabil, Ibra and Mudaybi 5 8 40 
Control system None 5760 One in one to five years Loss of supply to Al Qabil, Ibra and Mudaybi 4 8 32 
Pump failure - Al Qabil 
PS to Mudaybi 
2 operational + 1 standby 16752 One in one to five years Partial loss of supply to Ibra 4 16 64 
Loss of power - Al Qabil 
PS  
16752 More than one per year Loss of supply to Ibra 5 8 40 
Control system None 16752 One in one to five years Loss of supply to Ibra 4 8 32 
Loss of Supply from Desalination Plant 
Hazard 
Operational 
Capacity 
(m3/d) 
Average 
Daily 
Flow 
(m3/d) 
Storage at 
Desalination 
Plant (m3) 
Storage 
(hours of 
supply 
capacity) 
Potential loss of Supply 
(m3) 
Likelihood Consequence L C Risk 
Mini Max. 
     
Loss of Supply from 
Sur DP 
80000 60868 164000 49.2 0 0 
One in one to 
five years 
< 12 hours partial reduction in treated 
water production (>34% of design 
output) 
4 1 4 
Loss of Supply from 
Sur DP 
80000 60868 164000 49.2 0 0 
One in one to 
five years 
<12 hours loss of treated water 
production 
4 1 4 
Loss of Supply from 
Sur DP 
80000 60868 164000 49.2 0 0 
One in one to 
five years 
12 – 48 hours loss of treated water 
production 
4 1 4 
Loss of Supply from 
Sur DP 
80000 60868 164000 49.2 0 262076 
One in one to 
five years 
2 – 7 days loss of treated water 
production 
4 16 64 
Loss of Supply from 
Sur DP 
80000 60868 164000 49.2 262076 >>262076 
One in five to 
twenty years 
>7 days loss of treated water production 3 16 48 
 
